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A transcription, translation and discussion of Book Five of the Dual Latin
Commentary of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy by the scholastic Pseudo-Thomas
Aquinas and the humanist Josse Bade is the focus of this study.
The commentary of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas possesses the scholastic
preoccupation with using ancient philosophy to aid understanding of Christian
doctrine. The commentary of Josse Bade embodies the humanist focus on the
importance of eloquence in written expression.
The findings of this study were that Josse Bade and Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas
were products of two different educational philosophies, yet they shared the same goal
of wanting to educate university students in a manner which they believed would best
facilitate pursuit of truth.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of Problem
The German tradition of commentaries on Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy
has received very little attention from scholars. 1 The source noted in the German
tradition is the commentary on De Consolation Philosophie which is attributed to
Saint Thomas Aquinas, hence the title Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas. However, very little
is known about Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas.2 Alastair Minnis explains that Pseudo
Thomas Aquinas was probably German and lived in the fifteenth century.3 There is
Palmer notes that Pierre Courcelle lists only Pseudo Thomas Aquinas as a
commentator for the German tradition. Nigel Palmer," The Latin and Vernacular in
the Northern European, Tradition of the De Consolatione Philosophie," Boethius:
His Life Thought and Influence. ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1981) 380. See Pierre Courcelle, La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition
litteraire antecedents et posterite de Boece, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967)
414.
1

Alastair Minnis, Nigel Palmer and Anthony Grafton are the three authors
who mention Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas. However, Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas is not
the main focus of any of these sources, and most of the information noted about
him is in footnotes of these sources. Alastair Minnis, "Aspects of the Medieval
French and English Traditions of the De Consolatione Philosophie," Boethius: His
Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981)
312-361. Anthony Grafton, "Epilogue: Boethius in the Renaissance," Boethius:
His Life, Thought and lnfluence,ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1981) 410-415.
2

3

Minnis cites H.F. Sebastion as the source for this information. Minnis 354.
1

2
scant information written about the actual contents of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas'
commentary, and much of what has been written is misleading.4
There is adequate information on Josse Bade (Jodocus Badius Ascensius) as a
printer in Lyons, but there is almost no mention of him as a commentator on texts.5
He is best known for his printing of famous author's works.6 He lived from 1462 to
1535.7 He was educated by the Brethren of the Common life at Ghent, which William

Palmer suggests that Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas' technique of beginning each
section of the commentary with a "literal paraphrase" betrays the school or
university context in which the work was written. Literal paraphrasing may
indicate the context of the work, but Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas does not always
begin each section in this way. He begins meter sections with a discussion of the
meter style and its possible originator. While Alastair Minnis notes that Pseudo
Thomas Aquinas was one of many commentators known for "narrative
elaboration", the definition he gives of this technique is not completely true of the
commentator's work. He does not give "case histories of exemplary individuals"
or "brief biographies of famous or infamous men, including the pagan rulers and
philosophers" in any part of the text other than the Proemium, where he discusses
the history of Boethius.
4

Nigel Palmer lists one work on Bade as a commentator. See P.G. Schmidt,
"Jodocus Badius Ascensius als Kommentator," in Der Kommentar in der
Renaissance, ed. A. Buck and 0. Herding (Boppard, 1975), 63-71. John Delaney
and James Tobin mention that Bade wrote "editions of the classics with his own
annotations," but note none of these specifically. "Badius,Jodocus," Dictionary of
Catholic Biography. by John J. Delaney, and James Edward Tobin (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday Company Inc., 1961) 91.
5

Delaney and Tobin note his life of Thomas a Kempis. Delaney and Tobin
91. Wallace Ferguson explains that Bade was a publisher of the works of Erasmus
for many years. Wallace K. Ferguson, "Annotations," The Correspondence of
Erasmus: Letters 142-297, 1501-1514, Vol. 2., trans. R. A. B. Myers and D. F. S.
Thomson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) 97.
6

7

Delaney and Tobin 91.

8

Estep suggests was most certainly the origins of his humanist thinking. He taught
Greek at Lyons and was a university professor at Paris, where he set up his printing
press around the year 1500. 9
The text itself is properly titled Commentum Duplex in Boetium De

Consolatione Philosophie cum Utriusq tabula.

The dual commentaries are De

Consolatione Philosophie which is "falsely attributed to Saint Thomas Aquinas" 10 and
De Disciplina Scholarium "generally attributed to Boethius." 11 The larger part of text
of the Dual Commentary on the Consolation of Boethius is by Pseudo-Thomas
Aquinas.

Bade's contribution is a running gloss on Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas'

8

Ferguson notes Bade's educational background. Ferguson 97. William
Estep explains that the Brethren of the Common Life were the "transmission lines
of Northern Humanist learning. The Brethren also educated Agricola, Mutian,
Erasmus and Luther. William R. Estep, Renaissance and Reformation, (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986) 45. However, R.R.
Post's does not hold this view. He states: "...despite their merits in training and
supplementing the education of small groups of students with a particular aim
within their hostels, the Brothers were essentially pastors and not teachers in the
late medieval and first Humanist schools. Their main task was the pastoral care of
the schoolboys and nuns. Only in exceptional cases and in a few cities did they
introduce their charges to the humanistic culture, and here too they only developed
after the new concepts had already gained hold in the schools. R.R. Post, The
Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism, (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1968) 630.
9

Delaney and Tobin 91.

°The British Museum's General Catalog of Printed Books offers this
information in its catalog entry number IB42063. British Museum, Department of
Printed Books, General Catalogue of Printed Books: Philolitho2raphic edition to
1955 (London: Trustees of the British Museum).
1

Nigel Palmer states this information about Boethius being assumed as De
Disciplina Scholarium, which is a thirteenth century text.
11

3

4
commentary. Anthony Grafton suggests that Bade's gloss "drew upon the proper
ancient and humanist sources to refute Ps.-Aquinas point by point. "12 However, this
is not the case. There are no instances of point by point refutation by Bade; his few
refutations are in the Proemium, concerning Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas' information on
the life of Boethius. Furthermore, current scholarship assumes a Thomist tradition
behind the commentary of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas, but offers no justification for this
other than that it has been attributed to Aquinas. 13
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is primarily an investigation of the scholastic and
humanist views as they are applied here to Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy.
After preparing a literature review on scholasticism, humanism and the tradition of the

Consolation of Philosophy, I was better able to understand the educational philosophies
of scholasticism to which Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas adheres and of humanism to which
Josse Bade adheres.

Understanding these philosophies allowed for a more

conscientious analysis of their comments.

12

Grafton 413.

Nigel Palmer explains that the first printing of this text was in Northern
Europe by Anton Koberger at Nurnberg in 1473. It was a bilingual edition which
contained a "fairly elementary Latin commentary attributed to Ps.Aquinas. Palmer
363. Anthony Grafton states that Ascensius was teaching in Lyons in 1498 when he
wrote the running gloss to the commentary attributed to Aquinas.
13

5
Organization of Study
The text utilized for this study is taken from the commentary on Book Five for
its discussion of eternity as well as the discussion of the compatibility of divine
providence with free will.

The sections are set of by centered titles, and the

commentaries of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas are distinguished by name and underlined.
The transcription was prepared with the aid of Adriano Cappelli' s Lexicon

abbreviaturarum. The translation was prepared with the aid of Charlton T. Lewis' A
Latin Dictionary.

The actual text of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy

is

represented in the transcription and translation inside quotation marks. At first the
method may seem confusing, but it was necessary in order to separate the actual words
of Boethius from the paraphrases and comments of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Bade.

CHAPTER II
TRANSCRIPTION OF BOOK FIVE
Incipit Prosa Prima Libri Quinti
Sanctus Thomas
"Dixerat orationis quern cursum... " hie incipit quintus liber Boethius De

Consolatione Philosophie cuius hec est prima prosa in qua philosophia studet solvere
quedam dubia suam determinationem consequentia de fato et providentia. Videtur
enim ex dictis que casus non sit: quia si omnia provisa ita que nihil eveniat preter
ordinem divine providentie videtur que nihil casualiter evenit: quare casus importat
eventum in opinatum. Item videtur ex dictis que liberum arbitrium non sit, quare
omnia disponuntur secundum ordinem fatalis necessitatis. Liberum aut arbitrium
necessitatem excludit. Videtur ergo si ponitur providentia et fatum que omnino
excludatur liberum arbitrium. Philosophia ergo in presenti libro inquirit utrum casus
sit et quid sit. et inquirit utrum liberum arbitrium sit ponendo argumenta quibus
liberum arbitrium �um providentia divina non videtur posse stare. Post hoc ponit
falsam solutionem quorundam quam improbat et ponit propriam quam rationibus
confirmat, et de eternitate determinat. Et alia plura sicut patebit. Et dividitur iste
liber in undecim partes quare sex sunt prose et quinque metra, eiusque partes et que
6

7
in ipsis determinantur patebunt in proccessu libri. In prima prosa determinat de casu.
Et primo Boetius tangit acta Philosophie commendans eius exhortationem factam et
movet questionem de casu. Secundo Philosophia excusat se ab eius determinatione.
Et Boethius illam excusationem removet. Tertio Philosophia determinat de casu.
Secunda ibi. Tum illa festino. Tertia ibi. Tum illa morem. Primo <licit. Philosophia
dixerat hec predicta: et vertebat cursum orationis id est sermonis ad tractanda quedam
alia atque expedienda.

"tune ego" Boethius inquam, "O Philosophia recta est

exhortatio tua et prorsus est dignissima auctoritate: sed quod tu dudum dixisti" sexta
prosa quarti libri: "questionem de providentia implictatam esse pluribus aliis," scilicet
questionibus. "Ergo experior re" id est realiter. "Quero enim an arbitrere" id est
arbitreris casum omnino aliquid supple in rerum natura: et quidnam arbitreris esse
casum supple in rerum natura.
Nota per hoc que <licit Boetius dixerat innuit philosophia iam expedivisse que
ad sui speculationem spectabant, et ita determinasse principalem huius libri
intentionem, et Philosophia vertebat cursum orationis id est orationem currentem, quia
oratio philosophie non impediebatur ignorantia docentis, nee tarditate discentis. Hane
orationem vertebat ad quedam alia tractanda. Quae autem fuerunt illa Boetius non
exprimit quare forsitam sua opinione nimis erant consideranda, vel forsitam quantum
tum ad propositum extranea. Notandum que <licit exhortationem Philosophie fuisse
rectam, quare Philosophia hortatur ad virtutes et ad contemptum fortuitorum. Talis
autem exhortatio quern sit ad bonum prosequendum et ad malum fugiendum recta est.
Et <licit exhortationem Philosophie esse dignissimam auctoritate: quare quod a

8
sapientibus dicitur auctoritate sapientis <lignum reputatur.
"Tum illa festino" inquit, hie philosphia excusat se de huius opinionis vel
questionis determinatione, et Boetius illam excusationem removet <licit Philosophia
inquit. "Ego festino absolverere" id est perficere "debitum promissionis et aperire tibi
viam qua revebaris ad patriam. Hee autem que tu queris de casu etsi pro quern vis
sunt per utilia cognitu" id est cognitione "tamen paulisper aversa sunt tramite" id est
a via nostri propositi et <licit "paulisper, quare non sunt totaliter aversa sed
aliquantulum incidant permissa. Et est verendum" id est timendum "ne tu fatigatus
devii id est questionibus extraneis non possis sussicere ad emetiendum" id est
transeundum "rectum iter" <licit Boetius, "O philosophia ne illud vereare" id est ne
timeas, "quare hoc fuerit mihi loco quietis agnoscere ea quibus maxime delector et
cum omne latus" id est ommis constantia tue disputationis "mihi constiterit fide
indubitata: nihil est quod ambigatur de sequentibus."
Notandum que di. qua via reverbaris patriam. Hie patriam vocat beatitudinem
quam prius invenire docuit. Illa autem per que homo pervenit ad ipsam sunt virtutes
de quibus Boetius intendebat agere -- non in hoc libro sed in ultimis libris musice sue
agendo de musica humana. Intentionem autem suam non complevit, quare a Rege
Theodorice morte preventus fuit. Tum illa "mortem" inquit, hie philosophia determinat
de casu soluendo permissas causas et questiones. Primo soluit primam. An casus sit.
Secundo secundam, "Quid sit casus" ibi licet igitur. Primo ostendit quid significetur
per nomen casus, ponendo opinionem quorundam. secundo improbat illam opinionem,
ibi, "Quis enim."

Primo distinctione "O Boetius ego geram tibi morem id

9
estconfirmabo me voluntati tue. Et simul sic est exorsa id est sic incepit, "si aliquis
diffiniat quo ad nomen dicens casum e contra eventum productum motu temerario" id
est improviso: et nulla contexione causarum. Ego Philosophia confirmo casum sic
omnino nihil esse. "Et decerno" id est iudico "vocem casus prorsus esse in anem
propter significationem rei subiecte, sicut hec vox ·chimera inanis est."
Nota que quern vis questio si est precedit quid est secundum que questio quid
est querit de quid ditate rei. Quare quid est rei nulli debetur nisi enti tamen questio
quid est querens de quod quid est nominis est prima cognitio. Et ideo ex quo quid est
nominis oportet scire de aliquo si est. Propter hoc philosophia ad querendum de casu
utrum sit vel non accipit quod quid est, quod significat per nomen et <licit: "Si aliqui
dicunt casum esse eventum temerarium sine omni causa productum, ego video vocum
casus esse inanem tanquam sibi nihil correspondeat in re.
"Quis enim coercente..." hie Philosophia improbat opinionem istam ostendens
casum nihil esse secundum earn.

Secundo solvit secundum rei veritatem ibi,

"Arstoteles meus." Primo ponit unam rationem. Secundo ilam, ibi, "Nam nihil."
Antiqui dicebant que casus est eventus temerarius id est improvisus. Contra hoc arguit
philosophia sic. Ubicumque omnia sunt provisa ibi nihil est temerarium, sed omnia que
sunt: provisa sunt a deo. Ergo inter ea quern sunt nihil est temerarius. Hane rationem
breviter innuit in littera di, "Quis enim locus ullus potest esse reliquus" id est relictus
teritati id est improvisioni deo coercente cuncta in ordinem secundum provisum, quasi
diceret nullus.
Notandum que omnia a deo sunt provisa: cuius ratio est. Quocumque deus est

10
causa. Omnia talia provisa sunt a deo, sed deus est causa omnis entis, ergo omnia
entia a deo sunt provisa. Que autem deus sit causa omnis entis patet quare ab ipso
dependet celum et tota natura, ut patem ex duodecimo metaphisice.
"Nam nihil ex nihilo existere..." hie ponit aliam rationem phantem que casus
non potest esse sine omni causa productus sicut dicebant antiqui. Et arguit sit, "Quod
est ex nihilo nihil est. Secundum quod est ex nulla causa ex nihilo est. Ergo quod ex
nulla causa est nihil est. Sed secundum antiquios casus est ex nulla causa, quia est
productus sine ommni connexione causarum. Ergo casus nihil est. unde <licit in
littera: "Vera sententia est cui nemo unque veterum refragatus est," id est contradixit
"scilicet ex nihilo nihil existere: queque illi antiqui illam propositionem ex nihilo nihil
existere iecerint," id est posuerint, quasi quoddam fundamentum non de operante
principio scilicet de deo creatore, quare ille ex nihilo aliquid fecit. Sed intellexerunt
hoc de materiali subiecto id est de tota natura fundata in materia. Et exponit seipsum
distinctione "hoc est de natura omnium rationum nunc" id est de materia "que est
subiectum formarum naturalium. Sed si aliquid oriatur ex nullis causis, id videtur esse
ortum ex nihilo. Sed hoc fieri nequit, ut aliquid oriatur ex nihilo. Ergo non est
possibile casum esse huiusmodi," id est talem qualem pauloante diffinivimus.
Secundum antiquos: que sit eventus temerarius sine connexione causarum.
"Quid," ergo "dicendum est de casu" querit Boetius. "Est ne nihil in rerum
natura quod iure possit appellari casus vel fortuitum, vvel est aliquid tametsi pro
quamvis lateat vulgus cui ista vocabula conveniant." Notandum que hec propositio ex
nihilo nihil existere est vera in comparatione ad causam particularem que in sua actione

11
presupponit materiam. Tam.en in comparatione ad causam universalem que est causa
totius entis non est vera, unde diximus deum omnia creasse ex nihilo et fide tenemus.
Sed antiqui de isto modo productionis per creationem non loquebantur sed primo
modo. Unde Aristoteles primo Phisicorum, "Impossibile est aliquid fieri ex his que
non sunt."

In hac enim opinione conveniunt ommnes qui de natura sentiunt.

"Aristoteles meus inquit in phisicis..." hie Philosophia solvit questionem de casu, et
primo ostendit earn esse solutam ab Aristotele, et ostendit modum eius. Secundo
declarat que casus licet non habeat causas per se, habet tam.en causas per accidens, ibi,
"Hee sunt igitur..." Primo <licit "Aristoteles meus," id est doctrina mea nutritus et
deditus "diffinivit casum in phisicis," id est in secundo phisicorum breve ratione et
propinqua veris, id est veritati. Et querit Boetius, "Quoniam inquam modo." Dicit
Philosophia, "Quotiens aliquid geritur," id est fit "gratia cuiuspiam rei," id est alicuius
rei et aliud "obtingit quibusdam de causis que quod intendebatur illud vocatur casus,
ut si aliquis causa colendi agrifodiens humum inveniat pondus auri defossum, hec
inventio auri creditur fortuito," id est a casu accidisse. "Verum pro sed talis eventus
casualis non est de nihilo," id est de nulla causa "sicut dicebat diffinitio antiquorum.
Nam eventus casualis habet proprias causas quarum concursus et in opinatus et
improvisus supple ab eo qui aliquid fecit causa alterius rei videbitur operatus esse
casum, nisi enim cultor agri foderet humum que supple fossio est una causa inventionis
auri, et nisi eo loci id est loco depositor obruisset," id est abscondisset "pecuniam
suam, que est alia causa inventonis auri, aurum non esset inventum."
Nota que causa secundum Aristoteles est quoniam aliquid sit propter aliquem

12
finern ut fossio agri propter serninationern. Si aliquid aliud evenit ex quibusdarn causis
preter hoc quod intendebatur hoc est casus, ut inventio thesauri casualis est que, non
intendebatur a fossore agri. Ex quo patet que inventio thesauri est casualis, non ideo
que non est previsa a deo, sed quare non est provisa ab hornine. Et ita casus nihil est
quo ad deurn sed est aliquid quo ad horninern preter cuius intentionern et previsionern
evenit. "Ne sunt igitur fortuiti cause cornpendii... " hie ostendit philosophia que casus
non habet causas per se, sed per accidens dicit, "Ne igitur sunt cause fortuiti
compendii," id est fortuiti eventus "quod fortuiturn compendium evenit ex causis obviis
et confluientibus non ex intentione gerentis. Non enirn ille qui aurum obruit: vel qui
agrurn exercuit," id est fodid intendit "ut ea pecunia reperiretur sed ut dixi preter
gerentis intentionem evenit hunc fodere quo ille obruit pecuniam, et occurrit supple
inventio pecunie."
Nota que causa efficiens non agitur nisi moveatur a fine. Finis autern non
movet nisi secundum que est in intentione. Et ideo respectu illius effectus que est in
intentione agens est causa per se. Si aliquid contingat in actione preter intentionem
agentis illiis agens est causa per accidens et sic casus.

Quare contingit preter

intentonern agentis non habet causarn agentem per se sed per accidens. "Licet igitur
diffinire..." hie philosophia solvit secundam questionern ostendendo quid sit casus.
Concludit igitur diffinitionem eius ex iarn dictis dicens, "Licet igitur diffinire casum
esse eventum in opinaturn ex causis confluentibus in his que geruntur ob aliquid aliud. "
Tune ostendit quoniam effectus casualis cadit ab ordine providentie. Ducturn est enirn
que casus provenit ex causis confluentibus. Que autem cause confluant hoc provenit
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ex ordine providentie. unum elistinctione Causas "vero concurrere et confluere facit
iste ordo super fatalis procedens inevitabili connexione scilicet causarum,qui
descendens super ordo de fonte providentie cuncta elisponit suis temporibus et locis.
Nota que diffinitio casus est bona: quia per earn casus elistinguitur ab aliis. Per
hoc quod elicitur casus est eventus in opinata excluelitur effectus necessario eveniens,
vel ut frequenter sicut solem oriri vel hominem nasci cum quinque eligitis in una manu
talia non eveniunt casualiter et inopinate, per hoc. Quod elicitur ex confluentibus
causis excluditur casus primo modo elictus: qui secundum antiquos ponebatur produci
ex nulla connexione causarum. Per hoc autem quod elicitur in his que geruntur ob
aliquid aliud, per hoc excluditur a casu casualitas per se. Casus enim et fortuna sunt
cause per accidens: et fiunt preter intentionem agentis.
Ascensius
Dixerat, orationisque cursum ad alia quedam tractanda et expeelienda vertebat.
Dixerat "recte" <licit quare qui perorant id est finem orationis faciunt. Dicunt in fine
"dixi" quare ergo Philosophia materiam acceptam quodammodo fini erat sese ad alia
vertens, bene elicit auctor ex persona sua. Dixerat supple Philosophia, et cursum
orationis, hoc quoque recte elicit. Quare debet oratio non lente ingreeli neque violate,
sed currere id est medio modo sese inter prosam id est locutionem prorsus solutam et
metrum poematis haberere. Implicatam esse, sepius implicitam, leges que implicitam:
sed neutrum caret auctoritate. Morem geram id est votis tuis annuam. Est enim is
moriger et morem gerit alteri, qui morem. Et institutum vite sic gerit ut alteri placeat.
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Simulque sic exorsa est id est incepit loqui. Venit enim ab exordior. non itaque
legendum est exorta vel exhorta ut scriptum in quibus inveni. Cetera dilucida sunt.
Metrum Primum Quinti Libri
Sanctus Thomas
"Rupis achemenie scopulis... " istud est primum metrum istius quinti quod
dicitur metrum elegiacum, et primum metrum est dactylicum hexametrum. Secundum
est anapesti cum pentha metrum vel dactylicum pentametrum, in quo Philosophia
ostendit quomodo eventus casualis se habet ad providentiam divinam. Est autem
materia exempli que Tigris et Eufrates sunt duo fluvii ab eodem fonte procedentes qui
postea ab invicem dividuntur. Etsi iterum concurrant necesse est naves et alia que per
ista fluvia deferuntur concurrere, qui, quidem concursus provenit in quantum reguntur
decursu istorum fluviorum. Et tamen est preter intentonem istorum qui regunt naves.
Eodem modo concursus causarum casualis quemvis sit preter intentionem ipsorum
agentium.

Tamen concurrunt secundum defluxum ordinis fatalis ex regimine

providentie. Et quevis nobis ignorantibus ordinem providentie videatur aliquid casuale
et fortuitum, tamen in comparatione ad deum omnia sunt ordinata et provisa. Unum
<licit id est litera Tigris et eufrayes resolvunt sese uno fonte scopulis id est
concavitatibus rupis achemenie id est montis perthie, ubi scilicet in perthia fugax pugna
versa spicula. lid est sagittas figit pectoribus sequentum. Est enim consuetudo
perthorum que fugiendo pugnant sagittando a tergo contra insequentes. Et mox id est
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post pervum spactum Tigris et Eufrates dissociantur adiunctis aquis super aliis, et si
dicti fluvii iterum coeant id est conveniant et revocentur in unum cursum confluat id
est oportet confluem aliud. Quod unda alterni vadi id est utriusque fluminis trahit id
est secum ducit. Et conveniant puppes et trunci vulsi id est eradicati flumine flumine
idest per flumen. Et unda mixta id est confluens implicet id est implicabit fortuitos
modos quia unda faciet concurrere fortuitu naves et truncos.
Quos tamen vagos casus id est casualis eventus regit ipsa declinia terre id est
deressio terre dans viam fluvio. Et defluus ordo lapsi gurgitis id est currentis aque
regit illos vagos cursus. Et ita est de eventu casuali respectu providentie. Unum
distinctione fors id est casus vel fortuna que videtur fluitare permissis habenis id est
sine regimine, illa patit frenos id est regimina. Et meat id est transit ipsa lege id est
per ipsam legem divine providentie.
Notandum que scribitur in Genesi: Tigris et Eufrates sunt flumina quorumm
ortus est in Paradiso. Sed Hieronymus auctoritate Salustii, que ortus Tigris et Eufratis
demonstrantur in Armenia id est in Perthia, cui videtur Boethius consentire. Beatus
autem Augustinus super Genesis ad litteram istam contrarietatem concordat elicit,
"Illud contingit in istis fluminbus quod in aliis experimur scilicet que aliquando
absorbentur a terra et iterum oriuntur, et quare hec sepe possunt contingere, ideo de
ortu ipsorum fluviorum diversa possunt dici. Quando enim Moyses elicit in Genesi que
oriantur in Paradiso potest intelligi de prima origine eorum. Sed que dicitur ab aliis
que alihi oriantur, potest intelligi de ortu eorum secundario quotiendunt.
Notandum que parthia est regio quendam que alio nomine dicitur Armenia.

Unum dicitur homines Parthi qui vincunt hostes suos fugiendo sagittas a tergo
mittendo, et sic amor vincendus est fugiendo. Unde poeta <licit, "Qua specie mmartis
cedit victoria Parthis." Cipris ea parte simili quoque vincitur arte. Cypris id est Venus
que colebatur in Cypro. Et pauper Henricus, "Proscribas igitur gladiis et fustibus
ipsum super amorem. Et fugiendo fuga que fuga sola fugat."
Ascensius
"Rupis Achemenie" et cetera, carmen est elegiacum sicut primum Primi Libri.
Cuius sententie satis bene in superiori commento enodate sunt. Achemenes fuit teste
Herodoto libro Hystoria iiii, primus Persarum rex a quo postea reges omnes Persie
usque ad Darium descenderunt. Dicitur ergo hie Achemenia rupes id est Parthica que
est in Persia vel in Perside. Nam et Persis et Persia Parthorum regio denominatur et
Parthia.

Quod autem eum modum fugiendi et per fugam stimulatum hostem

insequentem sagittis petendi habent multi docent. Unum Virgilius iii Georgicus,
"Fidentem que fuga Parthum versis que sagattis" et cetera, ad cuius imitaionem hie
<licit versa spicula. Nam ly versa non recte adiiceretur ly pugna. vitio sum enim esset
dicere. Pugna fugax versa. Duo enim adiectiva plena non patitur Latina lingua sine
coniunctione media. Ordo igitur est: Tigris et Eufrates resolvunt se uno fonte in
scopulos rupis Achemenie, id est Parthice. Ubi pugna fugax scilicet parthorum figit
spiculaversa id est obversa in pectoribus sequentum id est in sequentium hostium.
Dicuntur autem parthi ipsorum lingua ut docet lustinus. exules. Quia exules
veniebant ex Scythia Orientali. Habent que sermonem mixtum ex Scythico et Medo.
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Omnes equitare et sagittare magna industria docent liberos suos. Auri autem et argenti
nullus ipsis olim usus erat nisi in armis. Habent plures uxores, et nulla delicta aut
peccata gravius puniunt qua adulteria. Habent et alia instituta que nihil ad presens
faciunt. Tigris a velocitate seu a sagitta dictus fluvius est armenie: sed sepe in lacus
recipitur et nonnunque occultatur. Unde Seneca in Troade. "Et qui renatum prorsus
excipiens diem. Templum rubente Tigrim immmiscet freto." Quod autem apud Parthos
sit ostendit illud bucolicum. Aut ararim Tarthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim. Terre
declivia scilicet declivitas. Sors patitur frenos, legitur et quidem melius fors id est
fortuna vel casus.
Prosa Secunda Quinti Libri
Sanctus Thomas
"'Animadverto' inquam'" hie incipit secunda prosa huinus quinti in qua incipit
determinare de convenientia liberi arbitrii ad providentiam divinam. Et primo querit
an liberum arbitrium possit stare cum providentia divina, et Philosophia probat liberum
arbitrium esse. Secundo ostendit quomodo diversificatur in diversis. Et tertio ostendit
actus liberari arbitrii cadere sub providentia divina. Secunda ibi, "Sed hanc." Tertia
ibi, "Que tamen." Primo dicit "Animadverto inquam" id est cognosco "quoniam casus
stat cum providentia, ita consentio sicut dixisti," et querit Boetius, "Est ne ulla libertas
arbitrii in hac ferie causarum sibi herentium, an fatalis cathena," id est fatalis
necessitas "constringit motus," id est affectus "humanorum animorum." Tune
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Philosophia probat liberum arbitrium esse dicens, libertas arbitrii est non obstante
predicta connexione causarum, "neque enim fuerit," id est esse poterit, "ulla rationalis
natura quin libertas arbitrii" eidem assit et accipitur natura large pro omni illo quod
habet cognitonem intellectivam. Probat autem que omni nature rationali insit liberum
arbitrium dicens, "Illud quod potest naturaliter uti ratione hoc habet iudicium quo
discernat unum quodque, igitur per se dignoscit," id est discernit "fugienda et optanda.
Quod autem quis iudicat optandum id petit" id est prosequitur "et refugit illud quod
estimat esse fugiendum. quare quibus inest ratio illis in est libertas volendi et nolendi."
Potest ergo ratio sic formari. Omne quod uti ratione habet iudicum cognoscendi
fugienda et optanda. Sed quod quisque iudicat optandum prosequitur et quod iudicat
fugiendum hoc refugit. Ergo omne quod potest uti ratione habet libertatem volendi et
nolendi.
Notandum que <licit, "Illud quod utitur ratione habet iudicium quo discernat
unum quodque." Hoc <licit ad differentiam iudicii naturalis quod est brutis quo non
iudicatur unum quodque agendum, sed aliquod particulare. Sicut ovis non iudicat de
quolibet fugiendo, sed tantum de lupo. Et apes non habent industriam ad faciendum
aliquod opus nisi ad favos mellis. Sed iudicium rationis est de quolibet que aguntur.
Notandum que <licit "habens rationis iudicium per se iudicat prosequendum vel
fugiendum. ". Licet enim bruta quodammodo cognoscant fugienda vel prosequenda
non tamen per se, quia non sunt causa iudicii. Homo autem non solum cognoscit
finem et ordinata in finem sed cognoscit ea universaliter vel per modum collationis vel
per mod si sillogisticum,etiam homo suum iudicium iudicat et discernit, quare
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intellectus est virtus conversa supra se.
"Sed hanc ..." hie ostendit Philosophia quoniarn liberum arbitrium diversificatur
in diversis scilicet in angelis et hominibus distinctione hanc scilicet libertatem arbitrii.
Non constituo esse equam id est equalem in omnibus, quare maior est in substantiis
divinis quern in hominibus. "Nam subernis et divinis substatiis inest perspicax
iudicium, id est infallibile iudicium: et in est eis incorrupta volantas," id est inflexibilis
ad malum. Et in eis est presto id est parata efficax potestas optatorum. Quare non est
in eis impedimentum executionis. "Humanas vero animas necesse est esse liberiores
quoniam conservant se in speculatione divine mentis. Minus vero libere sunt cum
dilabuntur ad corpora" id est aliud curam rerum corpalium, et ad hunc minus libere
sunt cum colligantur terrenis artubus id est affectibus quibus minus resistere possunt
passionibus insurgentibus. "Extrema vero" id est maxima est "servitus" animarum
quasi dedit eviciis ceciderint a possessione proprie rationis que regi id est dirigi
debeant in agendo. "Nam ubi," id est post que anime "deiecerint oculos" rationis
intellectus "a luce summe veritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa," id est ad terrena et
carnalia "mox caligantur," id est obscurantur "nube inscitie," id est ignorantie "et
turbantur perniciosis affectibus," id est passionibus "quibus accedendo et consentiendo
adiuvant," id est augmentant "servitutem quam sibi invexere," id est induxerunt. et
anime viciosorum "sunt quodam modo captive propria libertate."
Notandum que liberum arbitrum est libertas iudicandi et etequendi res. Vel
secundum Boetius super primo periarmenias, liberum arbitrium est de voluntate
iudicium animi nullo extrinseco aut violenter cogente aut violenter impediente, nullo

cogente ad faciendum quod displicet: nullo impediente ne fiat quod placet. Notandum
que liberum arbitrium in duobus consistit, et in libertate iudicandi et in libertate ex
equendi iudicata. Primum scilicet libertatem iudicandi impedit ignorantia, sed
libertatem ex equendi impedit impotentia executionis et corruptio voluntatis. Quinque
enim possumus bonum perficere, tamen voluntate corrupta vicio non perficimus. In
substantiis autem separatis non est ignorantia iudicandi nee impotentia perficiendi nee
corruptio voluntatis. Ergo in eis est maxima libertas arbitrii. Intelligentie enim in
nullo falluntur. Ergo habent prospicax iudicium, et nunque volunt nisi bonum. Ergo
in est eis incorrupta voluntas et possunt perficere quicquid desiderant. Igitur in eis est
efficaxere pretans optatorum.
Notandum que quidam dixerunt fuisse de intentione Platonis; animas humanas
simul esse creatas in celo et postea descendere in corpora et in eis detineri tanquam in
vinculis. Secundum illos gradus libertatis animarum humanarum quas ponit in littera
sic distinguitur. Scilicetque anime cum sint in celo create in contemplatione divine
mentis, sunt maxime libere. Cum antem iam sint colligate corporibus adhunc sunt
minus libere. Sed minima libertas est in eis quoniam subduntur viciis. Ista tamen
expositio non tenet secundum veritatem. Ideo aliter exponitur que illas animas necesse
est esse liberiores que contemplationi divine inserviunt ,ut anime virtuosorum
contemplativorum quorum conversatio in celis est. Ille autem sunt minus libere que
dilabuntur ad corpora id est que descendunt ad curam rerum temporalium,sicut sunt
practici qui negociantur circa bona temporalia ad communem utilitatem dispensando.
Ad hue minus libere sunt anime que terrenis artubus colligantur id est que descendunt
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ad curandum proprium corpus et propriam utilitatem. Mini.me autem libere sunt que
subdite viciis rationem amittunt. Viciosus enim non unius tamen domini est servus,
sed tot dominorum quot viciorum secundum Augustinus.
"Que tamen ille..." hie ostendit philosophia quoniam actus liberi arbitrii cadunt
sub providentia divina, quare propter hoc que divina cognitio se extendit ad omnia
dicens, "que omnia dicta quo ad diversos gradus libertatis et quo ad omnes actus inde
provenientes cernit ille intuitus providient� divine cuncta prospiciens," et queque
predestinata disponit suis meritis reddendo bonis bona et malis mala. Et hoc confirmat
auctoritate Greca que sonat in Latino. "Omnia videt deus, et omnia audit." Vel
secundum alios sonat. "Deus illustrat omnia Clarius que sol."
Notandum que licet divina providentia ab eterno omnia prospexit, non tamen
propter hoc necessitatur liberum arbitrium ad faciendum bonum vel malum. Quia
secundum Aristoteles iii Ethicorum, "Homo est dominus suarum operationem a
principio usque ad finem." Et ergo secundum merita operationum liberi arbitrii recipit
penam vel premium.

Ascensius
'"Anirnaadverto' inquam"' et cetera. Animaadverto id est considero quasi animum
ad id verto et applico. Sed in hac herentium de libertate arbitrii -- non solum apud
theologos nostros, sed etiam apud veteres philosophos magna sernper fuit disputatio.
Unde Aulus Gelius libro vi.c.ii. fatum inquit Chrysippus Stoice princeps philosophie sic
diffinit, "Fatum est sempterna quedam et indeclinabilis fories rerum, et catena
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voluens semet ipsa sese et implicans per eternos consequentie ordines ex quibus opta
connexaque est." Aliarum autem opinionum disciplinarumque auctores huic
diffinitiioni ita obstrepunt. Si Chryssippus inquiunt fato putat omnia moveri ac regi nee
declinari transcendique posse agmina fati et volumina, peccata quoque hominem et
delicta non subsistenda neque condicenda sunt ipsis voluntatibusque eorum, sed
necessitati cuidam et instantie que oriter ex fato. Omnium umque rerum domina et
arbitrata per quam necesse sit fieri quicquid futurum est. Et propterea nocentium penas
legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt sed fato
trabuntur. Contra ea Chrysippus tenuitur multa et argute disserit que super ea scripsit.
Sententia huiusmodi est, "Quamque ita sit," inquit "ut ratione principali quadam
necessario coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia." lngenia tamen ipsa mentium
urnarum perinde sunt sato obnioxia ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. Nam si
sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliter que ficta, omnem illam vim que de fato
extrinsecus ingruit in offensius tractabiliusque transmittant. Sin vero sunt aspera et
inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etsi parvo sive nullo
fatalis incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua tamen levitate et voluntario impetu in
assidua delicta et in errores ruunt. ltque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et
necessaria rerum consequentia efficit, que fatum vocatur. Est enim genere ipso quasi
fatale et consequens ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non vacent. Huius deinde rei
exemplo non Hercule nimis aliene neque illepide utitur. Sicut inquit lapidem cylindrum
si per spacia terre prona atque diruta iacias causam quidem ei et initium preceipitantie
feceris, mox tamen ille preceps voluntur, non quare tu id iam facis: sed quomodo ita
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sese modus eius et forme volubilitas habet. Sic ordo et ratio et necessitas fati genera
ipsa et principia causarum monet, impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrorum
actionesque ipsas. Voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia moderantur. Infert
deinde verba hec iis que dixi congruentia. Quam obrem a Pythagoreis sic dicitur,
"Nosces homines spontaneas haurire calamitates, quasi detrimenta singulis a seipsis
fiant et suo impetu delinquant et in incommoda ruant sua voluntate atque proposito."
Propterea negat oportere ferri audirique homines aut nequam aut ignanos et nocentes
et audaces, qui quum in culpa et maleficio revicti sunt; perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem
tanquam in aliquod sani asylum, et que pessime fecerunt, ea non sue temeritati, sed
fato esse attribuenda dicunt. Primus autem homo et sapientissimus et antiquissimus
poetarum dixit in hisceversibus. Hei mihi quid damnant mortales numina celi. Esse
aiunt et enim per nos mala, cum tamen ipsis Vecordi preter fatum sint mente dolores.
Itaque Marcis Cicero in libro quern de fato scripsit quum questionem istam diceret
obscurissimam esse et implicatissimam: Chrysippum quoque philosophum non
expedisse se in ea refert his verbis. Chrysippus estuans laboransque quonam pacto
explicet et fato omnia fieri, et esse aliquid in nobis intricatur hoc modo et cetera hoc.
Aulus Gelius ubi super, sed ad auctorem revertor. Est ne inquit. Meltus responsive
legas sic. Est inquit, neque et cetera, quo quicque discernat, quicque legendum est non
quodque. Non enim additur substantivum. sed quodque adiectivum est sicut quod
aliquod et similia: et ita substantivum desiderant: quique autem quid, aliquid, et similia
sine substantivo ponuntur aut substantivum in genetivo regunt. Supplent enim vicem
substantivorum. Artubus a nominativo artus per u scribitur. quare artibus a nominativo
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artes declinatur, cetera patent.
Metrum Secundum Quinti Libri
Sanctus Thomas
"Puro claru lumine Phebum..." istud est metrum secundum huius quinti quod
dicitur Archiloicum ab inventore.

Dactylicum a pede predominante. In quo

Philosophia commmendat excellentiam divine cognitionis in comparatione ad solem
materialem dicens, "Homerus oris melliflui," id est dulcis eloquentie "canit," id est
describit "Phebum" id est solem "clarum puro lumine." Forsan enim Homerus fecit
librum de claritate solis, qui scilicet sol "non valet prorumpere" id est penetrare
"intima viscera" id est profunda "terre et pelagi" id est maris "infirma" id est debili
luce "radiorum." Haud sic id est non sic habet se conditor magni orbis scilicet Deus,
sed ipse sua cognatione penetrat omnia, cum nihil possit ipsum latere huic scilicet
conditori tuenti id est respicienti cuncta ex alto id est celo terre sibi resistunt nulla
mole id est magnitudine sicut obsistunt radiis solis. Nee etiam nox obscura "obstat sibi
atris nubibus." Immo in uno "ictu mentis" id est in uno mentali intuitu cernit quern
scilicet quantum ad presentia que su erunt quantum ad preterita, que veniunt quantum
ad futura. Quern scilicet conditiorem respicit omnia solus tu possis dicem verum
solem.
Notandum licet deus omnia cognoscendo prevideat etiam ilia que fiunt ex libero
arbitrio, volunt tum quasdam creaturas esse liberi arbitrii, quare hoc magis decet
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divinam bonitatem. Sicut enim melius et nobilius est regnum in quo non tamen servit
regi a servis sed etiam a liberis que ubi tamen servitur a servis, sic melius erit regnum
dei et decentius ex hoc que sunt alique creature libere servientes sicut homor angelus,
que si essent sole creature serviliter operantes cuiusmodi sunt omnes creature preter
hominem et angelum: que ex determinatione nature necessitantur ad sua opera.
Ascensius
"Puro clarum" et cetera. Carmen iam sepe descriptum est, vult autem ostendere
deum dici proprie solem. Cum enim sol interpretatur solus omnia lustrans, et multa
sint que naturalis sol non penetret, licet dicatur iiii Eneid, "Sol qui terrarum flammis
opera omnia lustras... " consequens est solum deum cui nihil est absconditum, et qui
solus omnia lustrat. Vere verum solem dici. Quinetiam Plinius et Macrobius solem
solum deum esse putant et ei omnia numina contribui, sed nihil ad presens negocium
facit: cui satis sit orindisse deus solum cuncta videre non solem naturalem.
Prosa Tertia Quinti Libri
Sanctus Thomas
"Tum ego 'en' inquam..." hie incipit tertia prosa huius in qua Boetius obiicit
contra praedictam ostendens non posse similis stare providentiam et liberum arbitrium.
Et primo premittit que dicta possunt habere dubitatonem. Secundo ponit rationem
dubitatonis ibi, "Nimium inquam."

Primo <licit, tum pro tune finitur, <licit

Philosophia. "ego Boethius inquam O Philosophia rursus ego "confundor difficiliori
ambiguitate."

Et querit philosophia, "Que nam est ista ambiguitas. iam enim

coniecto," id est iudico quibus tu conturbare: idest "perturbaris". Notandum que
coniectare est ex aliquibus signis aliquid putare. Et sic Philosophia coniectat per
locum a communiter accidentibus dubitatonem Boetius, quare communiter quicunque
loquebantur de providentia et libero arbitrio dubitabant de compossibilitate eorum.
"Nimium inquam..." hie Boetius exprimit suam dubitationem ostendens providentiam
et liberurn arbitrium esse incompossibilia. Primo facit hoc. Secundo excludit quasdam
vias quibus aliqui conabantur defendere providentiam, ibi, "Quid igitur." Ad
probandum ergo incompossibilitatem predictorum ponit tres rationes. Secunda ibi. Ad
bee. Tertia ibi. Postremo. Primo ponit primam rationem. Secundo excludit quandam
solutionem eius, ibi, "Neque enim" vel facturn aliud. Primo <licit, "Nimiurn videtur
adversari et repugnare" deum "prenoscere universa et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium"
que autem repugnat probat. "Nam si deus prospicit cuncta neque ullo modo falli
potest: necesse est evenire illud quod providentia previderit esse futururn." Quod si
non eveniret falleretur providentia "quare si ab eterno non modo," id est non tanturn
facta horninurn sed etiam consilia et voluntates prenoscit, nulla erit libertas arbitrii, sed
ornnia evenirent de necessitate. Que autem deus sua providentia ornnia prenoscat
declareat. Neque enirn poterit existere aliquod factum vel aliqua voluntate nisi quam
presenserit id est prescinerit "providentia divina nescia" id est non potens "falli" nee
possunt aliter evenire qua previsa sunt. "Nam si valent detorqueri aliorsurn" scilicet
ut aliter eveniant que "previsa sunt, non erit iam firma prescientia dei. Sed potius erit
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incerta opinio, quod iudico nephas credere de deo."
Notandum que ex littera sic formatur ratio. Illa providentur infallibiliter de
necessitate eveniunt, sed omnia providentur a deo infallibiliter. lgitur omnia de
neccessitate eveniunt: et sic perit libertas arbitrii. Notandum que scientia Dei non est
opinio, quare opinio est eorum que sic et aliter se possunt habere, ex pnmo
posteriorum. Scientia autem est eorum quern non possunt se aliter habere. Igitur
scientia dei non est dicenda opinio. "Neque enim illam probo rationem..." hie
Philosophia excludit quandam responsionem que posset dari ad predictam rationem.
Et primo ponit earn. Secundo earn excludit, ibi, quasi vero. Primo <licit, "Neque enim
probo" id est approbo illam rationem. lid est responsionem que quidam credunt posse
dissolvere nodum id est difficultatem questionis. "Aiunt enim non ideo quid venturum
quomodo providentia prospexerit" illud esse futuru id est venturum. "Sed potius
econtrario" id est econverso "quomodo quid futurum est" illud non "posse latere
providentiam divinam."

Quasi diceret eventus rei est causa prescientie et non

econverso. Et ideo ex eventu dicet concludi necessitas prescientie, non econtra verso
secundum eos, et isto modo necessarium est. Hoc quod concludit de eventu "relabi
in contrariam partem" scilicet quod concluditur de eventu, hoc concludatur de
prescientia. Neque enim necesse est "contingere quae providentur" secundum eos, "sed
ea que futura sunt necesse est provideri."
Notandum que prior ratio pretendebat que omnia futura de necessitate eveniant,
quare Deus futura infallibiliter providet.

Responsio autem quorundam <licit

contrarium. Dicit enim non ideo quia deus previdet. futura necessario eveniunt, sed

quare futura sunt ideo Deus ea previdet. "Quasi vero que cuiusque rei causa sit
prescientia..." hie excludit istam responsionern. Dicit ista responsio procedit quasi
laboraretur querendo cuius rei causa sit prescientia, utrurn sit causa necessitatis
futurorurn, vel utrurn "necessitatis futurorurn sit causa providentie." Sed nos nitamur
id est laborarnus hoc dernonstrare scilicet "necessariurn esse eventurn rerurn
prescitarurn quoquo rnodo" id est quocunque rnodo "se habeat ordo causarurn." Et si
pro quarnveis "prescientia non videatur inferre necessitatern eveniendi rebus futuris,"
quod declarat exernplo <licit, si aliquis "sedeat necesse est opinionern esse verarn que
coniectat eurn sedere et econtraverso si de" aliquo "vera sit opinio quare sedet necesse
est eurn sedere. Igitur in utroque" scilicet in opinione et "sedente" est "necessitas".
In hoc scilicet in sedente est necessitas sedendi, in altero scilicit in opinione est
necessitas veritatis. Sed non idcirco quisque sedeat super casualiter: quonarn vera est
opinio, quia "veritas opiniosis" non est causa sessionis, "sed hec scilicet" opinio
"potius est vera quornodo precessit quern piarn" id est aliquern sedere. Et "ita cum
causa veritatis ex altera parte procedit, tarnen in utroque est cornrnunis necessitas."
Et eodern rnodo contingit arguere de providentia et de his que providentur.
Unde dicit "patet" id est rnanifesturn est "ratiocinari" de providentia et de "rebus
futuris. Nam etsi" pro quern vis "id circo providentur quornodo futura sunt, non tarnen
ideo eveniunt quornodo providentur nihilo minus tamen necesse est a deo velventura
provideri vel provisa evenire." Ita queutrique parti inest necessitas quevis alteri
casualitas, "quod solurn satis est" id est sufficit "ad perirnendarn liberatern arbitrii."
Notandurn que responsio ista quarn innuit in litterarurn vestra fuisse ipsius Origenis,
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qui supra epistolam ad Roma sic <licit, "Non propterea aliquid erit, quare illud deus
scit futurum, sed quare futurum est ideo scitur a deo anteque fiat. Quod tam.en potest
intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo que eventus rei sit causa prescientie secundum rationem
consequentie.
Et sic responsio est vera Alio modo potest intelligi que eventus rei sit causa
prescientie secundum existientiam. Et sic est falsa, et hoc modo improbatur hie a
Boetius. Primo igitur ostendit Boetius. que ista responsio non est ad propositum.
Secundo ostendit que non includit veritatem ibi. "lam vero que proposterum est..."
hie philosophia ostendit que ista responsio includit falsitatem, quia ponit que aliquod
temporale sit causa eterni. Dicunt enim que res future sint causa provisionis eterne.
Unum <licit, "lam vero preposterum" id est perversum est, et "eventus rerum
temporalium dicatur esse causa" eterne prescientie quod dicitur in ista responsione.
Unum subdit, "Quid est aliud arbitrari deum ideo providere futura, quoniam sunt
eventura, quam putare que olim acciderunt" id est ipsa futura esse "causam summe
providentie," quasi diceret nihil est aliud dicere. Notandum que nullum temporale est
causa eterni, sed potius econtraverso. lndignius enim non est causa digioris eo que
causa dignior est effectu. Temporale autem est indignius eterno, sicut corruptibile
incorruptibili, igitur et ceterea. "Ad hec sicuti cum quid esse scio..." hie ponit
secundam responsionem ad probandum secundam conclusionem. Dicit "ad hec" super
predicta addenda est hec ratio, sicuti cum scio esse quid id est aliquid necesse est
ipsum esse, ita cum novi quid futurum necesse est id ipsum esse futurum. Sic igitur
fit id est contingit, ut eventus rei prescite nequeat evitari. Notandum que ratio sic
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posset formari. Sicut se habet scientia respectu scibilis praesentis, sic prescientia
respectu effectus futuri. Sed cum scio in presenti aliquid esse necesse est ipsum esse.
Ergo cum prescitur aliquid futurum esse. Necesse est ipsum esse, sed deus prescit
omnia futura.

Ergo necessario eveniunt, et sic iterum tollitur libertas arbitrii.

"Postremo si quid aliquis..." hie ponit tertiam rationem ad idem <licit, "Si quis
existimet aliquid esse aliorsum" id est aliter "quae res se habeat, illud non modo" id
est non tamen non est "scientia sed est fallax opinio longe diversa averitate scientie,
quaere si aliquid ita futurum est ut eius eventus non sit certus est necessarius" quoniam
illud "poterit presciri eventurum" quasi diceret/qua distinctio nullo modo. Cuius
rationem assignat <licit, sicut ipsa scientia est impermixta falsitati, sic illud quod
concipitur ab ea non posset aliter esse que concipitur. Quare si posset aliter se habere,
tune scientia posset esse falsa, unde subdit, ista est causa quare scientia "careat
mendacio" quare necesse est unamquamque "rem ita se habere" sicut "scientia
comprehendit earn se habere."
Notandum que ratio quam intendit est ista: quicunque estimat rem aliter esse
qua est: eius estimatio est falsa et non est scientia, "sed fallax opinio." Ergo si deus
prescit aliquid futurum esse, et si ipsum non necessario evenit sicut prescivit,
prescientia Dei non erit scientia sed fallax opinio. Ergo futura a Deo previsa
necessario eveniunt, et sic perit liberum arbitrium. "Quid igitur... " hie Philosophia
improbat modos quibus aliqui nituntur salvare providentiam. Et primo querit quoniam
possit salvari providentia divina irnprobando duos modos quibus aliqui conabantur
ipsam salvare. Secundo ponit tertium modo similiter ipsum improbando. Secunda ibi,
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"Quod si apud." Primo <licit, "Quid igitur" super dicemus. "Quonammodo" dici potest
que "Deus prenoscat hoc futura incerta." Primus modus est dicatur deum ea que
providet iudicare infalibiliter quevis possint non evenire, sed inconveniens est, quia
tune falleretur sua providentia. Unde <licit, "Nam si" Deus censet id est iudicat evenire
infallibiliter, "que etiam possibile est non evenire fallitur" super Deus "quod non
modo" id est non tantum "nephas est sentire" de deo "sed etiam nephas est voce
proferre." Secundus modus est ut dicatur deum providere futura indeterminate sicut
futura sunt. Sed isto modo providentia dei non est certa. Unum <licit, at id est sed si
Deus "decernit" ista "futura esse" previdentur indeterminate sicut sunt, ut scilicet
"cognoscat ea eque" id est equaliter "posse fieri vel non fieri, que est ista prescientia
que nihil certum nihil stabile comprehenditur." Quasi diceret talis providentia nulla
est, et quid hec prescientia differt ab "illo vaticinio ridiculoso Tiresie, qui dicebat,
"quicquid dicam" hoc "erit vel non" erit. Quo etiam id est in quo "divina providentia
prestiterit" id est prevalebit humana opinione si iudicat "incerta," sicut homines ea
quorum eventus est incertus quasi diceret nullo differt.
Notandum que cum Tiresias vidisset duos serpentes simul coire proiecto baculo
ipsos seperavit ab invicem,permutatus fuit in mulierem. Post septennium iterum
sepentes coeuntes baculo separavit, et mutatus fuit in virum. Cum autem orta fuisset
dissentio inter Iovem et Iunonem an maior esset delectatio in coitu viri qua mulieris
electus fuit Tiresias in iudicem, qui expertus erat fortem utriusque sexus. Tum autem
diceret maiorem esse delectationem mulieris Iuno commota excecavit ipsum. Iupiter
autem sui misertus in recompensam amissi visus dedit sibi spiritum vaticinandi. Fuit
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autem bee suavati timatio: "Quicquid dicam erit vel non erit." Si ergo deus non aliter
presciret futura indeterminata nisi quare erunt vel non erunt, non disserret sua
prescientia a prescientia Tiresie, quod est ridiculosum. "Quod si apud illum..." hie
ponit tertium modum conantium salvare providentiam. Et est ut ponamus omnia
evenire de necessitate, et auferamus liberum arbitrium. Primo ergo ponit istum
modum. Secundo ostendit que inconvenientia sequantur ad ipsum, ibi, "Quo semel."
Primo ergo concludit istum modum dicens, "quod si apud illum certissimum fontem
omnium rerum nihil potest esse incertum, certus est eventus eorum que ipse firmitur
presciverit futura. Quare nulla libertas humanis confiliis et actionibus, quas divina
mens sine errore falsitatis cuncta prospiciens alligat et constringit ad unum eventum."
Notandum que nulla mutatore cadit circa fontem omnium rerum quare cognitio
eius potest esse incerta. Etiam si esset icerta esset imperfecta nee divina. Si ergo est
certa respectu futurorum: necesse est ut omnia futura prescita a Deo necessario
eveniant. "Quo semel recepto..." hie ponit inconvenientia que sequuntur si auferatur
liberum arbitrium. Et primo ostendit que inconvenientia sequuntur ex parte hominem.
Secundo que ex parte Dei. tertio que ex parte coniunctionis hominem ad Deum.
Secunda ibi, "Quo nihil." Tertia ibi, igitur ne sperandi. Inconvenientia ex parte
hominem sunt. Si non sit liberum arbitrium "frustra proponuntur" hominibus "pene
vel permia," et iniuste puniuntur "mali" et preminatur "boni," nee erunt "vicia nee
virtutes" hominibus. Sicut nee in aliisque agunt necessitate nature et non libertate
animi. Unde <licit "Quo semel recepto" id est posito scilicet ut negetur liberum
arbitrium. Liquet id est manifestum est quantus occasus id est quanta destructio

humanarum rerum consequantur. "Frustra enim proponentur bonis premia et malis
pene." Ita statua et leges humane erunt inutiles que "penas et premia" statuunt que
"nullus motus animorum liber ac voluntarius meruit." Et illud "videbitur
iniquissimum" omnium "quod nunc iudicatur equissimum" scilicet "puniri improbos"
et "remunerari" bonos, "quos ad alterum" id est ad probitatem vel improbitatem "non
mittit propria voluntas sed cogit certa necessitas futuri, igitur virtutes et vicia non
fuerunt quicque sed potius erit mixta et indiscreta confusio omnium meritorum" scilicet
bonorum et malorum.
Nota que omnes virtutes et vitia oriuntur ex libera electione boni et mali.
Similter punitio et remuneratio fiunt propter liberam actionem boni vel mali. Si ergo
tollitur libertas arbitrii non erit libera electio, nee nisi libera actio bona vel mala est.
Et per consequens nulla erit virtus, nullum vitium, et iniuste malus punietur, cum ex
necessitate malum operetur, et iniuste bonus premiabatur, cum ex necessitate operetur
bonum, quod est absurdum dicere. "Quo nihil sceleratius..." hie ostendit inconveniens
quod sequitur ex parte Dei scilicet, que Deus erit auctor Malorum. unde <licit. Cum
omnis ordo rerum ducatur ex providentia divina, et si "nihil liceat" habere fieri ex
"humanis consiliis," fit id est sequitur "ut vitia nostra referantur in auctorem omnium
scilicet Deum. "Quo nihil sceleratius ex cogitari potest qua scilicet deum dicere
auctorem malorum. Quod tamen necessarium est ablata libertate. Notandum que
defectus in operatione, qui defectus non est in potestate rei ut enitetur necessario est
ab agente et a producente. Si ergo actio voluntatis nostre non est libera, defectus
actionis secundum voluntatem reducetur in Deum. Et sic Deus erit causans defectum
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nostrum. Quod est absurdum.

34
"lgitur nee sperandi aliquid... " hie ponit

inconvenientia que sequuntur ex coniunctone hominis ad deum, quia tolleretur actus
deprecandi et actus sperandi, quibus maxime coniunguntur Deo. Unde dicit lgitur si
tollitur liberum arbitrium, nee ulla ratio est sperandi aliquid, nee deprecandi inter
deum et homines. "Quid enim quisque deprecetur vel speret, si series indeflexa
connectit omnia optanda. Quasi diceret frustra fieret. Utroque igitur aufertur illud
11

11

unicorn commercium scilicet sperandi et deprecandi inter deum et homines.

11

Vocat

au tern spem et deprecationem commerium quare istis mercamur omnia beneficia.
Unde subdit, si quidem precio iuste humiltatis nos homines promeremur inestimabilem
vicem id est retributionem divene gratie, qui modus deprecandi solus est quo homines
videantur posse colloqui cum deo et contungi inaccessibili luci, scilicet deo. Prius que
homines impetrent quod petunt. prius enim preces porrigimus que effectum nostre
petitionis consequamur. Que spes et deprecatio si nihil credantur habere virium
recepta id est concessa necessitate futurorum. Quid erit quo connecti id est coniungi
atque ad hereri possemus illi summo principi rerum. Quasi dicat nihil. Quare
neccesse erit genus humanum disseptum id est dissipatum atque disiunctum suo fonte
id est a suo principio super a deo fatiscere id est deficere uti pauloante cantabas in
sexto metro quarti libri.
Notandum que actus deprecandi spectat ad intellectum. Et est oratio secundum
Johannem Damasce. Ascensus intellectus ad Deum vel in Deum, quoquidem actu
insinuamus Deo indigentiam nostram. Non que Deo per insinuationem nostram aliquid
innotescat quod prius ignoraverit, sed ut nos ipsa insinuatione utendo consideremus in

his esse recurrendum ad divinum auxilium. Actus autem sperandi pertinet ad
volunatem, quia eius obiectum est bonum futurum. Per istum actum adheremus deo
tanquam perfecto principio bonitatis nitentes eius auxilio ad consequendum bonum quo
indigemus. Sed si huiusmodi bonum necessario eveniret vel impossible esset evenire
uterque actus tam deprecandi qua sperandi esset inutilis.
Ascensius
"Tum ego 'en' inquam" et cetera. En et ecce tune dicuntur quoniam inopinate
et praeter solitum aliquid obvenisse naratur, sicut ibi "Ecce virgo concipiet et paret
filium." Divinam providentiam latere non posse. "Lateo" active sumitur significatque
fere quod fugio ne sciatur. Unde primo Eneid, "Nee latuere doli fratrem Iunonis."
Reperitur etiam cum dativo, ut tu mihi causa lates id est occultus es, et absconderis
mihi. "Quasi vero..." et cetera illud quod sequitur, ac non illud demonstrare nitamur
pro quo in glosa ponitur, sed nos nitamur, debet sic ordinari. Quasi vero laboretur id
est in aquirendo labor fiat que sit causa cuiusque id est cuiuslibet rei id est "ne" pro
"an". An scilicet prescientia super dei sit necessitas futurorum id est sit causa
necessaria ut futur fiant. An necessitas futurorum sit causa providentie id est quare
Deus de eis habeat certam providentiam ac pro et quasi super. Non nitamur id est non
conemur et studeamus demonstrare eventum rerum prescitarum a Deo super esse
necessarium super quoquo id est quocunque modo ordo causarum se habeat id est sive
res sit causa prescientie, sive prescientia causa rei. Hie animadverte duo. Primum que
hec particula quasi vero, tune poni solet quoniam per ironiam loquimur, et gnificamus
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non esse ut a quibusdam creditur, nee dicitur quasi "autem nee neque autem," saltem
tam

frequenter et decenter secum vallam sicut, "quasi vero," "neque vero." Secundum

ex presciano quotiens dictiones "relative" aut "infinite" et eis equivalentens
geminantur. Possumus posteriorem partem mutare "incunque" ut "qualisqualis"
"qualiscunque utut" "utcumque ubiubi" "ubicumque 11 "quotquot:" "quocunque". Quare
tamen "ly" cunque non iungit cum "quis" et "quid", sed cum qui et quod. Non
resolves "quisquis" in "quiscumque", sed in 'quicunque", et "quicquid" non in
"quidcumque" sed in "quodcunque". lam vero que preposterum et cetera qua id est
que tum preposterum id est in ordine perversum, quum "illud" preponitur quod
postponi debeat aut econtraverso preposterum dicimus.
Sane meminisse debes lector omnia verba huius prose sequentia, et etiam
sequentis carminis attribui Boetius. Non ergo dices cum commentario supiore, "hie
Philosophia ostendit," sed "hie Boetius ostendit." Ad hec dixi potius legendum esse
"ad hoc" id est "preterea", quod frequenter reperitur require per tabulam ubi dictum
sit. Quid igitur et cetera. Ad hue sunt verba Boetius non Philosophie . Aut quid hoc
refert id est distat interest a super vaticinio Tiresie. "Preterea" quam iam de Tiresia
vidisti ad de eum vatem Thebanum fuisse, et multa etiam post mortem secundum
Homerum ulixi predixisse apud inferos. Unum etiam Horatius libro ii. Sermonum. Hoc
quo tiresia preter narrata petenti Responde. Et quare cecus effectus erat dicit iuvenalis
nee surdum nee tiresiam quern que esse deorum. Quod autem in feminam mutatus sit
licet fabulosus putatur. Plinius tamen in septimo Naturalis Historie fiere potuisse
ostendit, docens re vera sexum non nullos mutasse. De vaticinio autem in textu hoc
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posito dicere que iussus oraculum certum enunciare dixerit. Hoc pro oraculo certo
habete: "Que quicquid dixero aut dicturus sum aut erit aut non erit." Quasi veritas
eius dicti ex futuro dependeat, cum iam necessaria sit. Unde merito ridiculum dicere
si aliud non pretenderit.
"Humana opinione prestiterit..." vide si non potius legendum est humane
opinioni. Nam Terentius in Eunucho ita locutus est, homo quid homini prestat, et non
dubito si hoc loco dixisset quid etiam divina providentia quoniam addidisset. Humane
opinioni non humana opinione prestiterit. Construitur autem multis modis hoc verbum.
Aliquando enim significat cum prestantia et eminentia exhibere. Et sic ac tamen regit,
ut apud Virgi: "Ibo animis contra vel magnum prestet Achillem." Aliquando significat
fore idem additio dativo cui sit prelatio, ut in dicto exemplo, homo quid homini
prestat. Aliquando absolute et quasi impersonaliter ponitur ut prestat Trinatrie metas
lustreare Pachomini id est melius religibilius est. Series indeflexa id est que nunquem
fuit flexa, vel potius inflexibilis. Nam sepe participia preteriti temporis ponuntur loco
verbalium inhilis que aptitudinem sonant: ut apud Virgi: "aut illaudati nescit husiridis
aras." Illaudati id est illaudabilis secundum Servium. Et ibi hoc est septimo Eneid:
"Dives inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos." Inaccessos lucos <licit non quos nemo accessit,
sed inaccessibiles, id est quos nemo debeat accedere. Fatiscere est affatim: id est
abunde hiscere. Sicut primo Eneid: "Omnes accipiunt inimicum imbrem, rimisque
fatiscunt." Disseptum venit a dis et sepio, et est quod sepem a missit id est compagem.
Uti pauloante cantabas. Ex hoc patet verba hec ex persona Boethii dici.

Metrum Tertium Quinti Libri
Sanctus Thomas
""Quenam discors federa rerum?" hie incipit tertium metrum huius quinti quod
dicitur adoni cum vel secundum alios Archiloi cum ab inventore. Dactylicum a pede
predominante. unum facit exclamationem super incompossibilitate qui apparet inter
providentiam et liberum arbitrium. Et primo quare sint incompossibilia cum per se
considerata sint possibilia. Secundo ponit responsionem ad hoc. Tertio contra
responsionem obiicit. Quarto obiectionem soluit. secunda ibi, "An nulla." Tertia ibi,
"Sed cur tanto." Quarta ibi, "An cum mentem." Primo elicit, "Quenam discors causa
resolvit" id est separat federa id est concordias rerum scilicet providentie divine et
liberi arbitrii ne compatiantur se simul. Aut quis deus tanta bella statuit duobus veris
et singula vera, quern carptim id est singulatim vel divisim accepta constant id est
permanent. Eadem tamen mixta id est conjuncta "noluit iugari" id est copulari se
invicem conpatiendo. Tune ponit responsionem dicens que istis duobus veris scilicet
providentie et libero arbitrio nulla est discordia, sed apparentia discordie provenit ex
debilitate nostri intellectus. Unde elicit: "An est nota solutionis nulla est discordia
veris" si semper certa coherent sibi, "sed mens nostra obruta id est opressa membris
cecis id est cecantibus animam, illa nequit igne splendore id est oppressi luminis."
Scilicet intellectus noscere tenues id est subtiles nexus id est coniunctiones "rerum que
videntur discordare."
Nota si consideremus providentiam divinam per se, possibile est earn esse. Si
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consideremus liberum arbitrium per se, etiam possibile est eum esse ut patet ex dictis.
Sed si consideremus utrunque simul tune videntur incompossibilia, sicut patet ex
rationibus superioribus. Secundum veritatem autem se bene compatiuntur et sunt
compossibilia, sed nobis non apparet. Quare intellectus noster oppressus mole corpis
non potest se elevare in huiusmodi cognitionem, nam · secundum sapientem corpus quod
corrumpitur aggravat animam, et terrena habitatio opprimit sensum multa cogitantem.
"Sed cur tanto flagrat amore..." hie Philosophia obiicit contra solutionem. Si
enim anima ignoret istas subtiles coniunctiones, unum est que desiderat eas scire cum
nihil ignotum possit desiderari? Unum dicit, "Sed cur anima flagrat" id et ardet "tanto
amore" id est desiderio reperire notaste etas id est notificationes latentes veri id est
veritatis. "Scitne mens illud quod ipsa anxia" id est sollicita "appetit nosse?" Quasi
diceret non, quare nemo appetit scire, illud quod scit.et hoc est quod dicit, "Quis
laborat scire nota?" Quasi diceret nullus. Oportet igitur dicere que nesciat, et tune
sequitur aliud inconveniens scilicet que anima desideret illud quod nescit. Unde dicit,
"Si nescit" illud quod petit "quid petit" id est desiderat mens ceca, id est ignorans.
Quis enim nescius optet id est desideret quicque, an quis potest sequi nescita, aut quis
nescius potest noscere quo inveniat super illud quod querit, et quis ignotus, id est
nescius quis at id est potest noscere formam repertam. Quasi diceret nullus.
Notandum que dictum est in responsione que anima ignorat compossibilitatem
providentie et liberi arbitrii, sed desiderat earn scire. Contra hoc arguit sic, "Nullus
appetit scire quod scit." Si anima desiderat scire aliquid, vel ignorat illud vel scit. Si
scit, ergo non desiderat ipsum scire quod scit, quia nullus appetit scire quod scit, cum

omms appetitus sit ratione carentie. Si autem ignorat quod desiderat, quomodo
ignotum desideratur cum voluntas non querit incognitum. Ideo si ignorat nunque
cognoscet. "Quis enim ignotum inveniet?" Si enim pater familias quereret servum
fugitivum quern ignoraret, posset sibi multotiens occurrere que ipsum non inveniret,
sicut <licit Linconiensis super primo posteriorum. "An cum mente cerneret altam.."
hie solvit obiectionem, ubi notandum est que Plato posuit animas esse in celo creatas
et habere cognitionem omnem perfectam sed per lapsum ad corpora earn oblivisci
cognitionem rerum in particulari et retinere earn in universali.

Et postea per

exercitium recuperare cognitionem rerum in particulari. Unde <licit sic, "An" est nota
solutionis cum anima "cerneret" id est specularetur altam "mentem" id est profundam
mentem Dei, ipsa pariter et simul norat id est noverat summam id est universalem
cognitionem et singula id est singularem cognitionem rerum. Sed nunc ipsa condita
id est tecta nube membrorum non est oblita sui in totum id est totaliter. Sed ipsa tenet
summam id est cognitionem universalem rerum perdens singula id est singularem
cognitionem. Igitur quisquis requirit id est investigat cognoscere vera, talis est neutro
habitu super ut perfecte cognoscat vel que omnino ignorat. Unde <licit, "Nam neque
novit" scilicet in speciali et perfecte illud quod requirit, "nee penitus nescit omnia, sed
ipse meminit" id est in memoria habet summam id est universalem cognitionem "quam
retinens consulit" super. Actuali consideratione "retractans" id est revocans per
studium. Arte id est subtiliter. "Visa" id est prius in speciali cognita, ut ipse "queat
addere oblitas partes" partibus servatis supple in memoria. Nota que secundum istam,
"viam Platonis absolveretur ratio prius tacta." Vel anima scit quod desiderat vel nescit.
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Dico que nescit in speciali et in propria forma sed scit in universali. Et cum dicitur
nullus desiderat ignotum, verum est sicut est ignotum in universali. Tamen desiderat
ipsum ut est ignotum in speciali. Et cum dicitur si ignoret nunque inveniet, verum est
si ignorat

tam

in generali quam in speciali. Et si ignorat in potentia et in actu. Si

tamen scit in potentia et in universali et ignorat actu in propria forma, potest ipsum
invenire et addiscere.

Ascensius
Quenam discors et cetera Carminis huius legem prius habuimus. Loquitur ad
hue Boetius: admirans apparentem repugnantiam inter duo vera: cum dici soleat: que
omne verum alteri vero consonet: verum autem est deum infallibilitur omnia prescire:
verum etiam est arbitrium nostrum esse liberum: quod divine providentie sicut
pretactum est repugnare videtur et econtrario. Nihil autem obscuritatis hie est nisi in
carmine. Nam in sine. Consulit arte vel alte legi potest non autem consuluit. Sequens
autem carmen duos pedes ultra mensuram iustam habere repperi. Sic enim scriptum
erat. ut servatis queat oblitas addere partes. sed opinor: illud adomum per se in
principio ponendum esse: et sic posui.
Prosa Quarta Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas
"Tum ilia. Vetus inquit... " hec est prosa quarta huius quinti, in qua Philosophia
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incipit dissolvere questionem de compassibilit.ate providentie et liberi arbitrii. Et primo
tangit difficultatem huius questionis et causam difficultatis, et tangit modum
procedendi circa eius solutionem. Secundo dissolvit earn, ibi, "Quero enim." Primo
<licit "hec querela," id est questio hec de providentia est "Vetus." Et est vehementer
agitata id est protract.at.a Marco Tullio, cum distribuit id est dividit divinationem, in
libri Divinationum, ubi dividit divinationem in suas species, non solum hoc, sed sibi
ipsi est res multum diu quesit.a. "Sed haud quaquam" id est non alicubi "ab ullo
vestrum satis diligenter et firmiter expedit.a. Cuius caliginis" id est difficultatis "causa
est que motus id est actus humane ratiocinatis non potest admoveri" id est applicari "ad
simplicitatem divine prescientie" id est providentie.

"Que si ullo modo queat

excogitari. Nihil relinquetur prorsus ambigui." Quod scilicet rationem et causam
difficultatis, it.a demum patefacere et expidere tentabo, si prius expandero" id est
declara vero "ea quibus tu moveris." Notandum que questio de providentia divina et
libero arbitrio est omnium questionum difficillima, de que multi antiquorum
dubit.abant, et non nulli modernorum propter difficultatem lapsi sunt, quam Tullius in
libri De Divinationum pertract.ans et non valens dissolvere eius difficultatem, negat
penitus providentia et presciam futurorum a deo in predicto libro De Divinationum.
"Quero enim ..." hie Philosophia accedit ad solutionem questionis, et primo discutit
motiva Boetius secundo solvit dubitationem sive questionem, ibi, "Quomodo igitur."
Circa primum sciendum que duo fuerunt motiva Boetius principalia circa hanc
questionem. Primum quare videtur necessarium si deus previdet futura que necessario
eveniunt. Secundum motivum que futura quorum eventus est incertus sicut sunt futura
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contingentia non possunt a deo certa provideri. Primo ergo pertractat pnmum
motivum. Secundo secundum, ibi, sed hoc inquis. Primo ostendit que si deus
11

11

previdet futura non propter hoc necessario eveniunt. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi,
11

Sed qui fieri potest. Primo ostendit que ex prescientia Dei non infertur necessitas
11

libero arbitrio. Secundo ostendit que prescientia · dei non sit signum necessitatis
futurorum ibi, Sed prescientia. Circa primum sciendum est que prius improbavit
11

11

quandam responsionem qua quidam nitebantur impedire rationem, ostendentem non
esse liberum arbitrium propter prescientiam divinam. Quam responsionem hie resumit
ostendens earn aliquo modo esse bonam, quare sufficienter impedit intentionem
adversarii. Nam adversarius ex nullo alio probat necessitatem futurorum, nisi quare
sunt prescit a deo. Cum igitur ex responsione habeatur que prescientia nullam
causalitatem habet super futura videtur sufficienter ostensum esse que ea que procedunt
ex libero arbitrio non sunt necessaria.
Primo ergo ponit istam responsionem resumendo eius solutionem dicens.
"Quero enim cur illam rationem solventium putes minus esse efficacem que putat
libertatem arbitrii" non impedire a prescientia, quare estimat prescientiam non esse
causam necessitatis futurorum. Quod autem per istam responsionem impediatur illatio
necessitatis futurorum patet ex hoc, quare tu non "trahis aliunde argumentum
neccessitatis futurorum, nisi quod ea quae presciuntur non possunt non evenire. Si
igitur prenotio id est prescientia futurorum nullam adiicit" id est imponit necessitatem
rebus futuris ut dicit responsio, ut tu etiam fatebare pauloante, quid est id quod esse
poterit quod voluntarii exitus cogantur ad certum eventum rerum? Et ita per istam
11

11

responsionem excluditur necessitas futurorum et manifestat se in exemplo dicens, "Ut
advertas quid consequatur gratia positionis id est exempli, statuamus id est ponamus
per impossibile nullam esse prescientiam futurorum, igitur hoc posito "quantum ad
hoc" id est quantum ad istam illationem qua ex prescientia concluditur neccessitas
futurorum, "ex ea quae eveniunt ex arbitrio coguntur ne ad necessitatem. Dicit
Boetius, "Minime" et Philosophia "Statuamus iterum esse" providentiam, "sed nihil
necessitatis iniungere rebus futuris. Manebit ut opinor eadem libertas voluntatis
integra et absoluta. ab omni necessitate.
Notandum que prior solutio improbata fuit bona et mala, in hoc fuit bona
quare posuit prescientiam non esse causam neccessitatis futurorum. dicere enim Ideo
futura eveniun, non quare deus ea previdet. Sed in hoc fuit mala. Quare posuit futura
esse causam prescientie Dei. Dixit enim quare futura sunt ideo Deus ea previdet. Patet
ergo ex responsione antiquorum que prescientia non cum causa necessitatis rebus
futuris. "Sed prescientia inquies... " hie ostendit Philosophia que prescientia divina
non sit "signum necessitatis" rebus futuris. Secundo ostendit que modus probandi ex
signo non "esse efficat" ibi. lam vero primo dicere, Tu "inquies" id est dicere
"poteris, tametsi" pro quamvis prescientia non sit necessaria eveniendi rebus "futuris,
tamen est signum ea necessario esse ventura." Et ita prescientia posset inferri
necessitas futurorum" tamquam ex signo. "Hoc igitur modo" ponendo prescientia esse
signum "necessitatis futurorum constaret exitus" id est eventus "futurorum esse
necessarios etiam si" non fuisset "precognitio," quod probat ex natura signi
distinctioni. "Omne namque signum tamen ostendit quid sit" id est manifestat illud
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cuius est signum, sed non efficit quod signat. Quare "ut prenotionem" id est
providentiam "appareat esse signum necessitatis" futurorum demonstrandum erat.
Prius nihil contingere non ex necessitate" id est omnia evenire necessario. Alioquin
si haec necessitas" futurourm "nulla est," nee illa prescientia "poterit esse signum eius
rei quae non est." Et ita non valet argumentem neceSsitatem futurorum ex prescientia
tanquam ex signo.
Notandum que signum non est causa eius cuius est s1gnum, sed tamen
manifestat signatum esse, ut circulus non est causa venditionis vini, sed tarnen est
signum venditionis. Si igitur prescientia essent signum necessitatis futurorum
presupponeret futura esse necessaria. Et sic ad ostendendum prescientiarn esse
signum necessitatis futurorum oportet prius ostendere futura necessario esse futura
tanque prescientia esset singum necessitatis futurorum, aliis prescientia est signum
alicuius rei que non esset quod est absurdum. "lam vero..." hie ostendit modum
probandi ex signo non esse efficacem et <licit. "Constat" id est manifestum est
"rationem subnixarn" id est firmarn probatione id est demonstratione earn non esse
ducendam "ex signis neque ex argumentis extrinsecus petitis" id est acceptis, sed
firmarn rationem esse "ducendarn ex convenientibus" id est ex propriis ex "necessariis
causis." Cum ergo predicta ratio processerit ex signo non est efficax et demonstratina
cum sit a posteriori. Demonstratio aut que est potissima probationum ipsa est a priori,
cum sit ex causis per se immediatis prioribus et notioribus, et pro tanto �
demonstratio est sillogismus faciens scire efficax ad probandum ex primo posteriorum.
"Sed qui fieri potest..." hie Philosophia monet quamdam dubitationem et solvit

earn. Videtur seque quod alique possunt preferri que tamen non necessario eveniunt.
Si autem non necessario eveniunt possunt non evenire. Et sic sequitur quod aliquod
prescitum a deo non eveniat. Primo ergo Philosophia dubitando de hoc querit dicens,
ex quo ita est, que ea que sunt prescita non sunt necessaria sed possunt non evenire
qui, id est quomodo fieri potest ut ea que providentur futura esse non proveniant. Tune
solvit dubitationem dicens, que non negatur que prescita non eveniant, immo oportet
dicere que prescita eveniant, sed tamen non eveniunt de necessitate. Unde <licit,
"Quasi vero."

Quasi dicat ista dubitatio procedit quasi non credamus ea que

providentia prenoscit non esse eventura. Sed hoc non est verum, ac quasi non potius
arbitremur illud scilicet que licet futura eveniant, nihil tamen necessitatis habuisse in
sui natura ut evenirent.

Id manifestat in exemplo quomodo aliquid certe

comprehenditur, quod tamen non est necessarium. Dicens que aliquid cognitum
eveniat, et tamen non necessario licebit que tu hoc perpendas huic, id est ex tali
exemplo. Intuemur enim plura subiecta oculis dum fiunt, id est dum sunt in fieri, sicut
ea que videntur aurige facere in moderandis et flectendis quadrigis et cetera. Videmus
ad hunc modum ut que fiunt in aliis actibus• volutariis num quid ulla necessitas
compellit aliquod illorum ita fieri sicut oculis videtur? Et <licit Boetius, "Minime," et
assignat rationem, "frustra enim esset effectus artis si omnia moverentur coacta," et
frustra esset ars flectendi quadrigas si necessario flecterentur. Igitur ilia que cum fiunt
carent necessitate existendi eadem sunt futura sine necessitate priusquam fiant. Ex quo
concludit, "Quare quaedam sunt eventura quorum" exitus id est eventus est absolutus
ab omni necessitate, et forsan aliquis diceret, nam ea que nunc fiunt non erant futura
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priusquam essent.
Hoc concludit dicens, "nullum arbitror esse dicturum quod quae nunc fiunt
eventura non fuerunt," hoc enim esset nimis irrationabile. Ideo necessario concluditur
que hoc etiam precognita habent eventus liberos. Quare sicut scientia presentium nihil
importat necessitatis his rebus quae fiunt in presenti, sicut patet in exemplo predicto
de regimine quadrigarum ita prescientia futurorum nihil importat necessitatis his que
ventura sunt. Notandum quod licet futura in comparatione ad divinam providentiam
sint necessaria necessitate conditionata, non tamen omnia sunt necessaria necessitate
absoluta. Multa enim libere eveniunt sicut ea que fiunt ab arte et voluntate ad regimen
quadrigarum. Si enim regimen quadrigarum necessario eveniret: frustra esset ars
regendi quadrigas.
Notandum que sicut res actu fiunt, ita erant future, sed quaedam actu libere
fiunt. Ergo erant libere future, et per consequens non omnia sunt necessario futura,
licet necessitate conditionata inquantum comparantur ad providentiam divinam. Non
tamen in sui natura considerata necessario eveniunt necessitate absoluta, sicut postea
videbitur, ubi distinguet duplicem necessitatem, conditionatam et absolutam. "Sed hoc
inquis ..." hie Philosophia discutit motivum Boetius utrum futura incerta sicut sunt
contingentia possint certe presciri. Et primo movet dubitationem de hoc, et tangit
rationem dubitationis. Secundo assignat causam erroris, ibi. "Cuius erroris causa est"
<licit primo. "Sed tu inquis 'O Boetius'..." hoc ipsum dubitatur an possit esse ulla
prenotio, id est prescientia illarum rerum que non habent necessarios exitus id est
eventus. Hoc enim nullo modo vero possibile, cum enim "videntur dissonare"
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prescientia et contingentia. Tu enim "putas si prevideantur" contingentia "necessario
ipsa consequi" et "si necessitas desit minime ipsa presciri," et putas "nil posse
comprehendi" prescientia divina "nisi certum." Et "si ea que sunt incerti exitus" id
est eventus sicut contingentia, si "providentur" illa "quasi certa: tu putas "illud esse
caliginem" opinionis "non veritatem scientie." Et in hoc tu deciperis, cuius deceptionis
causa est error tuus circa iudicium cognitionis. "Credis" enim "diversum esse ab
integritate scientie aliter arbitrari rem" que se habeat et in hoc erras.
Nota que quare nos non possumus futura contingentia certe prenoscere.
Putamus similiter Deum hoc non posse. Res enim eodem modo se habens diversi
mode a diversis posset cognosci. Unum cognoscere rem aliter quae se habeat ex parte
cognoscentis bene est scientia, et sic futura contingentia licet in se sint incerta.
Possunt tamen presciri a deo sine errore falsitatis. Cuius erroris causa est. Hie assignat
causam erroris, ubi notandum que causa erroris. Quare putamus futura incerta non
posse certe presciri est quare putatur que facultas cognitionis sit secundum facultatem
rei cognite et non ipsius cognoscentis quod est falsum. Primo igitur premittit
huiusmodi causam erroris. Secundo probat ipsam, ibi, "Nam ut hoc brevi." Dicit
primo, "Cuius erroris causa est." Quare existimatur quod omnia quae quisque novit
illa cogniscit "tantum ex vi et natura ipsorum que sciuntur" et non ex vi cognoscentis,
"quod totum est contra" id est per contrarium. Quare res magis cognoscuntur
secundum naturam cognoscentis. "Omne enim quod cognoscitur non comprehenditur
secundum sui vim" id est secundum modum sue nature sed potius secundum facultatem
cognoscentis.
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Nota que si cognitio esset secundum facultatem rei cognite, tune res ab omnibus
eodem modo cognosceretur.

Et sic comprehenderetur aliquid eodem modo ab

intellectu humano et divino quod falsum est, quia que sunt incerta comprehensione
humana sunt certa comprehensione divina. Cognitio ergo potius attenditur secundum
facultetem potentie cognoscentis ita quod quanto potentia est efficacior et certior tanto
certius et limpidius rem comprehendit. "Nam ut hoc brevi exemplo liqueat..." hie
probat quod facultas cognitionis est secundum facultatem potentie cognoscentis et non
rei cognite. Primo declarat hoc exemplis. Secundo probat hoc idem per rationem, ibi,
"Ipsum quoque." Primo <licit que cognitio sit secundum facultatem cognoscentis liquet
brevi exemplo. Nam visus aliter agnoscit eandem corporis rotunditatem et aliter tactus.
Ille eminus scilicet visus "manens enimus" id est a longinquo "intuitur totum" corpus
"simul iactis radiis" visualibus. Hie vero scilicet tactus coherens et coniunctus "orbi"
id est "rotunditati et motus circa" ipsum "ambitum," id est circa corpus rotundum
"comprehendit" scilicet eius "rotunditatem partibus," id est per partes.
Nota que innuit duplicem differentiam inter modum cognoscendi visus et tactus.
Prima est que visus a remotis existens cognoscit aliquod corpus rotundum. Tactus
autem non cognoscit ipsum nisi coniunctus. Secunda differentia est que visus totum
corpus simul comprehendit, tactus autem per partes. Talis autem diversitas in
cognoscendo non esset si res cognosceretur ex sui natura cum eadem res maneat in
utraque cognitione. Notandum que quidam dixerunt visionem fieri per emissionem
radiorum visualium ab oculis usque ad rem visam, sed hec opinio est contra
Aristoteles. visio enim non sit extramittendo sed intus suscipiendo. Patiente enim
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aliquo sensitivo sit 1psum videre. ii. de anima. Hie autem loquitur secundum
opinionem antiquorum cum <licit quod visus totum corpus intuitur iactis radiis. "Ipsum
que hominem..." hie ponit secundum exemplum in virtutibus cognoscitivis
subordinatis. Secundum ostendit quoniam iste virtutes se habeant ad invicem, ibi, "In
quo illud." Primo igitur declarat quomodo idem a diversis potentiis diversi mode
comprehenditur.

"Dicit sensus exterior aliter contuitur ipsum hominem, aliter

imaginatio, aliter ratio: aliter intelligentia" divina. "Sensus enim" exterior sicut visus
"iudicat figuram" hominis in "subiecta materia" id est in sensibili materia, sed
imaginatio solum figuram discernit sine materia id est in absentia rei materialis. "Ratio
vero bane" imaginationem "transcendit" et "ipsam speciem" id est naturam specificam
hominis quae singularibus inest perpendit" id est discernit "universali consideratione,
oculus vero" id est consideratio "intelligentie est celsior." Quare intelligentia divina
super gressa "ambitum universitatis" que existit in singularibus "illam simplicem
formam" scilicet ideam hominis que est in mente divina "contuitur pura" facie id est
speculatione "pure mentis."
Notandum que primum exemplum fuit de virtutibus cognoscitivis non
subordinatis sicut de visu et tactu. Istud autem exemplum est de virtutibus subordinatis
que sunt quattuor scilicet sensus exterior quo in est omnibus animalibus imaginatio que
tamen in est animalibus perfectis, ratio que tamen est in hominibus, et intelligentia per
quam intelligit divinam cognitionem.

Iste virtutes habent diversum modum

cognoscendi eandem rem scilicet hominem ut declaratur in littera quod non esset nisi
cognitio fieret secundum facultatem virtutum cognoscentium et non rei cognite. "In

quo illud maxime considerandum est. .." hie ostendit Philosophia quoniam predicte
virtutes cognoscitive se habent ad invicem ostendens quod quicquid potest virtus
inferior, potest etiam et superior et amplius. Et primo hoc ostendit de intelligentia
respectu aliarum virtutum. Secundo ostendit idem de ratione, secunda ibi, Ratio
quoque. Primo <licit "in quo" id est in ordine istarum virtutum "illud est maxime
considerandum quevis comprehendendi superior amplecitur in se inferiorem." Quare
virtus superior cogniscit omnem illud quod inferior. "Inferior" autem non "surgit ad
superiorem" ita ut apprehendat illud quod superior, quod manifestat in exemplo <licit,
"Neque enim sensus aliquid valet apprehendere extra materiam," et "imaginatio
contuitur species universales" id est minus particulares. Sed ratio capit "simplicem"
id est universalem formam. "Intelligentia" aut divina "quasi desuper spectans," cum
sit in supremo gradu cognitionis ipsa "concepta forma" ideali "diiudicat etiam cuncta
que subsunt" illi forme, ut cognoscendo ideam hominis cognoscit omnia que sunt in
homine, sed eodem modo comprehendit ipsam formam que nulli inferiori virtuti nota
esse poterit. Nam ipsa cognoscit universum id est universalem formam "rationis et
figuram imaginationis et materiale sensibile" quod spectat ad sensu extriorem non
"utens ratione nee imaginatione nee sensibus, sed prospiciens cuncta uno ictu mentis"
id est absque decursu cognoscit quod non facit ratio.
Nota quod virtus superior virtutem inducit inferiorem, sicut tetragonum includit
trigonum, ut patet. ii. De Anima. Ideo quicquid potest virtus inferior potest et
superior et magis. Quare non magis universali comprehendit quod inferior, modo
magis particulari licet non econtraverso.

ldeo que potest intelligentia humana
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comprehendere potest et clivina intelligentia, licet non econtraverso. "Ratio quoque
cum quid respicit. .. " hie ostenclit idem ratione, que sicut intelligentia comprehenclit
alias tres virtutes inferiores, sic ratio etiam comprehendit sub se alias duas virtutes
scilicet imaginationem et sensum <licit, "Quoque cum ratio respicit quod universale non
utens imaginatione nee sensibus: et comprehendit in imaginabilia et sensibilia"
universali compehensione. "Haec enim est ratio que ita cliffinit universale sue
conceptionis. homo est animal bipes rationale, quae" cliffinitio "cum sit universalis
notio" id est notificatio. Cum "nullus etiam ignoret rem esse imaginabilem sensibilem
que" hac cliffinitione explicatur. Illa ratio considerat universale non utens
"imaginatione vel sensu sed rationali conceptione." Tune ostenclit que sicut ratio
comprehenclit imaginationem et sensum, sic imaginatio sensum comprehenclit elicit
"imaginatio quoque tametsi" pro quivis "sumpsit" exorclium "ex sensibus visencli et
formancli figuras, tamen absente" sensu exteriori imaginatio collustrat id et cognoscit
"quaeque sensibilia, non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iuclicancli." Et tune concluclit
<licit, "Videsne igitur quod cuncta potius utantur sua" id est propria "facultate in
cognoscendo, quam facultate eorum quae cognoscuntur?"
Notandum quod licet ratio in conprehendende suum universale non utatur
imaginatione et sensu, tamen in actu suo presupponit imaginationem et sensum, quare
nihil est in intellectu nisi fuerit in sensu. Similiter licet imaginatio in sua operatione
non utatur sensu, tamen presupponit sensum fuisse in actu, quare fantasia quam hoc
vocat imaginationem est motus factus a sensu secundum actum ex secundo De Anima.
"Neque id iniuria..." hie confirmat dictum suum per rationem clicens, illud scilicet que
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res cognoscitur non secundum sui naturam sed secundum sui naturam cognoscentis
illud non cognovit iniuria id est irrationabiliter. "Nam cum omne iudicium" cognitionis
sit actus et operatio iudicantis id est potentie cognoscitive, "necesse est ut quisque"
cognoscens "perficiat suam operam" id est suam operationem cognoscendi, "non ex
aliena potestate secundae" rei cognite "sed ex propria potestate" id est ex virtute
cognoscentis. Notandum quod ex littera formatur talis ratio. Omnis actus et operatio
sequitur conditionem illius potentie cuius est actus et operatio, sed iudicare sive
cognoscere est actus et operatio potentie cognoscentis et non rei cognite. Ergo iudicare
et cognoscere sequitur modum et conditionem potentie cognoscentis et non rei cognite.
Ascensius
"Tum illa vetus" et cetera, hie incipit Philosophia respondere ad proposita
obiecta. Est autem facillimus verborum textus, et sententie satis explanate in superiori
commento sunt. Scies tamen iniungi in significatione in qua nunc vulgo ponitur. Et
Plurimus, Quintilianus, Statius et alii illorum tempore posuerunt, Ciceronem non
posuisse. Memineris etiam ut super notam bigas, trigas, et quadrigas singulariter non
profertur apud doctos. lbi autem, "Atque ad hunc modum" et cetera, defectus est qui
sic credo supplebitur. "Atque ad hunc et ad hunc modum" et cetera. super facere
videntur. "Illic" autem, minime, frustra enim esset," et cetera, verba sunt Boetii usque
ad illum locum, "Qui igitur. .. " et cetera. Et ita distinximus cum aliter invenissemus,
sed ad alia pergamus.
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Metrum Quartum Qunti Libri
Sanctus Thomas
"Quondam porticus attulit..." istud est quartum metrum huius quinti quod
dicitur gliconicum ab inventore, coriambicum a pede predominante. In quo metro
improbat opinionem Stoicorum, ex qua videtur sequi contrarium dictis suis. Fuit enim
opinio Stoicorum quod cognitio intellectiva solum preficeretur ex hoc que corpora
exteriora suas similtudines impremunt in mentem, ita ut mens solum se habeat in
ratione patientis, et res extra in ratione agentis. Ex quo sequitur cum patiens trahatur
ad naturam agentis et non econverso, que cognitio sequetur naturam rei cognite et non
naturam cognoscentis, quod est contra dicta. Primo ergo ponit opinionem Stoicorum.
Secundo improbat earn, ibi, sed mens. Primo <licit. "Quodam porticus attulit senes"
scilicet Stoicos, qui dicebantur senses propter maturitatem morum. Senes in qua
"nimium obscuros" super in sententiis, quo Stoici credunt "sensus et imagines" id est
rerum sensibilium formas imprimi mentibus ex "corporibus extimis" id est
exterioribus. Et posuerunt corpora illa eo modo imprimere "imagines mentibus, ut
quondam mos" fuit alicui scribenti "celeri stilo figere pressas litteras equore" id est
planicie "pagine quae pagina nullas prius notas habebat."
Nota quod Stoici dicuntur a stoa Grece quod est porticus Latine, quare Athenis
in manifestissima porticu et aliis locis publice Stoici disputare solebant. Illi posuerunt
animam tamen habere se in ratione patientis respectu rerum exteriorum. Et quia
cognitio magis videtur sequi virtutem activam qua passivam, ideo secundum eos
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eognitio potius debet attendi seeundum faeultatem rei eognite que est aetiva, quod
anime eognoseentis quae est passiva. "Sed mens si propriis vigens..." hie improbat
hane opinionem. Seeeundo ponit suam veritatem, ibi, "Hee est effieiens." Primo ergo
dedueit ad plura ineonvenientia istam opinionem dieens, "Sed si mens vigens nihil
explieat" propriis motibus id est si nullam aetionem propriam habet, "sed tantum iaeet
patientis subdita notis," id est similitudiniubis eorporum. Et si ipsa "reddit" id est
representat "eassas" imagines rerum id est similes "invicem speeuli" id est ad modum
speeuli, tune queritur "unde viget hee notio" id est hee eognitio "animis" quod anima
est "eernens omnia," non tamen eorporalia sed etiam ineorporalia.
Nota quod primum ineonveniens est si eognitio intelleetiva fierit per solam
impressionem eorporum in anima, tune non esset virtus per quam anima eognoseeret
ineorporalia. Nune autem manifestum est que etiam ineorporalia eognoscit. Aliud
ineonveniens ponit dicens, si anima tamen est passiva, "quae vis anime eognita singula
perspicit" id est iudicat? Aut quevis anime eognita dividit, divisa reeolligit, aut quevis
anime legens id est apprehendens alterum iter eomponendi et dividendi. "Nune inserit
eaput summis" id est generalissimis aseendendo a speeialissimis ad generalissima
eolligendo multitudinem, et nune desidet vel deeidit seeundum aliam litteram id est
eadit in infima id est in speeialissima proeendo a generalissimis ad specialissima
dividendo. Tum id est tandem anima "referens" id est eomparans "sese sibi redarguit
falsaveris" id est per vera.
Notandum quod ex littera talis formatur ratio. Illa anima non est tamen passiva
sed aetiva que iudicat componit et dividit et vera falsis redarguit, sed anima intelleetiva
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est huius modi, ergo et cetera Maior est nota. Quare iudicare, componere, dividere,
redarguere, videntur esse operationes active. Minor apparet. Anima iudicat inter
verum et falsum. Componit predicatum cum subiecto, aliquando dividit predicatum
a subiecto, et falsas opiniones redargint. "Hee est efficiens magis..." hie Philosophia
ponit veritatem dicens, "Hee mens est magis causa efficens" quod est "causa longe
potentior qua illa que modo materie" id est similitudine materie "patitur notas
impressas." Et quare aliquis crederet que in anima nulla esset passio ideo subdit.
Quandam passio precedit operationes anime in uno corpore excitans et movens vires
animi ad operandum, ut quando "lux ferit oculos" tune patitur visus "vel cum vox
instrepit" id est insonuit auribus tune patitur auditus. Et "tandem vigor mentis excitus"
id est "excitatus vocans species quas intus tenet ad similes motus applicat eas notis
exteris" id est simmilitudinibus exterioribus, et "miscet" id et "applicat imagines
exteriores" corporum "formis" id est speciebus 'introsum" id est in anima "reconditis."
Notandum quod Boetius hie utitur sententia Platonica quod ponit species rerum
a principio naturaliter inditas anime, sed anima sopita est in corpe, ita quod non
intelligit per eas nisi excitetur per imutationem sensuum exteriorum. Excitata autem
evocat speciem similitem illi quam sensus exterior impressit, et applicando earn rei
exterior, et sic intelligit per earn. Ad hanc intentionem etiarn loqitur Linconienere id
est posteriorum dicens, "Ratio in nobis Sopita non agit nisi prius per operationes
sensuum quibus admiscetur fuerit experta." Notandum quod ex littera videtur quod
intellectus passibilis intelligendo etiam sit activus cum sit causa efficens, ut dicitur in
littera. Aristoteles autem, iii. De Anima vult quod intelligere sit pati, et quod
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intellectus nullam habet naturam nisi que est passibilis vocatus. Ad hoc dicunt aliqui
que quare anima conprehendit tam intellectum passibilem quam agentem. Anima est
activa, immo causa effectiva intellectionis ratione intellectus agentis, sed est passiva
ratione intellectus passibilis. Vel dicendum que intellectus passibilis est potentia
passiva saltem quo ad primum eius actum, cum intelligere sit pati. Sed omnis potentia
passiva de necessitate reliquit potentiam activam que reducat ipsam ad actum. Tale aut
activum non posset esse res corporalis extra, cum agens sit prestantius passo. Ideo tale
activum ex parte anime erit intellectus agens cuius operatione est facere potentia
intellecta actu intellecta, ita que a rebus extra virtutem intellectus agentis imprimitur
aliquid intellectui passibili, per quod in actum intelligendi reducitur. Non est ergo
intentio Boethius negare quin mens sit passiva ratione intellectus passibilis, sed vult
que mens sive anima magis habeat efficientiam in intellectione que sit passiva ab ipsis
corporibus extra. Et per consequens efficentia intellectus non debet attribui rebus
extra: quod erat de intentione Stoicorum.
Ascensius
"Quondam porticus attulit" et cetera, versus est monocolosi. unius membri, est
autem glyconicus ab inventore. Dactylicus a pede predominante, trimeter a numero
pedum, acatalecticus, quare plenus et non redundans. Constat autem spondeo et duobus
dactylis sed ultima syllaba sicut semper est communis. Damnat opinioni Stoicorum qui
a menone prius menonii dicti postea a porticu stoici ceperunt appelari. Omnia satis
dilucida sunt.
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Stylus aliquando est columna: aliquando instrumentum scribendi in tabula
cerata aut simuli, aliquando qualitas scriptorum. Hie est instrumentum equor dicitur
ab equalitate sive in mari sive in terra, quicquid asperum non est equor dicitur.
Voluerunt autem animam esse velut tabulam rasam in qua nihil scriptum est. Pagine
autem inquit festus dicte sunt que in libris suam queque obtinent regionem, ut pagi id
est vici iuxta fontes siti, vel a pangendo que in illis versus panguntur id est figuntur.
Est igitur pagina utraque pars phyllure seu folii dicta que in ea carmina pangantur hoc
est sigantur. Unde hie bene <licit pressas figere litteras. Nam pangere est sigere et
solidare, et per translationem cantare dicitur, notis subdita id est impressionibus
subiecta.
Tum mentis vigor excitus, ita scribendum est non exitus. Habet autem excitus
secundam syllabam communem, quia apud Virgi. in iii. Eneid, producitur cum <licit
"excitum ruit" et cetera, et hie corripitur. Volunt "acio" quarte coniungationis produci,
et "acieo" secunde corripi, nam ab utroque deduci arbitrantur.
Prosa Quinta Quinti Libri

Sanctus T homas
"Quod si in corporibus sentiendis... " hec est quinta prosa huius quinti libri, in
qua probat specialiter divinam cognitionem esse secundum motum cognoscentis, et non
rei cognite. Secundo ostendit insufficientiam eorum qui ex nostro modo cognoscendi
improbant providentiam divinam, ibi, "Quid igitur" et cetera. Primo facit quod dictum
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est. Secundo infert duas conclusiones, ibi, "Hae itaque." Primo dicit, "Si in sentiendis"
id est in cognoscendis "corporibus animus noster non tamen insignitur" id est afficitur
"passione corpis sed ex sua vi iudicat passionem subiectam corpori, itaque" in
cognoscendo sequitur propnum motum, quamvis qualitatis "obiecte forinsecus
afficiant" id est mutent instrumenta id est organa sensuum. Et "passio corporis
antecedat vigorem agentis animi, quod passio provocet actum mentis in se, et excitat
formas intrinsecus quiescentes." Si hoc est in animo nostro multo vagis "ea quae
absoluta sunt cunctis affectionibus" id est qualitatibus corporum, sicut intelligentie
separate et precipue deus, illa "in discernendo non consequuntur obiecta extrinsecus,
sed expediunt" id est perficiunt "actum suae mentis" id est operationem intellectivam
secundum naturam propriam.
Notandum quod ex littera potest sic argui, si id de quo minus videtur inesse
inest et de quo magis, sed minus videtur que animus noster in cognoscendo sequatur
motum suum et non rei cognite, et tamen sequitur facultatem sue cognitionis, ergo
multo magis intelligentia divina sequitur in cognoscendo proprium motum sue
cognitionis que ipsius rei cognite. "Hae itaque ratione ... " hie infert duas conclusiones
ex premissis dicit, ex quo cognitio sequitur naturam cognoscentis et non rei cognite.
Et cum cognoscentia sint diversa secundum naturam, omnem diversis cognoscentibus
convenire diversas cognitiones unum dicit, "Hae itaque ratione," quare cognitio
sequitur naturam cognoscentis "multiplices cognitiones cessere" id est cesserunt
diversis "ac differentibus substantiis sensus enim solus destitutus aliis cognitionibus
cessit animantibus immobilibus quales sunt conche maris et quaeque nutriuntur herentia

sax1s.

Imaginatio vero cessit mobilibus beluis" que moventur motu progressivo

"quibus videtur inesse affectus" id est appetitus "fugiendi" malum vel "appetendive"
bonum.

"Ratio vero" per quam comprehendimus universale tantum est humani

generis, sicut intelligentia est divini generis." Tune ponit secundam conclusionem quod
illa conclusio est notior et nobilior que non solum apprehendit proprium obiectum, sed
etiam obiecta aliarum notitiarum id est cognitionum. Unum <licit, "Quo fit ut ea
notitia," id est cognitio "prestet" id est nobilior sit ceteris "quod suapte natura" id est
"propria natura non modo" id est non tammodo proprium super obiectum cognoscit,
"sed etiam cognoscit subiecta certarum noticiarum."
Notandum circa primam conclusionem que cum actus et operationes
diversitatem secundum diversittem agentium et operantium. Sequitur si agentia et
operantia sint diversa que habeant diversas operationes et cognitiones. propter quod
sensus sine aliis cognitionibus cessit animalibus ignobilibus, et accipitur hie sensus
stricte pro apprehensione sensitiva que solum imutatur ad praescentiam sensibilis. Sic
enim distinguitur contra imaginationem que non tamen apprehendit rem presentem, sed
etiam absentem.
Notandum circa istam conclusionem que quecumque potentia plura agnoscit
videtur esse prestantiorea que cognoscit pauciora. Si igitur alique potentia "cognoscit
proprium" obiectum et cum haec obiecta aliarum potentiarum inferiorum sicut est
intelligentia divina et non econverso, sequitur que potentia superior plura cognoscens
sit nobilior inferiori. "Quid igitur... " hie Philosophia ostendit insufficientiam eorum
qui ex modo cognoscendi numero improbant divinam providentiam. Secundo hortatur
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nos ad considerandum modum divine cognitionis, ibi, "Quare in illius." Primo
manifestat insufficientiam eorum per simile. Secundo applicat simile illud ad
propositum, ibi, simile est similitudo autem quam intendit talis est Sensus et imaginatio
sunt cognitiones inferiores qua ratio. Si ergo sensus et imaginatio vellent iudicare
modum cognoscendi rationis ex modo cognoscendi proprio et dicere que ultime nihil
esset quod ratio apprehendit, vel si verum esset iudicium rationis, vel si esset
particulare et sensibile ratio vero dicere contrarium manifestum est que nos qui
vigemus utraque cognitione potius assentiremus rationi iudicando motivum sensus et
imaginationis esse insufficiens. Dicit ergo, "Quid igitur si sensus et imaginatio
refragentur" id est contradicant "ratiocinationi dicentis nihil esse universale id quod
ratio putat se intueri." Sic arguendo, "Quod enim est sensibile vel imaginabile id non
posse esse universum" id est universale habet iudicium sensus et imaginationis. "Aut
igitur iudicium rationis necesse esse verum," et per consequens "ne quicque esse
sensibile," quod est absurdum. "Aut quoniam motum sit" tibi secundum "sensui et
imaginationi plura esse subiecta sensibus et imaginationi" que necesse est "esse
sensibilia," crederes ne "conceptionem rationis esse in anime que considerat illud quod
est sensiblile" et "singulare quasi quoddam ultime. Ad hec si ratio respondeat
conspicere in ratione" universali illud "quod est sensibile et imaginabile, illa vero," sed
sensum et imaginationem "non posse aspirare" id est pervenire ad "cognitionem
universitatis" id est universalis "quoniam notio" id est "cognitio eorum non excedis
figuras corporales." Et diceret ratio "potius esse credendum firmiori et perfectiori
iudicio rerum. In huiusmodi igitur lite" scilicet inter sensum et imaginationem ex una

parte et rationem ex altera parte, nos quibus inest tam vis ratiocinandique imaginandi
et sentiendi nonne potius probaremus causam rationis. Et reputaremus motiva sensus
et imaginationis esse insufficientia quo diceret immo.
Notandum quod iudicio nobilioris potentie potius est astandum que iudicio
potentie ignobilioris. Cum igitur ratio sit potentia nobilior sensus et imaginatio eo que
ratio conprehendit proprium obiectum et obiectum sensus et imaginationis et non
econverso. Ergo potius astandum est iudicio rationis que potentiarum inferiorum.
"Simile est..." hie applicat illud simile ad propositum et elicit, illud quod est dictum
de sensu et imaginatione respectu rationis "simile est ei quid humana ratio" non putat
"divinam intelligentiam intueri, nisi que ipsa ratio cognoscat" quod apparet ex ipso
modo arguendi. "Nam ita disseris" id est arguis, "si qua videatur non habere certos ac
pro et necessarios eventus, talia nequunt presciri ea certo eventura. Igitur harum
rerum nulla est prescientia, quam scilicet prescientiam si credamus esse in his nihil erit
quod non proveniat ex necessitate. Si igitur uti pro sicut" sumus participes rationis "ita
possemus habere iudicium divine mentis, sicut nunc iudicavimus imaginationem et
sensum oportere cede id est locum dare rationi, sic censeremus" id est iudicaremus
"iustissimum humanam rationem sese submittere divine menti."
Notandum quod simile est de iudicio sensus et imaginationis respectu rationis,
et rationis respectu intelligentie divine. Nam sensui et imaginationi videtur quod ratio
aliter non possit comprehendere rem, nisi sicut ipsa comprehendit, quod falsum est.
Sic similiter videtur rationi humane que intelligentia divina non possit res incertas
cognosces aliter qua ipsa cognoscit quod falsum est, nam que ratio humana incerte
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cognoscit intelligentia divina summa comprehendit. "Quare in illius..." hie Philosophia
hortatur ut erigamus nos ad cognitionem divine intelligentie <licit, "Quare si possimus
erigamur" per diligentem considerationem in "cacumen" illius summe "intelligentie"
super divine. "Illic enim ratio videbit quod in se non potest intueri. Scilicet quoniam
certa et diffinita prevotio Dei" cognoscat illa "quae non habent certos" existus. Et
illud non erit opinio, "sed potius erit simplicitas summe scientie nullis termins
inclusa." Quare simplicitas summe sapientie est infinita. Notandum quod si cognitio
sequiretur facultatem rei cognite et non virtutis cognoscentis, tune sicut ratio humana
cognoscit futura contingentia incerte, sic similiter intelligentia divina ea incerte
cognosceret.

Sed quia facultas cognitionum est secundum facultatem virtutum

cognoscentium, et intelligentia divina id est cognoscentia divina in cognoscendo excedit
rationem humanam, poterit ipsa certe cognoscere que ratio humano incerte cognoscit.
Ascensius
"Quod si in corporibus sentiendis" id est sensu dignoscendis. Cognitiones
differentibus cessere substantiis. Quia "cedere" interpretari solet pro eo quod est
"locum dare." Ideo non nunquam accipitur pro eo quod est "dari," quia cui ceditur
illi datur. Unde Virgilius xi, "Hee omnis regio et celsi plaga pinea montis. Cedat
amicitie Teucrorum." "Cedat" id est detur et concedatur. Sic igitur hie, "cognitiones
cessere" id est date sunt, et per fortem obvenerunt. Cetera nota sunt.
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Metrum Quintum Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas
"Quam variis terras..." hie incipit quintum metrum huius quinti quod dicitur
Archiloicum ab inventore. Dactylicum a pede predominante. In quo ostendit hominem
esse dispositum ad contemplationem ex figura corporis sui. Et primo describit figuram
corporalem aliarum bestiarum. Secundo fig1_1ram hominis, ibi, "Unica gens." Primo
<licit "Animalia permeant terras quam variis" id est valde "variis figuris. Namque alia
animalia extento corpore" sicut sunt serpentes sicut sunt reptilia. Illa "verrunt" id est
vertunt "pulverare" et "incitata" id est mota vi "pectoris trahunt continuum sulcum"
super in pulvere. Sunt alia animalia quibus in est "vaga levitas alarumque verberant
ventos et enatant" et transeunt "liquido volatu spacia longi etheris" id est aeris. Sunt
alia que "gaudent vestigia pressisse solo" id est terre gressibus super suis et
transmittere id est pertransire "virides campos et gaudent subire silvas. Quae omnia
animalia licet videas eas discrepare variis formis" tamen "facies eorum prona" id est
ad terram inclinata "valet ingravare" id est ingravatos ostendere sensus bebetes.
Nota quod Philosophia tangit tria genera animalium scilicet reptilia, volatilia,
et gressibilia, quae licet differant in formis, quia quedam formantur ad reptandum ut
serpentes, quedam ad volandum ut aves, quedam ad gradiendum ut bestie terrestres.
Tamen in hoc omnia conveniunt que habent facies inclinatam ad terram. "Unica gens
hominem..." hie describit figuram hominis <licit "Unica gens hominem," id est solum
genus humanum "levat celsum cacumen" id est caput suum altius et "levis stat recto"
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id est erecto "corpore et despicit terras," vultque elevato ad celum. Tu homo
"terrenus qui recto vultu petis celum et exeris" id est exigis frontem. Haec recta
"figura admonet te quod tu male decipis, nisi" etiam feras id est extolles "animum
tuum sublime" id est in celestia, ne mens "gravata" id est grave divine depressa
"pessum" id est sub pedibus vel subtus, et est pessum adverbium loci, ne illa mens
fidat id est resideat inferior levato corpore celsus.
Notandum cum homo habeat figuram corporis erectam ad celum, si anima non
erigeretur ad contemplationem celestium videretur corpus esse nobilius anima. Nota
secundum Aristoteles. in xvi. De Animalibus: "Homo inter omnia animalia habet
figuram recti linearem." De qua figura etiam loquitur Ovidius in Ii. Metaphisicis,
<licit, "Pronaque cum spectant animalia cetera terram, os homini sublime dedit
celumque videre Iussit," et erectos ad sydera tollere vultus.
Ascensius
"Quam variis" et cetera. Versus est monocolos. est enim totus phaletius seu
Archilochius constat que ex quatuor pedibus heroicis id est consuetis in hexametro
heroico, et tribus trocheis. Ita tamen que ultima syllaba intelligatur communis, nam
ultimus pes spondeus frequenter est. Quartus autem dactylus est semper finiens partem
orationis more bucolici versus, et si quartam syllabam a fine dempseris erit totus
heroicus, ut deposita ultima syllaba huius verbi pertineant erit hexameter sic.
"Quam variis terris animalia perme figuris." Et ita in singulis legitur autem
principium diversi mode. Nam alii dicunt quod variis: alii tam variis, alii tum variis.

In illo autem versu, "Hee pressisse solo vestigia," "gressibusque" "gaudent" duo vitia
offendi. Nam pro "pressisse" scriptum erat "precessisse" quod neque versus neque
sententia patitur. Venit enim a premo pressi. Nam sensus est, "gaudent pressisse" id
est impressisse vel fixisse solo vestigia. Alterum vitium erat quia ablata fuit sillaba
quod ibi "gressibusque" unde tam versus quam sensus imminutus fiebat. Unica gens
hominum, sic Ovidius in primo metamorphoseos, "Pronaquod" cum spectant. "Gens"
autem dicitur "genus" et etiam pecudibus attribuitur, unde Virgilius in septimo etiam
equis gentem esse dixit, "Despicitque terras," "despicere" est "deorsum inspicere," et
quia per contemptum fit que nolumus quenque aspicere, aut quia eum aspicientes, sic
aspicimus quasi deorsum et ad rem vilem "inspicientes." Ideo "despicere" accipitur
pro "contemnere," ut in bucolicis. "Despectus tibi sum, nee quis sim queris a lexi."
Econtrario "suspicere" est susum seu sursum aspicere, ut "Attenuati sunt oculi mei
suspicientes in excelso." "Exerisque frontem," male legitur "erexerisque," quia versus
non patitur. Est autem "exero" compositum ab "ex" seu extra et "sero", sed quia "x"
valet geminum "ss" vel "c", et si ideo secundum Priscianum post "x" non solet poni
"s". Nam "ab" et "salio" salvi saltum fit "exulto" no "exsulto". Est autem "exerere",
se altius extra alios servere, vel "expuere" unde exertam linguam dicimus.
Notum etiam esse debet "que ibi hec nisi terrenus male desipis." Non est
legendum "decipis", venit enim a "de" et "sapio" non a "capio". "Pessum" est sub
pede vel sub pedem. Est autem mala ut docet Augustinus politia: dum corpus quod
debet esse ancilla dominatur anime que merito fuerit domina, aut dum sensus rationi
imperat. Sidere est capere sedem ad sedendum.
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Prosa Sexta et Ultima
Sanctus Thomas
"Quoniam igitur uti pauloante..." hie incipit sexta prosa et ultima huius libri
quinti in qua determinat veritatem de compassibiiitate prescientie divine et liberi
arbitrii. Et primo ponit suam determinationem. Secundo subiungit utilem
exhortationem circa finem libri, ibi, "Adversamini igitur." Primo ostendit modum
divine cognitionis. Secundo solvit obiectiones factas contra divinam providentiam.
Tertio concludit compassibilitatem liberi arbitrii cum providentia divina. secunda ibi,
"Quid igitur postulas." Tertia ibi, "Que cum ita sint." Primo determinat de statu Dei
qui est eternitas. Secundo ex hoc declarat modum divine providentie, ibi, "Quoniam
igitur omne iudicium." Primo premittit que determinandum sit de eternitate. Secundo
determinat de ea, ibi, "Eternitas igitur est intermina" et cetera. Primo <licit, quomodo
monstratum est pauloante que omne quod scitur cognoscitur non ex sui natura id est
ex natura rei scite, sed ex natura comprehendentium id est cognoscentium. Intueamur
nunc quantum probatas est quis sit status divine essentie vel substantie, ut possimus
agnoscere que sit eius scientia. Et subdit que commune iudicium cunctorum degentium
id est utentium ratione est Deum esse eternum. Ideo consideremus quid sit eternitas,
"hec enim nobis patefecit pariter naturam et divinam scientiam."
Notandum quod viri degentes ratione sunt viri prediti luce sapientie et omnes
isti concedunt Deum esse eternum. Nam philosophus viii. Phisicis, "Ex eternitate
motus ostendit eternitatem motoris." Et omnes tam greci qua barbari putantes deos
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esse estimant eos immortales. Notandum que quare eternitas Dei et natura et scientia
Dei non differunt secundum substantiam. Ideo cognita eternitate cognoscitur natura
et scientia <lei. "Eternitas" igitur, hie prosequitur de eternitate. Et primo ponit eius
diffinitionem. Secundo declarat earn, ibi, "Quod si ex collatione." Primo <licit,
"eternitas est possessio vite interminabilis existens tota simul et perfecta."
Notandum secundum Albertus supre libro de causis. "Aliquid est eternum et
est m eternitate, et est ipsa eternitas sicut Deus." Aliqua sunt eterna et sunt in
etemitate, sed non sunt ipsa etemitas sicut subsantie separate. Alia sunt eterna non in
eternitate, nee sunt ipsa eternitas ut motus tempus et mundus. Notandum cum <licit
etemitas est possessio, ibi utitur nomine possessionis ad designandum immutabilitem
et indeficientiam eternitatis, quia ipsa firmiter possidetur et quiete habetur. Et <licit
vite ad innuendum que nonviventia non mensurantur eternitate. Et <licit interminabilis
ad differentiam illius vite que habet terminum a parte ante et a parte post sicut vita
hominis, vel a parte ante tamen sicut vita angelorum. et distinctio tota simul ad
differentiam vite angelice quevis enim esse angeli secundum substantiam sit totum
simul, non tamen secundum operationem cum habeat operationes successivas et
intellectiones. Et <licit perfecta ad designandum que eternitati nihil de est. Perfectum
enim est cui nihil de est id est celi et mundi. "Quod ex... " hie declarat diffinitionem.
Secundo redarguit quosdam qui vocabulo eternitatis abutebantur, ibi, non recte. Primo
igitur declarat diffinitionem eternitatis in comparantione ad tempus <licit, Unum dictum
est que "eternitas est possessio tota simul interminabilis vite, quod liquit clarius ex
collatione" id est ex comparatione temporalium. "Nam quicquid vivit in tempore illud
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praesens procedit" per successivam mutabilitatem "a preteritis in futura et nihil est in
tempore constitutum quod pariter possit amplecti" id est comprehendere ultimum
spacium vite sue, "sed crastinum nondum apprehendit. Hesternum vero tempus iam
perdidit, et in hodie nativa non amplius vivitis" id est nihil plus est praesens de hodie
nativa nisi quod "in illo mobili et transitorio momento" continetur de vita. Et dicere
momentum illud indivisibile instans quo futurum copulatur cum preterito. "Quod
igitur temporis conditionem" id est successionem "licet nunque ceperit esse nee
desinat esse sicut Aristoteles censuit de mundo, licet vita" id est duratio eius "tendatur"
id est extendatur "cum infinitate temporis, nondum tarnen tale est ut iure credatur esse
eternum." Quare "non comprehendit" neque "complecitur simul totum spacium vite"
id est sue durationis, "licet infinite" id est "infinito tempore" duret, "sed futuram
nondum habet transacta" id est pertransita et preterita non habet. "Quod igitur" non
"comprehendit" et "possidet pariter totarn plenitudinem interminabilis vite cui nihil
absit futuri" nee aliquid "fluxerit preteriti," illud "iure prohibetur esse eternum," quare
illud "eternum" sui compos eo, quod nihil sibi desit necesse est "semper sibi assistere
praesens" est "necesse presentem habere infinitatem" id est "infinitarn" durationem
"temporis mobilis" id est successivi. Notandum que quare per cognitionem temporis
devenimus in cognitionem eternitatis, eo que opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescunt.
Ideo per naturam et successionem temporis declarat nobis naturam eternitatis. Sicut
enim ratio temporis consistit in successione et apprehensione prioris et posterioris in
motu cuius una pars preterit et alia futura est. Sic ratio eternitatis per oppositum
consistit in apprehensione uniformatis illius quod ornnino est extra motum
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comprehendens simul preteritum et futurum tamquam praesens. Notandum que ipsius
eterni nil transit in preteritum.

Ideo semper sibi praesens assistit, quare vero

numquam deficiet sicut nee unque incepit cum habeat vitam interminabilem. Necesse
est que assint quelibet differentie temporis, etiam si ponatur tempus infinitum. Et
quare eodem modo assistit differentiis temporum per quern modum in se subsistit.
Motus autem quo in se subsistit est presentarius. Ideo etiam assistit differentiis
temporis per modum praesente. Ideo <licit que necesse est et eternum praesentem
habere infinitatem temporis mobilis.
"Unde quidam non recte..." hie Philosophia reprobat quosdam quo abutebantur
vocabulo eternitatis. Secundo docet proprium modum loquendi ibi. Ita si digna, primo
facit quod dictum est. Secundo manifestat quoniam temporalia deficiunt a simplicitate
divine natura quam nituntur imitari, ibi, "Hunc enim." Primo <licit Dictum est que
eternitas non solum <licit interminabilitatem sed etiam simplicitatem. "Unde non recte
quidam" putant "qui cum audiunt visum esse Platoni mundum hunc non habuisse
initium temporis nee habiturum defectum" id est finem "hoc modo putant mundum
conditum fieri coeternum conditori." Causa autem quare non recte putant est; "quia
aliud est" duci per "interminabilem" vitam cum quadam successione, "quod Plato
tribuit mundo" et aliud est simul "esse complexam totam praesentiam vite
interminabilis quod est proprium divine mentis." Et quare aliquis diceret, si mundus
nunque incepit vester esse coeternus Deo. Ad hoc respondit que Deus est prior mundo
non "antiquitate temporis sed simplicitate nature." Unde <licit, "Neque" enim "deus
debet videri antiquior rebus conditis quantitate temporis" sed "potius proprietate
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simplicis nature."
Notandum sicut patet ex libro thimei Plato voluit mundum incepisse sed finem
non habere. Et hoc idem Aristoteles sibi imponit in libro Celi et Mundi, dicit que
solus Plato generat mundum. quid est ergo quod dicit Boetius que Plato non posuit
mundum incepisse. Ad hoc dicitur que dum Plato dixit mundum habuisse initium
intelligitur que habuit initium institutionis non autem temporis. Sicut ponit exemplum
de vestigio pedis, ut si pes ab eterno stetisset in pulvere, pes esset causa vestigii
naturaliter precedens vestigium licet non tempore.
"Hunc enim vite..." hie manifestate quoniam temporalia deficiunt a simplicitate
divine nature quam nituntur imitari dicit, "Ille infinitus motus rerum temporalium
imitatur" quatum potest "hunc praesentarium statum vite immobilis" id est eternalitatis.
"Et cum non potest effingere" id est exprimere "et equare, deficit" ab eius
"immobilitate" successive acquirendo quod habere "non potuit et ex simplicitate
prescientie decrescit in infinitam quatitatem preteriti et futuri, et cum nequeat
possidere pariter totam plenitudinem vite sue, hoc ipso que aliquo modo nunquam esse
definit. Videtur aliquatenus emulari illud quod implere non potest alligans" se scilicet
status temporalis "ad qualemcumque presentiam huius momenti" id est instantis
"exigui" id est indivisibilis "et volucris" id est transitorii qua scilicet praesentia
instantis temporis gestat. Habet "quandam imaginationem manentis prescentie" id est
eternitatis et "prestat quibuscumque contigerit ut illa esse videantur." Nam illam
dicimus esse quod sunt in praesenti momento. "Quoniam vero non potuit manere"
scilicet presentia instantis propter naturam rei mobilis, ideo "rapuit infinitum iter

temporis" per successionem et "eoque modo factum est ut continuaret vitam eundo"
de uno esse in aliud, "cuius plenitudinem non valuit" id est potuit complecti
"permanendo."
Notandum quod infinitus motus rerum temporalium quantum potest imitatur
statum eternitatis quare non potest eum totaliter exprimere, quare status temporalis est
successivus status eternitatis. Non et status temporalis respicit preteritum et futurum.
Status eternitatis tamen praesens. Et tamen hoc imitatur statum eternitatis que sicut
eternitatisnumqua deficit. Sic infinitus motus rerum temporalium numquam esse
definit. Et sicut in tempore est dare instans quod habet quandam imaginem cum
etrenitate, itaque sicut in eternitate aliquid dicitur esse. Et sicut illa dicimus esse que
sunt in praesenti instanti. ldeo status rerum temporalium licet non possit imitari
statum eternitatis presentialiter permanendo, tamen ipsam imitatur suam durationem
successive continuando.
"Itaque si digna..." in ista parte Philosophia docet quoniam proprie loquendum
sic de Deo et de mundo dicit, "Si nos sequentes Platonem velimus imponere nomina
digna" id est convenientia "rebus, dicamus deum esse eternum. mundum vero dicamus
perpetuum." Et hoc consonant dicto auctoris Grecismi. Eternum vero sine principio
sine fine. Perpetuum cui principium sed fine carebit.

"Quoniam igitur omne

iudicium..." hie Philosophia ex dictis ostendit modum scientie divine. Primo ergo
ostendit qualis sit scientia divina et qualiter sit nominanda dicit, "Quoniam omne
iudicium comprehendit ea quae sunt sibi subiecta" id est sua obiecta secundum "sui
naturam." Secundum id est naturam virtutis cognoscentis. Natura autem dei talis est
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que "semper ipsi deo est status eternus et praesentarius." Ex quo sequitur que scientia
Dei supergressa omnem motionem temporis manet in simplicitate praesentie," et
"complectens infinita spacia preteriti et futuri temporis omnia considerat quasi iam"
id est praesenti aliter "gerantur in sua simplici" conditione. Tune ostendit quoniam
scientia Dei est nominanda <licit, "Itaque si velis pensare prescientiam quo cuncta
dignoscit," non dices divinam scientiam "esse prescientiam quasi futuri, sed rectius
estimabis divinam scientiam esse instantie" id est praesentie "numquam deficientis."
Quod confirmat per ethymologiam huius nominis providentiam <licit unum cognitio
divina "non dicitur praevidentia" quare illa importat ordinem ad futurum "sed dicitur
providenia quod porro" id est procula "rebus infimis constituta, quasi ab excelso
cacumine rerum cuncta prespiciat."
Notandum que cognitio sequitur modum rei cognoscentis, ideo cognitio et
scientia Dei sequitur statum et dispositionem Dei. Status autem <lei est eternus et
prasentarius, cum esse divinum mensuretur eternitate. Ergo scientia dei erit etrna et
praesentaria, itaque omnia que sunt preterita et futura cognoscit quasi sint praesentia.
Notandum que aliquis diceret, non ens non potest alicui esse praesens, sed preteritum
et futurum est non ens. Ergo non potest esse praesens cognitioni divine. Dicendum
que duplex est non ens, quoddam quod nullo modo est ens nee potest esse ens,et tale
non est realiter praesens alicui cum nihil sit. Aliud est non ens non simpliciter, sed
quia actu non est ens, et licet huiusmodi non ens non possit realiter coexistere tempori
presenti, potest tamen coexistere eternitati, quare eternitas cum sit infmita excedit
tempus praesens extendendo se ad preteritum et futurum. Et sic preteritum et futurum
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sunt etemitati coexistentia praesenti aliter, quare in etemitate non est successio. Unum
non sequitur si aliquid coexistit eternitati que pro tanto simpliciter existat, quare
eternitas etiam extendit se ad non existens sicut ad preteritum et futurum.
Notandum que deo omnia sunt praesentia. Sibi nihil est futurum. Ideo scientia
sua non est dicenda prescientia que sonat aliquid futurum, nee debet dici previdentia
propter eandem causam, sed debet dici providentia quasi procul constituta a rebus
inferioribus omnia prospiciens. "Quid igitur. .." hie solvit obiectiones superius factas
contra providentiam. Primo ergo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi obiectiones solventur.
Secundo resumit primam obiectionem ipsam fortificando ut formalius solvatur.
Secunda ibi, hie si dicas circa primum notandum que erant rationes quarum prima et
secunda fundantur super hoc scilicet que nihil potest esse prescitum a deo nisi id sit
necessarium. Tertia fundatur super hoc que eventus incertus non potest certitudinaliter
cognosci. facit ergo duo. Primo ostendit que prescientia non imponit necessitatem rei
prescite, per quod solvitur prima et secunda ratio. Secundo ostendit que scientia dei
non mutat naturam rei, sed simul stant certitudo a parte scientie et in certitudo a parte
eventus, per quod etiam solvitur tertia ratio. Secunda ibi, "Quare hec divina." Primo
<licit. Ex quo deus cogniscit omnia tanque presentia, "quid igitur postulas ut illa fiant
necessaria quae lustrantur" id est que comprehenduntur "divino lumine" id est divina
cognitione, "cum nee homines faciant ea necessaria que presentialiter vident" verbi
gratia. Quod homo videt in presenti non "facit esse necessarium. Numero pro nunquid
enim intuitus tuus addit" id est dabit aliquando "necessitatem eis quae tu cernis
presentia." Dicit Boetius, "Minime." Et Philosophia "Si est digna collatio divini et

fl

fl

humani intuitus respectu praesentis uti pro sicut vos videtis quedam hoc praesenti
temperario fl id est in praesenti tempore fl ita fl deus suo "eterno fl intuitu fl omnia cernit fl
tamquam praesentia.
Notandum que intuitus noster rei presentis nullam ponit necessitatem re1
presenti, quia visio fortis currentis non imponit necessitatem currenti, quare potest
fortes currere vel non currere. Sic etiam intuitus divinus qui omnia presentialiter
cognoscit nullam imponit rebus necessitatem, sed videt ea praesentialiter sicut futura
sunt. Futura enim necessario videt necessario futura, et futura contingentia videt
contingentur futura. flQuare hec divina prenotio... fl hie ostendit que circa contingentia
simul stant certa cognitio dei et incertus eventus rei dicit, fl Quare hec divina prenotio"
qua deus novit futura illa non mutat proprietatem rerum quo ad necessitatem et
contingentiam. Quare non imponit necessitatem rei que contingens est, sed fl talia apud
se spectat presentia qualia olim prevenient futura, nee confundit rerum iudicia fl ut
contingens faciat non esse contingens, sed fl uno intuitu mentis dignoscit tam necessarie
quam non necessarie ventura fl id est futura. Quod declarat in exemplo dicens, fl sicut
vos homines quando pariter fl id est in eodem instanti fl videtis hominem ambulare in
terra et solem oriri in celo, fl licet fl utrumque simul fl sit fl conspectum tamen discernitis
hoc esse voluntarium fl scilicet fl hominem ambulare in terra, et illud esse necessarium fl
scilicet fl solem oriri. fl Ita similiter fl divinus intuitus cuncta despiciens fl deorsum
inspiciens minus flperturbat rerum qualitatem, fl scilicet contingentiam et necessitatem
rerum. Dico apud se presentium ratione eternitatis, sed futurarum ad conditionem
temporis, "Quo fit ut cognitio" futurorum Dei tanque presentium non sit opinio, "sed
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cognitio veritate nixa" id est confirmata, "cum cognoscit" aliquid "esse exiturum" id
est futurum, "quod idem non nesciat" id est bene sciat "carere" potest "necessitate"
existendi.
Notandum de hoc quod dicitur Deum omnia presentialiter cognoscere scilicet
preterita et futura ponunt quidam exemplum: de baculo fixo in aqua qui successive toti
fluvio praesens est cum partibus eius. Sic etemitas simul est cum toto tempore, et cum
omnibus que fiunt in tempore. Itaque totum tempus et quicquid est successivum in
tempore est praesens eternitati. Aliud exemplum ponitur de centro ut si ponatur
etemitas sicut centrum et totum tempus sicut circumferentia tune licet circumferentia
continue moveatur et pars toti succedat, tamen in comparatione ad centrum uniformitur
se habet. Aliud exemplum ponitur de aliquo qui vadit per viam et non videt homines
post se venientes sed ille qui de alta turri respiceret videret totatm viam et homines per
earn transeuntes tam precedentes qua sequentes. Sic deus de speculo sue eternitatis
respiciens omnia presentialitur videt tam presentia quam futura.
"Hie si dicas ... " hie philosophia redit ad primam rationem superius positam
1psam fortificando ut formalius solatur et fortificat earn. Secundo soluit. Tertio
solutionem declarat, secunda ibi, "Respondebo." Tertia ibi, "Due enim." Dicere igitur
sic. Si dicas hoc obiiciendo illud non posse non evenire quod Deus videt eventurum,
quare deus falleretur. "Quod autem non potest non evenire id ex necessitate" super
dicas "contingere, et sic astringas me ad nomen necessitatis," vel concedam contingens
aliquo modo esse necessarium. Ego "fatebor rem solidissie veritatis cui vix aliquis
accesserit" earn concedendo "nisi speculator divini" id est divine nature. Tune soluit
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obiectionem <licit, si coartaveris me ut concedam aliquam necessitatem futurorum,
"respondebo idem quod futurum est quo ad nos cum refertur ad divinam notionem"
cui ipsum est praesens. Dico necessarium esse necessitate conditionata secundum
ratione presentie. Cum autem" idem futurum perpenditur in sui natura" ratione cuius
habet futuritionem et futuritinem et determinationem in sui causa, necesse est "videri
liberum."
Notandum que sicut illud quod se est contingens quoniam est nobvobis praesens
ratione praesentie sortitur quandam necessitatem qua necessitate est ipsum esse dum
praesens sit, ita quare omnia sunt deo praesentia, ratione istius praesentie in ordine ad
ipsam divinam cognitionem sortiuntur quandam necessitatem, licet in sui natura
prorsus videantur libera. "Due enim sunt necessitates, simplex una..." hie Philosophia
declarat solutionem per quandam <licit necessitatis et earn applicat ad propositum.
Secundo concludit ex premissis simul siare quod aliqua sunt secundum se contingentia
et incerta, quod tamen eveniunt certitudinaliter, inquam tum a Deo previsa. Secunda
ibi, "Fient igitur procul dubio cuncta." Primo <licit "due sunt necessitates, una
simplex, que est necessitas" nature, sicut "omnes homines" necessario "esse mortales."
Alia est necessitas conditionis, "ut si scias" hominem "ambulare" illum necesse
ambulare est. Quare "quod quisque novit" illud non potest aliter esse qua notum est,
"sed haec conditio" id est necessitas conditionata "minime" trahit "secum simplicem"
necessitatem. Quare necessitatem "conditionis non facere propria natura, sed adiectio
conditionis. Nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere" id est ambulare, gradientem id est
ambulantem "voluntate" sua "quamvis necessarium sit eum" ambulare "tum cum"
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graditur id est ambulatur. Hane <licit applicat ad propositum <licit "Eodem modo, si
quid providentia" divina "praesens videt illud esse necesse est" secundum ea conditione
qua provisum est et ea qua pronitur tibi praesens quavis nullam habeat necessittem
nature. Sed "ea futura contuetur" tanque "praesentia" quae "ex libertate arbitrii
proveniunt. Haec relata ad intuitum divinum fiunt per conditionem notionis, per se
vero" id est in sui natura non habito respectu ad divinam cognitionem. Ipsa "non
desinunt" id est deficiunt "ab absoluta" id est perfecta libertate "sue nature."
"Notandum secundum intentionem Boetius ista ratio, quicquid est provisum a
deo necessario evenit, soluitur dicendo quod verum est necessario evenit necessitate
conditionata, sed non necessitate absoluta. Alii aliter soluunt que illa proposita est vera
in sensu composito, sed falsa insensu divino. Unum cum dicitur, quicquid provisum
est necessario evenit, verum est in sensum composito, quare impossibile est provisum
a deo non evenire. Tamen in sensum diviso falsa est, quare eventus rei saltem
contingetis in se non est necessitas. "Fient igitur procul dubio... " hie Philosophia
concludit ex predictis que ista simul stant, que alique secundum se sunt contingentia
et incerta que tamen certitudim aliter eveniunt in que tum provisa a Deo. Secundo
obiicit contra hoc, ibi, "Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria" et cetera. primo <licit,
"procul dubio cuncta futura sunt quae deus prenoscit esse." Alioquin falleretur divina
providentia, "sed quandam eorum proficiscuntur" id est procedunt "de libero arbitrio,"
ita que quantum est de seipsis possunt non evenire. Unum subdit, "quae quamvis
eveniant, non tamen amittunt propriam naturam" libertatis, "quare priusquam fierent"
potuissent "non evenire."

Notandum que tota intentio. Boetius fundatur super hoc que aliquid libere
futurum ex sui natura in comparatione ad prescientiam divinam necessario evenit et
talis est necessitas conditionata. Quare inquantum pervisum est sic necessario evenit,
sed non absolute circum scripta pervisione. "Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria..."
hie obiicit contra solutionem et solvit obiectionem. Secundo contra illam solutionem
iterum obiicit, ibi, "Sed si inquies in mea." Obiectio in hoc constitit, ex quo futurum
contingens prescitum certitudinaliter evenit in necessario non videtur esse differentia
inter contingens et necessarium. Unde <licit, "Quid igitur refert" contingentia et libere
futura "non esse necessaria cum ista eveniant instar" id est ad similitudinem
"necessitatis." Tune solvit dicens que inter eventum necessarium et contingentem hoc
refert quod manifestum apparet per exempla "quae pauloante proposui scilicet quod
sol oriens et homo gradiens. Quae dum fiunt non possunt non fieri" id est necesse est
fieri, et ita utrumque est necessarium sub conditione presentie. Presentia enim necesse
est esse dum sunt praesentia. Tamen unum eorum "scilicet sol ories priusquam fieret
necesse erat existere. Alterum vero" scilicet "homo gradiens minime" habet
necessitatem fieri antequa fiat. Ita etiam" illa "que deus habet in praesentia procul
dubio existunt" propter necessitatem conditionis qua sunt provisa evenire tanque
praesentia, sed eorum quod sic sunt provisa hoc de rerum necessitate descendit sicut
solem oriri, aliud de potestante facientium scilicet hominem ambulare. Ex quo
concludit. Ideo non "iniuria diximus prius quam hoc scilicet" illa que contingenter
eveniunt si referantur ad divinam noticiam sunt necessaria scilicet ex conditione divine
scientie. Si vero "per se considerentur" ipsa sunt absoluta "nexibus" id est a vinculis
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"necessitatis" quod manifest.at per simile "sicuti si id quod patet sensibus si referas ad
rationem" tune est "universale. Si autem referas ad" sensum tune est "singulare."
Notandum quod si idem relatum ad diversa potest esse universale et singulare,
videtur similiter quod idem comparatum ad diversum possit esse contingens et
necessarium. Nam particulare habet rationem contingentis et ultime rationem
necessaru. Sed videmus que humana natura comparata ad intellectum agentem
abstrahentem a conditionibus individiantibus et comparata ad intellectum possibilem
habet rationem ultimis. Sed comparata natura humana ad sensum qui particulariter
comprehendit rationem habet rationem singularis. Nam universale est dum intelligitur:
particulare vero dum sentitur.

Similiter erit de futuro contingenti que ipsum

conparatum ad divinam prescientiam est necessarium conditionaliter: In se autem
consideratum habet se contingenter. "Sed si inquies in mea." Hie obiicit contra
solutionem iam diet.am: et solvit illam obiectorem. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi.
Quid igitur .Primo <licit, tu obiicies contra solutionem, sic, "Si in mea potestante est
mutare propositum" meum scilicet currendo vel non currendo ego "evacuabo" id est
frustrabo "providentiam" divinam "cum" ego in ut a vero illa que prenoscit esse
futura. Ipse solvit, ego "respondebo te posse deflectere" id est mutare "propositum
tuum, sed veritas providentie" ilia intuetur illud "te posse," scilicet mutare propositum
"et an facias" quod propsitum mutes, et "intuetur quove convertis propositum tuum.
" Ideo scias "te non posse vitare divinam prescientiam, sicuti quamvis libera voluntate
convert.as in varias actiones." Tu non potes "effugere intuitum presentis oculi."
Not.a que licet homo possit mutare propositum suum per hoc tamen non effugit
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prescientiam divinam, quia Deus illam mutationem prenoscit. Posito enim que deus
previderet te eras iturum ad forum quavis possis non ire et proponas non ire non tamen
non ibis.

Quare Deus providet simul et propositum et potestatem non eundi et

mutationem propositi actionem eundi, et ideo non potes aliquo modo effugere eius
prescientiam. "Quid igitur inquies... " hie movet dubitationem dicens, tu forte inquies,
quid igitur contingat ex ista solutione "mutabitur" ne scientia divina "ex mea
dispositione?" id est ex mea variatione scilicet cum ego "nunc velim hoc nunc aliud
videatur ne prescientia divina ex hoc alternare" id est mutare vices suas noscendi et
cognoscendi. Ipse respondet, "Minime" contingit hoc "quod divina scientia mutetur"
quod approbat Philosophia elicit, quia divinus "intuitus precurrit omne futurum et
retorquet" illud ad "prescientiam proprie cognitionis" cognoscendo omnia simul
tanquam presentia, nee alternat, id est mutat vices suas prenoscendi nunc hoc nunc
illud successive sicut tu estimas, sed manens liber a mutatione uno ictu prevenit et
complectitur tuas mutationes, quam presentiam comprehendendi visendi omnia tanque
presentia deus non est fortitus ex rebus futuris, sed ex propria simplicitate, ex quo
resolvitur id est declaratur "illud quod pauloante posuisti, secundum indignum esse si
futura nostra dicantur prestare causam scientie die. Virtus enim scientie" divine
"cuncta complectens" potestialiter ipsa imponit modum omnibus rebus quia scientia
Dei est causa rerum. Ipsa vero nihil debet ipsis rebus, quare nihil ab eis accipit sicut
nos accipimus scientiam a rebus.
Nota si deus simul non cognosceret ea que successive eveniant in tempore, tune
scientia dei esset variabilis propter hoc que ad cognitionem unius succederet cognitio
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alterius. Sed quare omnia simul cognoscit tamque presentia, ideo in scientia non cadit
variatio, ut prius nesciat esse alicuius, et posteat sciet. Vel que prius sciat hoc non
esse et postea esse immo simul omnia cognoscit. Et ideo simul scit aliquid non esse
in una differentia temporis menisurantis rem et esse in alia differentia temporis. "Que
cum ita sint..." hie concludit ex premissis compossibilitatem liberi arbitrii cum
prescientia divina dicit, "Que cum ita sint" ut predictum est "manet" libertas arbitrii
"mortalibus intemerata" id est incorrupta. "Nee leges proponunt" hominibus "penas
et premia inique" id est iniuste "voluntatibus nostris solutis," id est liberatis ab omni
necessitate. "Manet etiam" immobiliter "Deus" prescius "cunctorum," et "praesens
eternitas sue visionis" concurrit cum "futura qualitate" secundum bonitate malicia
nostrorum actuum "dispensans," id est distribuens "bonis premia et malis supplicia.
Nee frustra sunt" posite preces et spes "in Deo que non possunt esse inefficaces cum
sint recte."
Nota ex quo propter liberum arbitrium possunt res sic aliter evenire. Non
iniuste bonis premia et malis supplicia proponuntur, nee spes et preces frustrantur.
Frustrarentur autem omnia hec si omnia vinculo necessitatis uterentur sicut patet ex
dictis. "Adversamini igitur vicia... " hie Philosophia subiungit exhortationem utilem
dicit, ex quo sic est que non estis coacti necessitate ad faciendum aliquid sed manet in
vobis libera voluntas. Ideo adversamini id est spernite vicia per ea iuste incurratis
penas, colite id est exercite virtutes propter quas merita consequamini, sublevate
animam vestrum ad rectas spes que veram beatitudinem tenduut. porrigite in excelsa
scecundum ad deum humiles preces, et hoc merito faciatis. Quare "si non vultis

dissimulare" avertendo animum vestrum ab his, tune magna vobis est indita necessitas
probitatis, quare illud quod agitis non potest latere eum qui est index actuum
vestrorum. Unum subdit, "cum agatis ante oculos" id est cum actiones vestre sint in
prospectu "iudicis cuncta cernentis" scilicet Dei.

Nota vitia sunt spernenda que

reddunt hominem servilem. Nam qui facit peccatum servias est peccati. Et Seneca
<licit, "Si scirem deos peccata ignoscituros et homines ignoraturos," ad hue propter
vilitatem peccati peccare erubescerem. Virtutes autem sunt colende, quare virtus est
que habentem preficit et opus eius bonum reddit. Reeta spes et recte praecentes sunt
deo porrigende.

Quare his deo coniungimur et ipsum alloquimur.

Et si nos

dissimulamus negligendo predicta magna virtutes probitatem nobis inditam et
promissam inde consequimur, quomodo omnia que agimus sunt in prospectu dei cuncta
cernentis, sic enim scribitur ad Hebreos iiii "Omnia nuda et apta sunt oculis eius quis
est Deus." Bene dictus in secula seculorum Amen.
Ascensius
"Quoniam igitur" et cetera, hec est ultima pars operis scripti. Quod nonnulli
imperfectum rentur eo que preventus morte non potuerit alia que conceperat persequi.
Bonam tamen ut videbimus conclusionem facit et fere que ad consolationem necessaria
videbantur iam dicta sunt. Intueamur nunc quantum fas est. Bene <licit quantum fas est:
quare de deo sapiendum est sobrietatem. dictum que est. "Alti ora te" ne "quasi eris".
verum quare "Deus amari non potest nisi utcunque notus," etiam "noscitandus est."
De hoc autem vocabulo tueri scies que duo significat servare scilicet custodire aut
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protegere et inspicere. Et licet alexander varias voces indicandi det, ut pro priore
"tueor". Pro secundo "tuor", iuxta versiculum. Die "tuor insipcio" "tueor" defendere
dico, tarnen in utroque significatu apud ydoneos tueor secunde declinationis invenies,
ut hoc loco "intueamur". Nam si "intuor" diceretur: esset hie dicendum "intuamur".
Item quod Alexander "tuor facere tiutum" in supino et "tueor tutum", invenies a "tueor
utrumque" dici. Nam "inspectio dicitur a multis intuitus," et a Virgilio etiam "obtutus"
non "obtuitus". Veruntamen non est dubtum etiam "tuor dici", unde Statius in
Achileide. Utero modo contuorenses. Cui "nee" futuri quicque absit. Sic "legendum"
est non quicquid sicut plerique legunt. "Eternum" si ut quidam volunt ab ethere
deflectitur deberet in prima syllaba habere "ae" dipthongon, et in secunda "h" et scribi
"aethernum". Ideo autem "ab ethere" deductum volunt, quia sicut "ether". Id est
celum cum sit spherice figure non habet principium neque finem, ita nee "ethernum"
in tempore. "Perpetuum" autem sine dubio dicitur a "per" et "peto". Illud autem
perpetit quod semper petit id est aggreditur quod sequitur, unde perpetuum tempus est
cuius una pars procedendo semper petit et urget aliam. Sicut "continuum" a
"continendo" quoniam una pars "continet" aliam, et "contiguum" a "contingendo" que
una contingit aliam. Et "assiduum" ab "assidendo" quando una assidet alteri.
"Respondebo namque" et cetera, ordo est. "Namque respondebo," idem
futurum id est aliquid unum et idem quod est futurum. Videri necessarium cum id est
quod refertur ad divinam notionem, "vero" pro "sed", sed "videri liberum" 'et
prorsus" id est versus hoc est omnino esse solutum a necessitate scilicet, cum id est
quando perpenditur id est consideratur in sua id est propria natura. "Adversamini
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11

igitur vicia et cetera, quia inquit certum est peccatum esse voluntarium et ex libero
arbitrio produci. Igitur aversamini id est detestamini vitia. Hie male scriptum erat
11

adversamini 11 Nam 11 adversor 11 dativo iungitur et est idem que 11 adversarius" sum.

1

Aversor 11 autem accusativo et significat 11 detestari 11 aut de dignari. Quidius in satis.

1

•

Officioque levem non aversatus bonorem. Et auctor noster in primo carmine primi
libri primitivum sic posuisse videtur cum ait, 11 heuheu qua surda miseros avertitur
aure. 11 Item quia operibus bonis libere factis dabuntur premia. Igitur colite virtutes et
quia qui cuncta previdet etiam media previdet. Vultque ut salus nostra precibus
impetretur. Igitur ad rectas spes animum sublevate, et humiles preces in excelsa
porrigite. Humile dicitur ab 11 humo 11 Est ergo antitheton in his voculis, humiles et
•

excelsa. Magna vobis est indita. Iudere rarum est, et tamen ab eo deflectitur inditus,
tabula, tum. Sicut nee predare legitur: et tamen preditus frequentissime, est autem
inditum, a natura insitum aut impositum. Cum ante 11 oculos agatis iudicis cuncta
cernentis. 11 Ad hoc propositum dictum est a sancto viro. Si vis deum timere, cogita
illum cuncta videre. Urgentius autem est que hie dicitur, 11 iudicis cuncta cernentis. 11
Si enim iudex est, ergo timendus. Hee sunt que Stephane optime in boetii
consolationem habui explananda. In quibus grammatici munus gessi quia
philosophicum reliquum commentarium inveni. Quia vero semel unam rem declaravi
que sepe usui venit, opere precium duxi eorum que peculiariter explanavi indicem et
repertorium alphabeticum superaddere, adiuncturus apicem ex Marco Fabio,
Quintiliano de scholarium (ut ita dicam) disciplina, sed prius prioris commenti tabulam
preponamus.

Finitur Boetius de Consolatu Philosophie cum duplici commento Sancti Thome
videlicet et Ascensii.
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CHAPTER III
TRANSLATION OF BOOK FIVE
This Begins the First Prose Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
ti

ti

She spoke and [changed] the course of speech... here begins fifth book of

Boethius' s De Consolatione Philosophie of which this is the first prose section, in
which Philosophy strives to resolve certain questions following her conclusion
concerning fate and providence. Indeed, it appears from her statements that chance
does not exist, because if all things are foreseen, so that nothing comes to pass apart
from the order of divine providence, it appears that nothing happens by chance,
because chance brings about an unexpected event.

Moreover, it appears from

statements that free will does not exist because all things are arranged according to an
order of destined necessity. Here, free will excludes necessity. Therefore, it appears
that if providence and fate exist, free will is entirely excluded. Therefore, in the
present book Philosophy examines whether chance exists and what it is, and examines
whether free will exists by proposing arguments, by which free will does not appear
to be able to stand with divine providence. After this she proposes a false solution of
matters which solution she rejects and proposes her own solution, which she confirms
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by rational arguments, and establishes based on arguments concerning eternity, and
many other things will be just as plain.
Also, this book is divided into eleven parts, whereby six are prose and five
verse. Its parts and of what things are determined by them will be clear in the course
of the book. In the first prose section she first draws a conclusion concerning chance,
and first Boethius mentions the acts of Philosophy, commending her exhortation which
was made and he puts forward the inquiry concerning chance. Second, Philosophy
excuses herself from drawing a conclusion about it and Boethius withdraws that
excuse. Third, Philosophy draws a conclusion concerning chance. The second point
is there: "Then she [said] 'I hasten.... '" The third point is there: "Then she [said] the
manner...." First he says Philosophy had mentioned this before and was changing the
course of discourse, that is, of the discussion, to treat and explain certain other
matters. "Then I", Boethius said, "O, Philosophy your exhortation is right and truly
it is most worthy of authority, but what you said a little while ago," in the sixth prose
section of the fourth book, "the question concerning providence is to be related to
many other things," that is, inquiries. "Therefore I know from the experience," that
is, from reality for, "I ask whether you believe," that is, whether you believe "chance
to be anything at all," understand "in the nature of things", "and whether you consider
it to be a certain thing," understand "in the nature of the things". Note in this what
Boethius said. Philosophy intimates at length to have explained what things they
examined with regard to his speculation, and so to have determined the principal
purpose of this book, and Philosophy turns the course of speech, that is, the running
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discourse, because the speech of Philosophy is not hindered by ignorance of teachings
nor slowness of learning. She turned speech to certain different things fit to be
investigated. However, what things they were, those Boethius does not express, for
which reason, perhaps, in her opinion they were excessively considered, or perhaps
so much so as to be an extraneous purpose. Note that he say: the exhortation of
Philosophy was right, wherefore philosophy urges toward virtues and toward a
contempt of fortuitous things. Moreover, an exhortation of such a nature which is
toward the good, is fit to be pursued, and one to the bad, is fit to be avoided. He says
the exhortation of Philosophy is most worthy of authority, wherefore what is said by
wise men, with importance of knowing a suitable thing, is pondered.

"So that is

said in haste ..." here Philosophy excuses him of this opinion or question with a
conclusion, and Boethius removes that excuse. He says that Philosophy says: "I
hasten to finish," that is, to accomplish "the debt of the promise and open the way to
you by which you are returned home. These things, moreover, which you seek to
learn concerning chance just as they are of strength, although beneficial by knowing,"
that is, by knowing, "nevertheless a little turned from the course," that is, from our
proposed way "with a little of a separation, whereby they are not indeed different from
adverse things, but one should stop things somewhat exercised without reserve. And
it is feared," that is, fit to be feared, "lest you not be able to continue toward things
fit to be traversed," that is, passed over, "the straight path, fatigued from on out of the
way thing, that is, extraneous questions."
Boethius says: Oh Philosophy, lest you fear that, that is, you should not fear,

whereby this will be in a place of rest for me, to know things in which I most delight
and with all latus, that is, all your constancy of reasoning I will agree with, with an
undoubted faith. Nothing is which is uncertain on the following matters
Note that she says in what way you return home. Here she says the native land
is happiness which she previously taught to discover. Those things, moreover, by
which man arrives to it are virtues concerning which things Boethius intends to pursue
-- not in this book, but in the last books of his music from things fit to be done
concerning human music. However, he did not complete his intention, because he was
prevented by King Theodoric with death. Then she said "Morem..." here Philosophy
determines the permitted causes and questions of chance removed.

From the

beginning she removes the former, whether chance is. Second she shows the
following, what is error, where it is therefore said. At the beginning she shows what
is indicated by a thing of chance, by considering the opinion of certain ones.
Following this, she rejects that opinion, where it is written, "Quis enim". From the
first she says, "Oh, Boethius, I will show the way to you, that is, I will confirm by
myself your own will." And at once she began this, that is, she began: "If someone
should define the meaning of chance saying by that which is an event produced by
thoughtless movement," that is, unexpectedly, "and not by a joining of cause, I,
Philosophy, confirm chance thus to be nothing at all. And I determine," that is, I
judge "the voice of chance to be absolutely empty because of the emphasis of the
matter suggested, just as the voice from Chimaera is empty."
Note that whatever question whatever it is, he broke off, whatever it is
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followed what question, whatever it is, he asks from what something is enriched.
Whereby, what is of no matter is owing, except for the thing. Nevertheless, the
question which he is seeking on what is anything of a thing is primary knowledge.
Therefore from that which is anything from a thing, it is necessary to know from what
a certain thing is. Propter hoc philosophia ad querendum de casu utrum sit vel non
accipit quod quid est: which expresses in itself and she says: "If some say chance to
be an accidental event produced without all reason, I see the voice of chance to be
empty, just as nothing corresponds to it in truth."
"Quis enim coercente" here Philosophy rejects that opinion showing chance to
be nothing according to her. Secondly, she removes the following, the reality of a
thing in that place where she says, "Aristoteles meus." First she considers one reason,
in the second place "Nam nihil." The ancient writers said that chance is an accidental
event, that is, unexpected. Contrary to this Philosophy proves thus, "wherever all
things are seen there is nothing accidental, but all things which exist have been
foreseen by God.

Therefore, there are among these things nothing which is

accidental." She intimates this reason briefly in literature saying, "Indeed what is able
to be left behind," that is, abandoned, that is, a thing unexpected "from God,
controlling all, who follows in a foreseen order as if nothing is said." Note that all
things are foreseen by God, from whom reason exists. In every possible thing God
is the cause. All such things are foreseen by God, but God is the cause of all things;
therefore, all things are foreseen by God. Moreover, in whatever God is the reason
of all things, it is clear since heaven and the entire universe depends upon him, as it
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is clear from the twelfth book of metaphysics.
"For nothing comes from nothing..." here she makes another reason, an image
of chance which is not able to exist without all cause produced, just as the ancient
writers said. She proves thus, "what is from nothing is nothing." Accordingly,
because it is from no cause is from nothing. Therefore, because it is from no cause
it is nothing. But, indeed, according to the ancient writers, chance is from no cause,
since it is produced without any logical sequence of causes. Therefore chance is
nothing. Whereupon she says it says in literature: "True knowledge is for no man
who ever contested," that is, opposed "the ancients. It is clear enough that nothing
exists from nothing, all those ancients established," that is, asserted "that proposition:
nothing exists from nothing. As if some foundation from the efficient beginning is not
manifest from God the creator, as if man makes something from nothing." But indeed
they understood this on a material subject, thus it is from a whole nature grounded in
matter. She herself proposes, she says, "this is from the nature of all reason; thus
now" it is from matter, "which is subjected to natural patterns. But if something
originates from no cause, it is seen to be born from nothing. But this is unable to be
done, that something originates from nothing. Therefore, it is not possible that chance
exist in any way," that is, of such a kind as we defined a little before. Following the
ancient writers: an accidental event is that which is without a union of causes.
Therefore Boethius asks, "What is fit to be said of chance? Is it something in
the nature of things since, by right, is it able to be called chance or fortune, or is it
anything at all, although it is unknown to the common people for whom those names
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are suitable. Note that this proposition that nothing exists from nothing, is true in
comparison to the particular cause which in its action submits before the material
cause. Nevertheless, in a comparison to the universal cause which is the entire cause
of a thing it is not true, wherefore, we mentioned that God created all things from
nothing, and we have faith. But the ancients did not talk about this way of production
by creation, but by the prime mover. Therefore, Aristotle in the first book of Physics
says:" it is impossible that something be made from things which do not exist."
Indeed, all are united on this opinion, those who think about nature. "My Aristotle
says in this Physics... " here Philosophy solves the question on chance and from the
first she shows it is solved by Aristotle, and she shows his method. Following this,
she proves what is allowed of chance, that it does not have causes in itself, it has
nevertheless causes by accident, where she says, "These are therefore." First she says
"my Aristotle," that is, with my sustained and diligent teaching, "defined chance in
Physics. It is in the second book of Physics with a brief reason and things related to
truths, that is, in nature.
Boethius asks: "Seeing in that method." Philosophy says, "whenever something
is performed," that is, is done "for the sake of an uncertain thing," that is, of a certain
thing or something, "it occurs at any time from causes, because that which was
intended is called chance, as if a certain man with a cause of plowing afield to be
cultivated were to discover a covered mass of gold, this invention of gold is thought
accidental," that is, to have occurred by chance.

"The truth, however, of the

accidental event is not from nothing," that is, from no cause, "as the definition of the
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ancients said. For an accidental event has its own causes from which a combination
both in imagined and unexpected things appears to have produced a chance event for
him who made something from the cause of another matter. For if the cultivator of
the field were not digging up the region which is filled up from the first cause of the
appearance of gold, and if the depositor had not buried his money," that is, concealed
it, "in that particular spot," that is in that place, "the thing which exists from a certain
cause of the appearance of gold, that gold would not have been found. "
Note that according to Aristotle a cause is when something exists on account
of another end, as the digging of soil for the sake of propagation. If some other thing
happens from certain causes before this thing, which was intended, this is chance. So
that the appearance of the treasure is accidental, not what was intended by the digger
of the soil. From this what is plain is that the appearance of treasure is accidental, not
for this reason what is not foreseen by God, but on what account it is not provided by
man. So chance is nothing quo ad deum sed est aliquid quo ad hominem, before the
appearance and foresight of which it happens. "They are not, therefore causes of
accidental gain..." here Philosophy shows since chance does not have causes in itself,
yet they occur by accident, saying: "Therefore causes are not of accidental gain," that
is, of an accidental event, "because accidental gain happens from obvious causes and
from confluences, not from the appearance of something showing. Truly, not that
man who buries the gold, nor who disturbed the field," that is, he who dug it up, he
intended, "so that the wealth has been discovered but as I said before, the appearance
of something showing, this being dug up by which that man buries the wealth filled
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up, an appearance of wealth."
Note that an efficient cause is not held unless it is transformed in the end. The
end, moreover, is not chanced unless following what is in the appearance. For that
reason, with regard to this effect, what is an appearance is an efficient cause in itself.
If it relates to something in the action beyond the appearance of that efficient thing,
the cause is efficient by accident, and thus chance. Therefore, chance reaches beyond
the appearance of efficient, it does not have an efficient cause in itself, but by accident.
"One is permitted therefore, to define..." here Philosophy solves the second question
by showing what chance is. Therefore, she concludes her definition now mentioning
from the saying. "We may, therefore, define chance to be an unexpected event from
merging causes among things which are brought forth for some purpose." Then she
shows because an accidental effect occurs by order of divine providence, truly, what
is deduced is that chance originates from merging causes. Moreover, what causes
merge, this originates from an order of providence. One says that "truly the causes
are made to run together and merge, that order decreed from above, preceding by an
inevitable connection of causes is clear, which descending from above the order from
the origin of providence sets in order all in its time and place."
Note that the definition of chance is good, since by it chance is distinguished
from others. By this since it is said that chance is an event from something unexpected
a necessary effect occurring is removed , or as frequently as if originated alone, or a
man born with five digits on one hand, such as this does not happen accidentally and
unexpectedly on account of this. Since it is said from merging causes, it is excluded

from chance intended by the prime mover, which following the ancients it was
supposed to have been made from no connection of causes. By this, moreover, since
it is said among things which are brought forth for some purpose, by this it is excluded
from accidental chance in itself. Indeed, chance and fortune are causes by accident
and they make this more than an appearance of an efficient cause.

She had spoken and was changing the course of speech toward treating and
setting right certain questions. He had said "Right" by what means do they persuade?
that is, How do they make an end of speech? They say in the end "I said".
"Therefore, how is Philosophy materiam acceptam quodammodo fini erat sese ad alia
vertens," the author speaks well from this character. Philosophy has spoken fully, and
the course of speech, he says this all rightly. For this reason speech should neither
begin slowly nor violently, but it has a running, that is, a middle way, between prose,
that is, prose as a mode of expression alone, and the meter of poems. "Involving
others", often implied laws rather than "involving", but neither is without authority.
I will show the practice, that is, I will grant your wish. Est enim is moriger et morem
gerit alteri, qui morem. And the purpose of life she explains thus, so it is pleasing to
the other. Thus, she began, that is, she began to express clearly. venit enim ab
exordior. non itaque legendum est exorta vel exhorta ut scriptum in quibis inveni. The
rest are clear.
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The First Meter Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"Among the crags in the rocks of Persia... " here is the first verse of this, the
fifth book which is called elegiac meter, and the first verse is dactylic hexameter. The
following is anapestic with pentameter, or dactylic pentameter, in which Philosophy
shows in what way an accidental event is constituted in regards to divine providence.
It is, moreover, a matter of example, which the Tigris and Euphrates are two rivers
from the same source proceeding, after which they are mutually divide. Though they
repeatedly rush together, it is inevitable that ships and others are brought to come
together in this river, which, indeed produces a running together in so far as they are
controlled by the running down of these rivers. Nevertheless, it is beyond the
intention of this which directs ships.
In the same way the running together of accidental chance in any such way is
beyond the intention of the doings themselves. Nevertheless, they come together
following a flowing of order decreed from the command of providence. And in
whatever ignorance of ours something accidental and fortuitous is understood as an
order of providence, nevertheless in comparison to God, all things are ordained and
foreseen. A certain source says that it is in a written work that the Tigris and
Euphrates release of themselves from one source in the crags , that is, from the hollow
rocks of Persia, that is, from the mountain of Persia, where no one disputes that in
Persia those fleeing fighting turned from arrows. That is, arrows were fastened into
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the chests of those following. Soon afterwards, that is, after, pervum spactum the
Tigris and Euphrates separate from these joined waters and if the rivers of the verse
should come together a second time, that is, should convene and should be called back
and should flow into one course, that is, one stream, that is, something should come
together. Because water from an interchangeable stream contracts from one stream
and another, that is, moves with this. And if they join the sterns of ships and plucked
tree trunks, that is, plucked up by the roots, with the stream, into the stream, that is,
it is by means of the stream, and water mixed, that is, running together should
envelop, that is, encircle the fortuitous ways, since water makes the ships and tree
trunks rush together accidentally.
Nevertheless, such unfixed ways of chance, that is, of an accidental event, a
cause itself guides the ebbing of the land, that is, the sinking of the land, giving a path
to the river. And an order falling down of falling waters, that is, of running water,
guides those unfixed courses. This is from an accidental event, with respect to
providence. A certain one says perhaps it is chance or fortune which is understood to
flow in extended directions, that is, without direction which endures bridled, that is,
it endures rules. It goes , that is, moves, itself by law, that is, by the law itself of
divine providence.
Note that it is written in Genesis: The Tigris and Euphrates are rivers whose
origins are in Paradise. But Jerome, with the authority of Salus, says the origins of
Tigris and Euphrates are shown in Armenia, that is, in Persio, to which Boethius is
seen to agree. Moreover, the blessed Augustine in addition to Genesis, word for word

brings into union that opposition saying: it touches on these rivers because the others
we prove although what they devoured at any time from the land grew again, and
wherefore these are able to reach, for that reason, concerning the origin of the rivers
themselves, they can be called different. When indeed Moses says in Genes what
things grow in Paradise, it can be understood on the first origin of these. But it is said
by some what other things grow, and it can be understood of the origin from the
second of these. Note that Persia is a certain region which is called by another name,
Armenia. A certain source says the men of Persia who conquer their enemies in
flight, sent arrows in to the back, and thus, a conquering desire is fleeing, where the
poet says, in such a form, "Mars allows victory for the Parthians." The Cyprian
(Venus) for her part likewise in such a way is conquered by skill. Cypris, that is,
Venus, who rejoiced in Cyprus, and Henricus, the poor man says: "therefore, you
should confiscate by swords and clubs in addition to love itself, and route in fleeing
because flight alone routes."

"Of the rocks of Persia ..." the poem is elegiac, just as the first of Book One.
The opinions of which are clearly well enough in the previous commentary.
Achemenes was, with the historian Herodotus as witness, in the fourth History book,
the first king of the Persians from whom all kings of Persia, without interruption are
descended afterwards up to those of Darius. Therefore it is said here the rocks from
Persia, that is, Persia which is in Persia or in Persis. For Persis and Persia and Parthia
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is the designated region of the Persians. Moreover because many teach following that
way of fleeing and in the flight they had attacked the tormented enemy by arrows, such
as Virgil in the third book of Georgicus: "Fidentem que fuga parthum versis que
sagattis et cetera ad cuius imitationem hie <licit versa spicula." Nam ly versa non recte
adiiceretur ly pugna. Vitio sum enim esset dicere. · Pugna fugax verse. Indeed two
more adjectives are not to be sought in the Latin language, with out connecting at the
middle. The order therefore is: The Tigris and Euphrates separate from one source
itself the crags of the rocks of Persia, that is Persia, ubi pugna fugax scilicet
parthorum figit spicula versa id est obversa in pectoribus sequentum id est sequentium
hostium.
Moreover, Justinus teaches that the Persians themselves spoke the Latin
language as they were exiles. Because the exiles come from Eastern Scythia, they
have a way of speaking mixed from Scythian and Persian. All teach their children to
ride and shoot with great diligence. Of gold and silver however, they formerly had
used nothing except the armor itself. They have many wives and they punish no
offense or transgression as seriously as adultery. They have other habits which present
nothing for the present. The Tigris by its speed or by arrow led rivers to Armenia,
but often it withdrew into basins and sometimes it lay hidden. Whereupon Seneca in

Troadis says: "Et qui renatum prorsus excipiens diem. Templum rubente Tigrim
immiscet freto." Moreover, because it is at Parthos, as Virgil's pastoral poetry shows.
"Sooner will Parthus come to Germany or the Germans to the country of the
Parthians." Declivitis it is clear is a declivity. Fortune endures the bridle which is
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appointed, and indeed, perhaps this is better than fortune or chance.
The Second Prose Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
'"I understand' I said..." here begins the second prose section of this fifth book
in which he begins to determine on the harmony of free will in regard to divine
providence. From the first he asks whether free will can continue along with Divine
Providence, and Philosophy shows free will to exist. Second, she shows in what way
it is diversified on opposite things. Third, she shows the act of free will falling under
divine providence. Then according to this she says, "But in this...". The third point
thereupon, "Yet that...". First he says "I understand", that is, I know, "seeing that
chance continues along with providence, so I agree just as you have said" and Boethius
asks "Is there not any freedom of the will in those temporary things of those causes
holding fast to one another, or does the chain of something fated," that is, a fated
necessity "bind the motions," that is, volition "of human minds?" Then Philosophy
shows that free will exists saying that freedom of the will is not things ordered by an
opposing logical sequence of causes. "Unless, indeed, it had been" that it could have
been "any nature of a rational kind but that same freedom of the will" were present
and fully accepted from nature for all, since it has knowledge dependent on
discernment. Moreover, she shows because free will belongs to all rational things of
nature saying, "that which is naturally able to use reason has this judgment, by which
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it alone discerns everything. Therefore, it distinguishes by itself," that is, it discerns
things "to be avoided, and things to be chosen. Moreover, what one judges to be
chosen, that he seeks," that is, pursues, "and he shuns that which he estimates to be
avoided. Therefore, in whatever beings reason is contained, in those, freedom over
something desirable and undesirable is contained:" Therefore, reason can thus be
directed. "Everything which uses reason has judgment over something to be known,
avoided, or chosen. But what every man judges fit to be chosen, he pursues and what
he judges to be avoided, this he shuns. Therefore, everything which is able to use
reason has freedom over something desirable and something undesirable."
Note that she says, "That which uses reason has judgment by which it alone
discerns everything. " This she says in respect to the difference of natural judgment
which is irrational in which everything to be done is not decided, but something in
particular. The sheep does not decide concerning anything to be avoided, except only
concerning the wolf. Bees do not have the diligence toward accomplishing a certain
work unless for honey at the honeycomb. However, what things are aimed for about
anything is a judgment of reason.
Note that she says, "having judgment of reason in itself , it decides what is to
be pursued and avoided." Although, certainly irrational in a certain matter, they know
things fit to be avoided or desired, still, not in themselves, since they are not with a
cause of judgment. Moreover, man does not know only the limited and things ordained
in the end, but he knows this universally, or by way of comparison or by syllogistic
ways, and man decides his judgment and discerns whereby comprehension is virtue
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itself directed from above.
"Yet this..." here Philosophy shows free will is diversified in different things,
certainly, by the difference in angels and in men, this freedom of the will is clear
enough. I determine that it is not equal, that is, comparable, in all things, where more
is in divine substances than in men. "For in celestial and divine substances a
penetrating judgment," that is, an infallible judgment is contained, and in these an
uncorrupted will, that is, a will inflexible toward evil, is contained. And present in
these, that is, furnished, is an efficient control of things desired. Wherefore, it is not
a hindrance of execution in them. "Truly, it is necessary that human souls be more
free since they preserve themselves in speculation of the divine mind. Truly, they are
less free when more they move away to bodies," that is, care of corporal things, and
toward this they are less free when compressed in mortal limbs, that is, in a state of
mind in which they are less able to resist rising passions. "Extreme," that is, greatest,
"servitude" of their souls is, as if given to vice, they strike against the possession of
reason, which is proper to ruling, that is, ought to be directed in action. "For when,"
that is, after, such souls "have cast down their eyes" of discerning reason "from the
light of the highest truth to inferior and dark things," that is, to earthly and carnal
things, "soon afterwards they are surrounded by darkness," that is, obscured "by the
cloud of unknowing," that is, ignorance, "and they are troubled by destructive
affections," that is, passions, "acceding to and consenting to which they assist," that
is, they increase "the servitude which they have brought about," that is, introduced for
themselves. The souls of misfortune "are in a certain way, captives by their own

freedom."
Note that free will is freedom of judging and a matter of etequendi. Or,
following Boethius, beyond the first periarmenias, free will is the judgment of the soul
on desire, not an outer or vehement urging, or vehement clinging. Nullo cogente ad
faciendum quod displicet: nullo impediente ne fiat quod placet. Note that free will
consists in two parts, both in freedom of judging and in freedom judged from
comparing. First, because freedom of judging hinders ignorance, yet inability of
accomplishing and corruption of the will hinder freedom of comparing. Although,
indeed, we are able to accomplish good, nevertheless, with the will corrupted by vice,
we do not accomplish. Moreover, neither ignorance of judging, inability of achieving,
nor corruption of the will exists among separate substances. Therefore, in these is the
greatest freedom of the will. Intelligent beings are deceived in nothing. Therefore,
they have sharp sighted judgment and never wish but good. Therefore, an incorrupt
will is contained in these and they are able to achieve whatever they desire.
Therefore, in these there is an efficient conducting of desires.
Note that certain ones are said to have been from Plato concerning the
intention; human souls likewise, are things made in heaven, and afterwards descend
into bodies and are held in these, as it were, in chains. Following those degrees of
liberty of human souls which he proves in the literature. Though, what souls when
they are things made in heaven, they are most free in contemplation of the divine
mind. However, as now they are jointly in bodies, in this they are less free. But less
freedom is in these since they are subjected to vices. Yet, this explanation does not
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hold the following truth. Therefore, another is explained which is that these souls are
necessarily freer, those who serve in contemplation of the divine, so that conversation
is of the virtuous contemplative souls who are in heaven. These, moreover, are less
free, those who fall into confusion with regard to bodies, that is, those who descend
to the care of temporal things, as those who are active, who carry on business by
distributing in earthly goods for common service. In this their souls are less free who
are brought together in earthly limbs, that is, who descend to caring for one's own
body and one's own profit. Moreover, those are less free who, as subject to vices,
and dismiss reason. They are vicious indeed, not still a servant of the one lord, but
so many of the lord of the vicious, according to Augustine.
"Yet that [regard of providence] which..." here Philosophy shows since the acts
of free will fall under divine providence. Accordingly, she explains this, that divine
knowledge extends to all things, saying, "which looks forth to different things of
freedom and to all deeds truly understands them as predestined. It is understood by
providence now looking forth," and he disposes all that is predestined by returning
good for good, bad for bad, by their merits. Thus, he confirms through the Greek
author which he speaks in Latin. "God sees all, he hears all," or following others he
says, "God shows all to Apollo who is the sun." Note that although divine providence
sees all by eternal vision, still not because of this free will it is necessary to doing good
or evil. Because, following Aristotle in Book Three of Ethics: "Man is lord of his
works from the beginning continuously to the end." And therefore, following the
merits of the works of free will, he receives penalty or punishment.
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"I see that, I said..." I see that, that is , I consider, as if the soul says I turn to
this and I afix to it. But in this adhering, on the freedom of the will, this was always
a great debate - not only between theologians, but also between ancient authors. Aulus
Gellius speaks of it in Book VI, c.ii. He says that Chrysippus, the first Stoic of
philosophy defined it thus: "Fate is a certain perpetual thing and a series of
unchangeable things and a voluntary chain that goes through to itself and encircles
through eternal orders of natural succession, and we must choose what is necessary
from this." Moreover, the authors of other opinions and teachings accordingly
oppose this definition. If they say Chryssipus proposed all to be moved by fate and
are notable to be avoided and passed over by a king agmina fati et voumina in
anything, mistakes and faults are not encountered or proclaimed for their own desires
of these things by free will choices themselves, but by a certain necessity and force
which originates from fate. At any time the mistress of all matters and through whom
it is necessarily done, in whatever way it is future. Therefore the penalties from laws
for wicked things are unequally constituted since men come to evil deeds unwillingly
but by fate.
Against this Chrysippus diminished much and subtly examines what is written
upon this. His opinion is as such: " Everything is such that all things are assembled
and connected by a certain first necessary reason. Yet, natural capabilities themselves
of minds, or vessels, are such that they are punishment by means of fate, so the
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quality itself and the condition itself of these. For, if by nature they are originally,
wholesomely, and rightly fashioned, all this power concerning fate which attacks from
the outside may transfer to the offensive and the inoffensive. However, if they are
hopeless, ignorant, and unskilled, not strengthened with aids of good rhetoric, or they
are urged by no impression of destined trouble, yet they rush forward into continual
crimes and errors from fickleness and voluntary impulse. This is such that is done
with reason, the natural and necessary consequences of these matters, then it is called
fate. Indeed, it is in the origin itself, as if it were a matter destined by fate and
consequence with the result that they contain evil natures from sinning and errors.
About this matter then, one controls, for example, not as Hercules by excessively
unfriendly and not impolite ways. As he says lapidem cylindrum si per spacia terre
prona atque diruta iacias causam quidem ei et initium precipitantie feceris, mox tamen
ille preceps voluntur, non quare tu id iam facis, sed quomodo ita sesse modus eius et
forme volubilitas habet. So, order, reason and necessity of fate are the origins and the
first of the causes brings to mind a hinderence, but of our intentions , our intellects
and our actions themselves. Free will of each is proper and the natures of our souls
are controlled.

Then she applies these words to this which I have said are in

agreement. Therefore, from Pythagorus this is said: "You know man to choose the
worst in spontaneous misfortunes, as if the damages were caused from separate events
by themselves and by his passion they transgress and they hasten to misfortunes by this
choice and intention." On that account he denies that it is necessary that men are led
or understood, wretched or cowardly, wicked or bold, when they are convicted or
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take refuge in crime or wickedness; they say that it is to be attributed to the necessity
of fate, as if this were a sanctuary of something rational, and they say that because
they are made worse not by chance, but by fate.
However, a great, most wise, very ancient man of the poets said about speaking
in verse, "Hei mihi quid damnant mortales numina celi. Esse aiunt et enim per nos
mala, cum tamen ipsis vecordi preter faum sint mente dolores." Itaque Marcis Cicero
in libro quern De Fato, scripsit quum questionem istam diceret obscurissimam esse et
implicatissimam, Chrisippum quoque philosophum non expedisse se in ea refert his
verbis. Chrisippus estuans laboransque quonam pact explicet et fato omnia fieri, et
esse alquid in nobis intricatur hoc modo et cetera hoc. Aulus Gelius ubi super, sed ad
auctorem revertor. Est ne inquit. Meltus responsive legas sic. Est inquit, neque et
cetera, quo quicque discernat, quicque legendum est non quodque. Non enim additur
substantivum, sed quodque adiectivam est sicut quod aliquod et similia, et ita
substantivum desiderant, quidque autem quid, aliquid, et similia sine substantivo
ponuntur aut substantivum in genitivo regunt. Supplent enim vicem substantivorum.
Artubus a nominativo artus per u scribitur.

Quare artibus a nominativo artes

declinatur, cetera patent.
The Second Meter Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"Phoebus with pure shining light..." this is the second verse section of this fifth
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book which is named after the inventor Archilochus. It is dactylic by a surpassing
measure. In this Philosophy commends the excellence of divine understanding in
comparison to asserting the material alone. "Homer of the honeyed speech," that is
, of sweet eloquence "sings," that is describes "Phoebus," that is, the lone "shining
pure light." Perhaps Homer made the book on the beauty of the sun, he who "did not
have the strength to burst forth," that is, penetrate "the innermost parts," that is
depths, "of the land and sea," that is the "weakness" of the sea, that is, by the feeble
light "of his rays." So, not at all, that is , thus he does not possess in himself the
maker of the great Earth, God, who himself by his own intellect penetrates all things,
since nothing is able to be unknown to him the maker by watching, that is, caring for
everything on the earth from on high, that is from heaven in his view they continue,
nothing in the foundation, that is in the magnitude is such that it hinders the light of
his rays, not even "dark night hinders by its gloomy clouds." On the contrary, in one
"thrust of the mind," that is, in one mental view be knows what things are concerning
present as much as what they are concerning the past, what things will come
concerning the future. "He alone looks upon all things you could say, truly him
alone."
Note although God by knowing all foresees all and even these which are from
free will, voliunt tum quasdam creaturas esse liberi arbitri, quare hoc magis decet
divinam bonitatem. Sicut enim melius et nobilius est regnum in quo non tamen servit
regi a servis sed etiam a liberis que ubi tamen servitur a servis, sic melius erit regnum
dei et decentius ex hoc que sunt alique creature libere servientes sicut homo et angelus,
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que si essent sole creature serviliter operantes cuiusmodi sunt omnes creature preter
hominem et angelum, que et determinatione nature necessitantur ad sua opera.

"Shining with pure light..." The poem now often described wishes, however,
to show God to be mentioned specially as the sun. Since indeed the sun is interpreted
alone as all illuminating, and there are a great many things which the sun does not
naturally penetrate, although it is said in the fourth book of the Aeneid: "Sun, you
alone who observe the works of the earth by flames..." following is God alone for
whom nothing is hidden and who alone illuminates all. Indeed, he alone is to be called
the true sun. But Plinius and Macrobius thought the sun alone to be God, and all
duties to be are united by him, but he does nothing concerning the present affair for
which it is enough to be shown that God alone sees everything not as the natural sun
sees things.
The Third Prose Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"Then I said [See...]" here begins the third prose section of this fifth book in
which Boethius objects against the before mentioned things, saying that providence and
free will can continue together. First she instructs what sayings are held uncertain.
Second, she puts reason to the doubt, where she says, "I said '...too much... '". First
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he speaks. Then, before it is determined, Philosophy speaks. "O Philosophy," he
said, "I, Boethius, am quite confused with a more difficult doubt." Philosophy asks
"What is this ambiguity? For indeed, I guess," that is, I judge that you are confounded
by these things, that is, you are "disturbed." Note that to conjecture is to think
something from certain signs. Thus, Philosophy guesses the doubt of Boethius in this
passage by accidents together, because they were speaking on everything that concerns
providence and free will, reflecting upon the joint possibility of these. "I said ' ...too
great. .." here Boethius expresses his doubt, showing providence and free will to be
incompatible. First he does this. Second, he separates certain ways by which some
things they were attempting to defend, where he says "Why then".

To this

examination, the impossibility of predictions, he proposes three reasons. The second
point is there. For these the third is there last. First he considers the first cause.
Second he puts a certain solution there. For neither [do I agree with that]" or a certain
act.. First he said "It seems too opposing and incompatible" that God "foreknows all
things and that any sort of free will exists," moreover he shows what is incompatible.
"For, if God foresees" all "things and is not able to be mistaken in any way, it
necessarily follows that what he discerns beforehand to is the future." But, if that
does not follow, providence is mistaken or is in no way eternal. That is, "if he knows
not only the acts of men, but even their plans and desires, there will be no freedom of
the will," but if all things follow from necessity. Moreover, what can be said if God
knows all things through his providence. For neither will any deed or any desire be
able to exist unless "divine providence will have perceived beforehand," that is, will
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have foreknown, that is, not being able "to be mistaken," just as they are not able to
follow what things are foreseen. "For if they wish to be turned in another manner,"
so that they follow another, "the firm foreknowledge of God will no longer exist. But
rather an uncertain opinion will exist which I judge as something contrary to divine
law to believe that about God."
Note that from the writing reason is shaped. Those things foreseen follow
infallibly from necessity, but all things are infallibly foreseen by God. Therefore, all
things follow from necessity, and so, free will vanishes. Note that the knowledge of
God is not opinion, whereas the opinion of men is just this, and they are able to have
an opinion such, from the first of the latter things mentioned. Of these things, they
are not able to possess knowledge in itself. Therefore, knowledge itself is not stated
opinion. "For neither do I approve that argument..." here Philosophy excludes the
certain response since the previous argument was able to be given. From the first she
proposes a certain answer. Second she removes it, where she first says, "For neither
do I approve...", that is, regard as good, that argument. It is this which they believe
to be able to solve a certain knotty point, that is, difficulty of the question. "Indeed,
they say a thing will not happen since providence has foreseen" that to be the future,
that is, it will happen, "but rather on the contrary," that is, the opposite, "since what
will be", that is, is not able to be hidden from divine providence. As if one may say
an occurrence of an event is from the cause of foreknowledge and not the opposite.
Therefore, the necessity of foreknowledge is bound to be concluded, not the opposite
as when following those, and in this way it is necessary. He concludes from this "to
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return to the opposite side," although is known, is concluded, from the occurrence,
and this is concluded from foreknowledge. Indeed, it is not necessary that the events
following these "which are foreseen come to pass," but it is necessary that these things
which are foreseen will be.
Note that prior reason asserts that all future things which will occur are from
necessity, since God surely foresees future matters. However, the response of certain
ones says the contrary. Indeed, it is said that it is not so that God foresees future
events occurring by necessity, but "since they will exist" in the future, God foresees
them. "As if indeed such foreknowledge is the cause of a certain matter..." here he
removes the reply. He says this response proceeds as if it were "labored" by an
acquiring, "the cause of which is foreknowledge," whether the cause is from "the
necessity of future things" or whether "the cause of providence" is from "the necessity
of future things." But we strive, that is, we labor to show this our (work), although
"the occurrence of things foreknown is necessary, in whatever way," that is, by
whatever way "the order of causes possesses in itself." And if as though any
"foreknown thing does not seem to introduce the necessity of an occurrence in future
things," he shows such a thing with an example, he says, "If someone sit, it is
necessary that the opinion be true, that one concludes from the signs that he sits, and
conversely, if the opinion about someone be true, that he sits, it is necessary that he
sits. Therefore, in either point of view" certainly in the opinion and the "sitting" it is
"necessary". In this there is necessity of sitting , in this man sitting, in the other there
is necessity of truth of the opinion. But whoever he be above, he does not sit "for that

reason," accidentally, "but because the opinion is true," since "the truth of the
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opinion" is not the cause of the sitting, "but rather the opinion certainly is true,"
seeing that something preceding," that is, someone sits. "So, although the cause of
the truth proceeds from another part, still in both is a common necessity."
In the same way he happens to argue on providence and on these things which
it foresees. From which he says it "holds," that is, it is plain "to reason" concerning
providence and "concerning future things. For, even if for that reason it is foreseen
before anything, that will be. Still, they do not occur because they are foreseen.
Nevertheless, they are still necessary for God, either willing to be foreseen or foreseen
to occur." So, for each part necessity is combined in any of these accidentally,
"because that alone is enough," that is, it is sufficient "for destroying freedom of the
will" Note that this reply which he signified in the literature seems to have been from
Origen himself, who over a letter to Rome says thus: "Therefore, something will not
be because God knows that future matter, but because it is a future matter it is
therefore known by God to have been made before." Yet it is able to be understood
on two accounts. In one way that occurrence of a matter is from a cause of
foreknowledge, a reason of consequence.
Thus, Boethius' refutation is true in another way as it can be understood that
an occurrence of a matter is a cast of foreknowledge following a thing existing. So,
it is false and in this way it is rejected by Boethius. First, therefore, Boethius shows
why this refutation is not toward the argument. Second, he shows why it does not
include the truth, where he says, "But now how preposterous it is..." here Philosophy
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shows that this argument includes falsehood, since she proposes that something
temporal is from eternity. Indeed, they discuss what future matters are from cause of
eternal foreknowledge. First he says, "But now how preposterous," that is, it is
perverse, and "the occurrence of temporal matters may be said to be from a cause" of
eternal foreknowledge, which is mentioned in this argument. First he adds, "What is
else is to be declared that God therefore foresees the future things because they are
going to occur, than to think that these things, once they have occurred," that is,
themselves will be "the cause of highest providence." As if he were saying nothing
is something. Note that nothing temporal is the cause of an eternal matter, but rather
the contrary. Indeed, a cause is not more worthy in itself because that more worthy
cause has been performed in time. Moreover, it is undeserving with respect to eternity,
just as the corruptible compared to the incorruptible, and the like. "Therefore, just
as when I know that about this..." here she explains the second argument for proving
the following conclusion.

She says about this that the reason is beyond our

understanding of foreknowledge, just as "when I know that something is future,
therefore, it is brought to pass," that is, it happens, "so the occurrence of a foreknown
matter is unable to be avoided."
Note that reason is able to be shaped thus. Just as he has knowledge with
regard to knowable matters of the present, so he has foreknowledge with respect to an
occurrence of a future matter. But when I know something to be at present, it is
necessary that this itself exist. Therefore, when something is foreknown, it will be.
It is necessary that this itself exist, but God foreknows the entire future. Therefore
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they necessarily occur, and thus, once more, freedom of the will is removed. "Lastly,
if anyone [think] a thing ...". Here he proposes the third reason for the same, saying,
"If anyone considers something to be otherwise," that is, other "than what this matter
contains by itself , that by no means" that is, yet not even this "is knowledge, but it
is a false opinion, very much different from the truth of knowledge. Wherefore if
something is future, in such a way that the occurrence of this is not certain and
necessary," then that "will be able to be foreknown of events", it is as if he says it in
now way exists as such. Of what things he ascribes to reason, saying, "Just as
knowledge itself is unmixed with falsehood," so that "which is received by it is not
able to be otherwise than what is received". Therefore, if it is possible that another
contain this, then knowledge can be false, whereupon he adds, this is the cause
whereby knowledge is "without falsehood," because it is necessary that every single
"thing as it contains this, be contained" just as "knowledge understands it to be."
Note that the reason which he intends is this: whoever estimates a thing to be
other than what it is, his estimation is false and is not knowledge "but a false opinion."
Therefore, if God foreknows something to be future, and if that event does not
necessarily occur as he foreknew, foreknowledge of God will not be knowledge but
a false opinion. Therefore, future events foreseen by God do occur necessarily, and
thus, free will comes to nothing. "Then how [is this?] ... " here Philosophy rejects the
ways in which some labor to save providence. First she asks in what way divine
providence is able to be saved by rejecting two methods by which some presumed to
save it. Second, she proposes a third similar to this. Following this is where she says,
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"But if in [him] ...". First he says "Then how is this?", as we mentioned above. "In
what way" it can be mentioned by which"God foreknows in this uncertain future."
The prime mover is God, called this because he perceives beforehand to judge
infallibly whether it may not occur, but this is unsuitable, because then divine
providence is mistaken. Whereupon he says "For if: ..". God assesses, that is, judges,
that this occur infallibly, "and also because it is possible that they not occur, it is
falsely said "that God in no way," that is, it is not only "impossible to perceive" of
God in this way, "but also it is impossible to bring forth from speech." The second
method is that God is said to provide a future of unlimited matters as they will be. But
in this way the providence of God is not fixed. First he says, "but yet, that is, but if
God "discerns that those future things will be" just as they are foreseen, they are
indeterminantly known, so although he "knows these to be equal," that is, they can
equally "happen or not happen, what is this foreknowledge which understands nothing
as stably fixed." It is as if he were suggesting that providence is nothing. And how
does this foreknowledge differ from "that ridiculous prophesy of Tiresias" who said
"whatever I will say, this will or will not be", and by what means, that is, in what way
"will divine providence be superior to," that is, have greater worth than human
opinion, if it judges "this unstable" in this way as men do an event, "the outcome of
which is uncertain," as if he were saying it does not differ at all.
Note that when Tiresias had seen two serpents come together at the same time
like projecting sticks these separated themselves from each other, and changed into
a woman. After a period of seven years the serpents again joined together like a stick
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and changed into a man. However, when a disagreement had arisen between Jove and
Juno as to whether it had been more pleasure in the combination as a man or a woman,
Tiresias was elected as the judge, who was considered an expert on the strengths of
both sexes. However, when he said the better pleasure was as a woman, Juno became
enraged and blinded him. However, Jupiter in recompense of his pitied state of his
blindness gave him the gift of prophecy. Moreover, this was mentioned in the

Timatius. "Whatever I say will or will not be." Therefore, if God did not know the
future to be otherwise unlimited, unless whereby they were or were not examined by
his foreknowledge, it would be as if Tiresias had foreknowledge, which is ridiculous.
"But if in him..." here he proposes the third way, presuming to save providence. It
is so that we propose all things to occur from necessity and we remove free will.
First, therefore he proposes this method. Second, he shows what inconsistencies
follow toward this, where he begins, "This once...". First, therefore, he concludes
this method, saying "But if in him, that most certain source of all matters can be
uncertain of nothing, certain is the occurrence of these things which he himself knew
before it will have been. Therefore, no freedom from human resolution or action
which the divine mind, discerning the whole without error of falsehood, binds and
draws together all such in relation to the first event."
Note that nothing happens by a changer around the source of all things since
his knowledge can be uncertain. If he is uncertain, he is imperfect, not divine.
Therefore, if this is certain with respect of the future, it is necessary that the entire
future foreknown by God necessarily occur. "This once accepted..." here he proposes
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inconsistencies which follow if free will were removed.

First he shows what

inconsistencies follow, in part from man. Second, he shows which ones are in part
from God. Third, he shows which are in part the union of man and God. Following
this he states where he says that in such a thing there is nothing inconsistent. The
third he states where he says that the inconsistencies are therefore on the part of man.
If free will does not exist," punishment and rewards are placed before men," and the
wicked are punished and the good rewarded "for nothing," unless they are crimes or
virtues for men. But they are done from necessity of nature and not of free will.
Whereupon he says "This once accepted... " that is, assumed, certainly so that free will
is denied. He says "this is clear. ..", that is it is made clear how great the ruin, that
is, how great the destruction of human matters that follow. "For it is to no purpose
that the rewards are proposed for good men and punishments for wicked men." Thus,
statutes and laws for man are futile, because "penalties and rewards" are unjust
because "nothing merited the motive as free or voluntary will." And that "will seem
most unjust" if all "which now is judged most just," certainly that "the wicked be
punished and the good be rewarded, those who turned," that is toward uprightness or
wickedness "did not sense by their will, but knew certain the necessity of the future.
Therefore, virtues and vices would be anything. But rather, it will be mixed and
indistinguishable confusion of all merits," certainly good and bad.
Note that all virtues and vices arise from free choice of good and evil.
Similarly, punishment and reward exist because of the free action of good and evil.
If then freedom of the will is exalted, a free act will not exist, not unless free action
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from good or evil exists. In consequence, there will be no virtue, no vice, and the
wicked punished with injustice, when the bad thing was done from necessity , and the
good rewarded with injustice when a good thing was done from necessity, but it is
absurd to say this. "In which nothing more impious..." here he shows the
inconsistency which follows on the part of God, certainly, that God will be the author
of evil matters, whereby he says "since the whole order of things is led from divine
providence" and if "it holds that nothing is done by human intention," it happens, that
is, it follows "that our vices are returned to the author of all things," God. "In such
a thing as this nothing more impious from this can be conceived," to say that God is
the author of evil matters. Nevertheless, it is necessary with freedom removed. Note
that failure is the work which defect is not in power of a thing so that it is said to be
necessary for an act or for a production. Therefore, if an act of our will is not free,
the failure of that act following the will is produced in God. Thus, God will be
causing our failure. But this is absurd.
"Therefore [there is no reason] of hoping anything..." here he proposes the
inconsistencies which follow from the connection of man to God, since the act of
praying and the act of hoping was taken away, by which the best are joined with God,
whereupon he says that free will is therefore removed, unless there is any reason for
hoping something or praying something between God and man. "Indeed, what should
any man pray or hope" if "an unchanged series connects all desired things." It is as
if he is saying it is done in vain. "Therefore," in both directions "that sole fellowship
known between God and man of hoping and praying is taken away." Moreover, he

121
calls that hope and prayer fellowship whereby we purchase the entire benefits with
these.

Whereupon he adds, if a certain price of just humility, we humans are

deserving of the inestimable return, that is retribution of divine grace, which is the
only way of praying in which men seem to be able to converse with God and be joined
in the inaccessible light known as God. Before men get what they seek, even before
we offer prayers, we obtain the purpose of our request. What are hopes and prayer
if we do not believe to have received strength, that is, pardon from the necessity of
future matters. How will it be that we can be joined by this, that is, connected by this
and kept close to that highest principle of things. It is as if he says nothing. Since the
human race will be divided, that is scattered and separated from its source, that is, will
fall apart from its origin above from God, that is, it would cease to perform, as
wassaid a little while ago in the sixth verse section of the fourth book.
Note that the act of praying pertains to the intellect. The speech of the
following is from John Damascus: Knowledge of the approach to God or in God by
which the act of truth we make our way to God, which is our need. It is not because
in our entrance something is made clear from God which before was unknown, but
that we contemplate ourselves by exercising the entrance itself, that in these things,
hope and prayer, we are hastening back to divine assistance. The act, moreover, of
hoping pertains to the will since its object is future good. In this act we cling to God
as if shining by assistance from the perfect principle of his goodness to the following
good of which we have need. But if it comes to a necessary good in any such way or
is impossible that it occur, either act of praying or hoping is in vain.
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"Then I said 'See' ...". See and lo, then are said because something unexpected
and outside the usual is said to have occurred, just as where it is said "Lo, a virgin
shall conceive and shall bring forth a son." Divine providence cannot lie hidden.
"Lateo," or I am hidden, means at the same time to cause oneself to go actively, that
is, I flee. Whereupon in the first book of the Aeneid "And the tricks of Juno not
escape the notice of her brother." Even with the dative it is understood that you are
unknown to me, that is, you are concealed, and you will be hidden from me. "As if
truly..." she says this because it follows, and not that we might strive to indicate by
what is placed in the gloss, but indeed, let us endeavor that it ought thus to be
arranged. Indeed, it is as if it were formed, that is, as if it were a work made in
comparing which is the cause of whatever it is, that is, of anything whatever, that is,
"ne" before "an". Or perhaps that is to say foreknowledge is above God a necessity
exists of future things, that is, a necessary cause so that future things happen. Or
perhaps the necessity of future things is a cause of providence, that is, because God
holds among these a certain providence both before and as if beyond. We should not
labor, that is, we should not try and apply ourselves to show the occurrence of things
foreknown by God to be beyond necessary things, beyond everything, that is, in
whatever way the arrangement of chance events controls itself, that is, if this is the
cause of foreknowledge or if foreknowledge is the cause of this. Here consider two
things. First, what this clause is truly about, then it is accustomed to be placed since
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we speak through irony and we express it to be so that it is believed by certain ones,
and it is not said as such. Moreover it is said as "autem nee" or "neque autem", at
least as frequently and properly I will defend , as in "quasi vero" or "neque vero".
Accordingly, consider how often "relative" or "endless" follow directly
foreknowledge, and these are repeated with equal number. We are able to change the
latter part in any way as "incunque" or "qualisqualis" or "qualiscunque utut" or
"utcumque ubiubi" or "ubicunque" or "quotquot" as "quotcunque". Yet since "ly"
cunque does not connect as quis and quid, but qui and quod do connect. One does not
separate quisquis as in quiscumque, or in quicunque and quicquid, not in quidcumque,
or in quodcunque. Truly now how reverse and the rest in what way, that is, what
things so reversed, that is, perverse in arrangement, when illud has been placed
before, because it should be postponed or, on the contrary, we say perverse.
You the reader ought to well remember all the words, the sequence of this
prose, and, likewise, the sequence of the poetry attributed to Boethius. Therefore, you
should not speak as in the former commentary, as "here Philosophy shows and here
Boethius shows, "Ad hec dixi" it is better to be read "ad hoc", that is "preterea",
because frequently it is discerned, seek it in the table where it is said. "Why then..."
are the words of Boethius, not Philosophy. Or this thing is of importance, that is,
differs, it makes a difference, from above, from the prophecy of Tiresias. "Preterea"
which you now understand concerning Tiresias that he may have been a Theban
prophet, and many likewise have predicted to Ulysses in the underworld after death
in the second work of Homer. Once also, Horace in Book II of the Sermons. Hoc quo
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Tiresia preter narrata petenti responde. Et quare cecus effectus erat <licit Iuvenalis nee
surdum nee Tiresiam quern que esse deorum. Quod autem in feminam mutatus sit licet
fabulosus putatur. Pliny, however in the seventh chapter of Natural History shows this
able to have been done, teaching truth from this six, none was unchanged. De vaticino
autem in Textu hoc posito dicere que iussus oraculum certum enunciare dixerit. You
have this for a certain oracle: "What I will have said or I am about to say, either will
or will not be". It is as if the truth of his saying is dependent upon the future, when
now it is necessary. Whereupon, I would earn ridicule by speaking if something
should not happen. "Will [divine providence] be better than the opinion of man.." see
if it is not more fit reading for human imagination. For Terence, in "The Eunuch" said
thus, "Man is distinguished as a thing separate from human kind, and I do not doubt
if he said this place something, likewise, since it had been put to divine providence.
Opinions of men was not distinguished from human belief. Moreover, this word is
construed in many ways at any time. It is significant since it shows excellence and
eminence. Even so, it still directs, as in the work of Vergil, "I will go against the
spirits or, he should prove himself a great Achillles". This indicates something by an
additional dative as it is a preference to something, so that in the example mentioned
man is distinguished as something apart from mankind. Aliquando is used fully and
as if impersonally, as Pachomius is distinguished as a Sicilian lingering around
columns, that is, he was most religious. "Series indeflexa", that is, that which was
"nunquem flexa", or rather "inflexibilis". For often a past participle is considered
present in place of an awkward verbal construction, because they sound intelligent,
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as in Vergil's work it is stated: "Aut illaudati nescit husiridis aras. Illaudati id est
illaudabilis, secundum Servium. This is in the seventh book of the Aeneid: "Dives
inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos." He says inaccessible woods, not those no one has
access to, but inaccessible, that is, those which no one ought to enter upon. A thing
gapes open sufficiently, that is, gapes abundantly; just as from the first book of the
Aeneid: "Omnes accipiunt inimicum imbrem, rimisque fatiscunt." Divided comes
from "apart" and "encircle", and also, "fence" takes its root from "sepio", that is,
there is a connection. Make use of the little sayings. From this look for these words
to be spoken and the persona of Boethius.
The Third Meter Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"What unlike [cause breaks] the agreement of things?" here begins the third
meter section of the fifth book, which is said in Adonic verse, or accordingly, it
follows a certain style from the inventor Archilocus. It is predominantly dactylic in
measure. First, Boethius makes an exclamation over the incomparability which
appears between providence and free will. At first, why they seem incompatible when
by themselves they are considered possible. Following this she produces an answer
to this. Third, she objects against the answer. Forth, she solves the objection. The
second is found where it begins, "On the contrary." The third is found where it
begins "But why in such a way." The fourth is found where it begins "Or whereas the
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mind." First she says "What unlike cause breaks," that is, separates the agreement,
that is, harmony of things of divine providence, and free will, that they are not
compatible together. Or what God establishes conflicts between two truths and a
single truth, which separately, that is singly, or divided, they make an acceptable
agreement, that is, they last. They are the same,· yet mixed, that is, joined, "they
refuse to be yoked," that is, to be mutually united in compatibility. Then she explains
the answer, saying what in these two truths are evident of providence and free will,
"that no such discord exists," but the illusion of discord is produced from our
weakened intellect, whereupon she says the answer noted here "Or is there no such
discord among truths..." if they always know themselves fixed "but is it the mind ,
obstructed," that is, oppressed by blindness of its unseeing parts, that is, a soul in
darkness, that cannot know, the splendid light because of oppressed light. It cannot
recognize the fine, that is, the subtle, interlacing, that is, the connections of things
which appear to clash.
Note, if we consider divine providence by itself, it is possible to exist as such,
if we consider free will by itself, it too is able to exist as such, as it is plain from the
sayings. But if we consider from both sides at the same time, then they appear
incompatible, just as it is plain to superior reasoning. Moreover, according to this the
truth is that by themselves, they are compatible, they are possible, but to us this is not
apparent. Therefore, our intellect, oppressed by the mass of the body, is not able by
itself to elevate in such a way to cognizance, for the following wisdom, which is
corrupted by the body oppresses the soul, and earthly habitation greatly oppresses the

faculty of thinking.
"But why does it flame with so great a love?" Here Philosophy objects toward
the solution. If indeed, the soul ignores these subtle connections, for what reason
does it desire to know these things when nothing unknown is able to be lost? First she
says, "But why does the soul flame with such a great love," that is, with desire that it
should find something from a different time, that is, hidden true sighs, that is, of truth.
"Does the mind know that which it anxiously," that is, passionately "strives to know?"
It is as if she were saying no, but no one strives to know that which is known, and this
is what she says, "Who works to know known things?" It is as if she were saying no
one does this. Therefore, it is reasonable to say because something is unknown, then
something dissimilar follows, because the soul desires that which is unknown.
Whereupon she says, "If it does not know that which it seeks... ", that is, in blindness
the mind desires, that is, it is ignorant. Indeed, he who wishes is unaware, that is,
desires everything, or who can seek the unknown, or he who is unaware can
understand by what he ascertains, beyond that which he seeks, and he who overlooks,
that is, who is unaware, that is, who can come to know , will discover the before
known form. It is as if she were saying no one.
Note that it is said in response that the soul is unable to understand the
compatibility of providence and free will, but it desires to know this. Against this, she
argues thus: "No one strives to know what is known. If the soul desires to know
something, it either knows or does not know something. Therefore if it knows, the
soul itself does not desire to know what it knows, since no one seeks to know what he
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knows when everything has been sought without reason. If, however, he is unaware
of what he desires, in what way is the unknown desired, when free will does not seek
the unknown? Therefore, if he is always unaware, he learns. "Who indeed ascertains
the unknown?" Indeed, if the ordinary citizen were to ask servum fugitivum quern
ignoraret, posset sibi multotiens occurrere que ·ipsum non inveniret, sicut <licit
Linconiensis super primo poestrium. "Or when it perceived the greatest mind," here
she solves the objection, where it is noted that Plato proposed the soul to be the things
made in heaven and to possess whole perfect cognizance, but by slipping into bodies,
it forgot knowledge of things, in particular things, and retained this in universals.
Thereafter by exercise it recovers the knowledge of things in particular. Wherupon
she says thus: "Or", as is noted of the solution, "when it perceives the soul", that is
reflects on the great "mind," that is, the profound mind of God, and at the same time
learns of, that is, has become acquainted with the greatest, that is, universal knowledge
and separate, that is, particular knowledge of things. But now those things are
preserved, that is, they are concealed in the division of parts not offered to the soul on
the whole, that is, wholly. But the soul itself has the greatest, that is universal
knowledge of things, forgetting the singular, that is, particular knowledge. Therefore,
everyone who seeks, that is, looks toward learning the truth, such is beyond neither
quality, so that he knows perfectly, or is wholly unaware of such things. Whence she
says, "For indeed, it does not come to know", but seeks to join in the particular and
complete, and "the inner part does not know all, but remembers itself," that is, it holds
in memory the greatest, that is, universal knowledge, which he goes over, holding,
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"examining" again in practical reflection, that is, recalling through study, with skill,
that is, accurately, "those things perceived," that is, previously into particular
knowledge, "so that he might add the forgotten parts to those parts which were
furnished for serving in the memory. "
Note that according to this, "the way of Plato is that reason sets free what was
known before." Or, the soul knows what it desires or does not know. I say that it does
not know the particular or special forms but it knows the universal forms. Although
it is said that no one desires the unknown, it is doubtless here that what is thought to
be unknown is a universal. Still, it desired this so it is unknown in particular things.
When it is said if one is unaware, he learns, it is doubtless here that he is unaware
whether in the general sense or the particular. If he is unaware of a power and deed,
if however he knows power and in universals, and does not know from the act the
special forms, the soul itself is able to ascertain and learn further.

"What discordant... " in this poem we had the first law. Boethius says toward
these, looking at the apparent contradiction between the two truths, when he might
have wanted to declare in what way the truth might agree with another truth.
Moreover, the truth is that God infallibly foreknows all things. Also, the truth is our
free will, and it exists because divine providence, as was touched on previously, seems
to contradict, it is on the contrary. Moreover, nothing of obscurity is here, unless in
the poem. For in the end, he reflects from skill, or is able to do this by a higher law,

however, he does not consider it. Moreover, I found the poem sequence to have two
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feet beyond a just measure. Thus, it was written so that he might be a able to add the
unclear parts to those kept unharmed, but I believe that spondee in itself fit to be
placed at the beginning, and I placed it in the manner mentioned.
The Fourth Prose Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
Then she said: "That is the old complaint..." here is the fourth prose section
of this fifth book, in which Philosophy begins to destroy the question of compassionate
providence and free will. From the first she touches on the difficulty of this question
and the reason of the difficulty, and she touches on the way of proceeding around the
solution of this. Following this she destroys the question, where she says "For I ask".
At first she says "this complaint", that is, this question of providence is "the old
complaint", and it is powerfully pursued, that is, exposed by Marcus Tullius, when he
classified that it divided divination, in his book "On Divination", when he classifies
kinds of divination in the species not only here, but a matter sought out for a very long
time by you yourself. "But so far by no means," that is, not in any way, "has it been
developed sufficiently, diligently, or powerfully by any of you. The obscurity of
which," that is, "the reason of the difficulty is that the emotion," that is, impulse "of
human reasoning is not able to be led," that is, to be connected "to the simplicity of
divine foreknowledge," that is, providence. "If that could in any way be conceived,
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nothing whatsoever would remain ambiguous." But here the reason and the cause of
the difficulty are plain, and I will attempt to make clear and explain "just only when
I will have considered," that is, declared truly "those things by which you are moved."
Note that the question of divine providence and free will is wholly a most
difficult question, about which many of the ancients were uncertain, and none of the
moderns at hand escaped the difficulty, which Cicero in the book On Divination
investigating and not attempting to influence to refute this difficulty, denied the inner
providence and foreknowledge of future events by God in the before mentioned book

On Divination. "For I ask..." here Philosophy comes to a solution for the question
and from the first she dissipates the motive of Boethius. Following this, she takes
apart the uncertainty, or the question where it begins "Quomodo igitur." Circa
primum sciendum que duo fuerunt motiva Boetius principalia circa hanc questionem.
First, therefore, it seems necessary, since God foresees the future, that these things
happen by necessity. Following this motive, the occurrence of things in the future is
uncertain as future connections are not able to be foreknown for certain by God.
First, therefore, she explores the Prime Mover. In the second point she explores the
following, where she says "but this you ask". First she shows that if God foresees
future events, not this at hand, they occur by necessity. In the second point she
removes uncertainty when she says "But how could it be". From the first she shows
that from foreknowledge of God, necessity is not occasioned with free will. In the
second she shows that foreknowledge of God is not a sign of the necessity of future
things, where she says, "again, foreknowledge... " Near the first it is known that she
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first rejected a certain answer in which certain things that looked bright hinder reason,
showing them not to be free will on account of divine foreknowledge. Here she takes
up this answer again, showing it in such a way to be good, wherefore she sufficiently
entangles the attention of the rival. For the enemy proves the necessity of future
things from nothing else, unless, therefore, they are things foreknown by God.
Therefore, since from the answer it is held that what is foreknown holds no causality
over future events, it seems sufficiently to be shown that such things which proceed
from free will are not necessary.
Therefore, at first she considers this answer by taking up his answer, saying,
"Indeed, I ask why you ask that reason of those solving is less effectual which proves
free will" not ensnared by foreknowledge, wherefore it estimates that foreknowledge
is not the cause of the necessity of future things. However, because one might be
hindered by this answer, a conclusion of the necessity of future things is accessible
from this, wherefore "you do not consider from one argument of the necessity of
future things other than from the fact that those things which are foreknown cannot
come to pass. If then foreknowledge," that is, foreknowledge of future things adds
nothing, that is, hinders necessity of future things, since then the answer ly this, as you
truly did admit a little while ago what this is, that is, how might it be "the solution of
a voluntary act toward a certain event of things?" So, by this answer the necessity of
future events is excluded, and she makes this clear in an example, saying, "that you
might perceive what follows, for the sake of argument" that is, for example, let us set
for an example, that is, "let us consider as impossible that nothing is foreknown" of
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future things. Therefore, from this position, with respect to this, that is, with respect
to this conclusion, in which the necessity of future events is concluded from
foreknowledge, "from this those things which occur from this, are they compelled by
free will not by necessity?" Boethius says, "Not at all" and Philosophy says "Again,
let us suppose" that providence exists, "but that it·joins nothing of the necessity for
future things. It will remain, I believe, that same freedom of the will, entire and
absolute" by every necessary thing.
Note that before the solution had been made void by good or evil in this, it was
good, wherefore, it could have been that foreknowledge is not the cause of the
necessity of future things. Dicere enim ideo futura eveniunt, non quare deus ea
previdet. But in this sense it was bad. Therefore, it could have been that future events
are the cause of foreknowledge of God. Then she said that future events, therefore,
such that God foresees these things. Therefore, from the answer of the ancients he
perceives what foreknowledge is not the cause of the necessity of future things. "But
you inquire, concerning foreknowledge... " here Philosophy shows that divine
foreknowledge is not "a sign of the necessity" of future events. Following this she
shows that the way of examination from a sign does not "effect the existence." For
indeed, she says from the first, "You will say", that is, "you will be able to say
although" any such foreknowledge is not necessary for future events, "still it is a sign
that these things will necessarily come to pass." So, foreknowledge can be applied to
"the necessity of future things," as if from the sign. "In this way," by considering
foreknowledge to be a sign "of the necessity of future things, it would correspond that
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the outcome," that is, the occurrences of future events are necessary, even if
"foreknowledge" of it had not existed, because it is shown by the nature of that sign.
She then says, " For truly every sign still shows what is", that is, it makes clear that
thing whose sign it is, but it does not effect that sign.

Wherefore, it must be

demonstrated "that foreknowledge," that is, providence "may be seen as a sign of the
necessity" of future things.

"First, nothing comes to pass that is not from necessity,"

that is, everything occurs necessarily. "Otherwise, if this necessity" of future things
"is nothing," then this foreknowledge "might not be a sign of that thing which does not
exist." So, it is not a strong argument that the necessity of future things is from
foreknowledge, as if from a sign.
Note that a sign is not the cause of that of which it is a sign, yet it is shown to
be a sign sot that a circle is not the cause of the selling of wine, but still it is a sign of
selling. If, therefore, foreknowledge might be a sign of the necessity of future events,
this presupposes the future to be necessary.

So, toward the showing that

foreknowledge is a sign of the necessity of future things, it is first necessary to show
the future to be necessarily future, just as foreknowledge is a sign of the necessity of
future things with other things, that foreknowledge is a sign of another thing which it
is not is absurd. "But truly" here she shows the way of showing from a sign not to be
effectual and she says, "It is evident", that is, it has been made clear that "firm
reasoning", that is, strength by expression, that is, something with description, must
not be drawn "from signs or from arguments sought from the outside," that is, from
the acceptable ways, but strong reasoning "is drawn from conventional means," that
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is, from particular, from necessary causes. Therefore, since foreknown reasoning will
have proceeded from the sign, it is not effectual and demonstrative since it is from
later things. A demonstration, or what is most powerful of an examination, is from
the former, since it is from causes in themselves from the better known moderns,
ancients, and for such it is a demonstration, it is an argument making known effective
and showing from the first of the ancients.
"But how could it be... " here Philosophy warns against a certain doubt and
solves it. It seems in the following that anything can be shown which still does not
occur by necessity. If, however, they do not occur by necessity, they cannot occur.
So, it follows that anything foreknown by God does not occur. Therefore, from the
first Philosophy, from doubting concerning this, says that from this, as it is, these
things which are foreknown are not necessary, but those things cannot occur, that is,
how can it happen that these things which are foreseen to be future do not take place?
Then she solves the uncertainty, saying that in this she does not deny that foreknown
things do not occur; on the contrary, it is necessary to say that foreknown things
occur, but, nevertheless, they do not occur from necessity. Whence, she says "Just
as if" it is as if she were saying this uncertainty proceeds as if we were not to believe
these things which providence foreknows must not follow. But this is not true, and if
we would rather not think that it is necessary, because it is necessary that future events
occur, yet they have nothing in their nature that must occur of necessity. It is clear
in the example in what way something is really understood, but still it is not necessary.
Then she says that because a known thing occurs, still it is not by necessity, although
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you might consider it as such from this, that is, from such an example.

For we

observe many things with our eyes while they are happening that is, while they are in
action, as these things seem, as charioteers do in managing and directing horses, and
other things. We see in this way that what things are happening in any of these
voluntary acts, but does any necessity compel another of these so that it happens as it
appears to the eyes? Boethius says "Not at all" and ascribes reasoning, "for the
exercise of skill would be to no purpose if all things moved by force", and skill would
be useless in directing horses if they were necessarily directed. Therefore, those
things which, when they are happening are deprived by necessity of existing, the same
things are in the future without necessity before they happen. Whence, she concludes,
"therefore, there are certain things about to happen" and the final result, that is, the
occurrence of which is free from all necessity, and perhaps, some might say, for these
things are happening now and were not going to happen before they happened.
Here she concludes, saying, "I do not think that any man would say that those
things which are now happening were not going to happen." This truly would be
irrational beyond measure. Therefore, it is necessarily concluded that this and even
foreknown events have free ends. Wherefore, as knowledge of present things conveys
nothing of necessity for those things which were happening before, just as they seek
in an example foretold of the direction of horses, so foreknowledge of future events
conveys nothing of the necessity for those which are about to come. Note that
although the future events in comparison to divine providence are a necessary necessity
by condition, still all things are not necessary for free necessity. Indeed, many things
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occur freely as these things which occur by skill and voluntarily, as in the direction of
horses. Certainly if the direction of horses necessarily occurs, it would be useless, the
skill of directing horses.

Note that as these things are happening by an act, so they

were future events, but some things are happening by a free act. Therefore, they were
free future events, and in the following not all are necessarily future events, although
by necessity conditions in as much as they are compared to divine providence, still the
nature considered in itself occurs necessarily by absolute necessity, just as they will
seem afterward, where she distinguishes dual necessity, the conditional and absolute.
"But this, you say..." here Philosophy breaks down the motive of Boethius, the one
which in uncertain future events as they are contingent might be certain to be
foreknown. From the first she shows the uncertainty concerning this, and she comes
to a reason of this uncertainty. Following this she assigns the cause of error, where she
says from the first, "The cause of the error is..." and then "But you say, 'O
Boethius'..." this itself is doubted, if anything can be foreknown, that is,
foreknowledge of these things which do not have necessary ends, that is, occurrences.
Certainly in no way is this possible, since truly, foreknowledge and dependence on
chance "are seen to be discordant." Certainly "you believe if they are foreseen,"
contingency itself is "necessarily a consequence" and "if necessity itself is wanting in
the least to be foreknown," and you believe "nothing can be understood" by divine
foreknowledge, 'unless it is certain." And "if those things are of an uncertain end,"
that is, occurrence, as if they were contingent, if "they are foreknown as certain," you
believe it "to be obscurity' of opinion, "not truth of knowledge" and you will elude to
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this. The cause of this deception is your error about judgement of thinking. Truly,
"you believe thinking things to be other than they are, considering a thing" which
possesses itself and in this you err.
Note that therefore we are not able to foreknow future events to be for certain
dependent upon chance. We consider likewise that God is not able to do this. Truly
things in the same way a thing is able to be known in a different way by different
beings. A thinking thing is different from a part of knowing well which itself is
knowledge, and so it is necessary that future events dependent on chance are uncertain
in themselves. Still, they can be foreknown by God without error of falsity. "The
cause of this error is..." here she assigns the cause of the error where it is noted what
the cause of the error is. Therefore, we consider that an uncertain future cannot be
certain to be foreknown because it is believed that the faculty of knowing is not
following the power of the thing understood and not of its own power of thinking, that
is, false. Therefore from the first she sets forth the cause of the error. Following this
she proves it, when she says from the first "For - that this by a brief example...and
the cause of this error is...." Wherefore it is considered "that everyone thinks
everything" that he knows "such from the strength and nature of those things which
are known" and not from the strength of knowing "which is wholly otherwise," that
is, by the opposite herefore great things are not known according to the nature of
knowing. "For everything which is learned is not understood according to its own
strength," that is, according to the way of its nature, but rather according to the power
of knowing.

Note that if knowledge were according to the power of a thing known, then
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the thing would be known by everyone in the same way. Thus something would be
understood in the same way by human intellect and divine intellect which is false, since
what things are doubtful of comprehension in humans are certain of comprehension by
the divine. And cognition is directed rather according to the power of capacity of
knowing so that in such capacity is more effective and more certain in such a way that
one understands this very fixed and very clear. "For that this may become clear by
a brief example..." here she shows that power of knowledge is according to power of
capability of thinking and not of the think known. From the first she shows this by
example. Following this she shows this same thing through reasoning where she says,
"Also man himself.... " From the first she shows that knowledge is according to the
power of thinking which may become clear by a brief example. For sight recognizes
in one way the same roundness of body and touch recognizes it in another way. That
sight "remaining at a distance" is evident, that is, from far off "it looks at the whole
body at once by the visually emitted rays. Truly here" it is clear that touch
corresponding to and conjoined "to the sphere," that is, "to the round shape and
motion around, a moving around itself," that is, "around" the round body,
"understands,' although "the roundness is with the parts," that is, in the parts.
Note that she means a double difference between way of knowing and sight and
touch. First it is that sight manifesting form distances understood as a certain round
body. Touch, however, does not understand unless conjoined to this. In the second
difference is that sight sees the whole body at once, touch however in parts.
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Moreover, such diversities in understanding would not exist if this were understood
by its nature, since the same form remains in each conception. Note that certain ones
said vision to be made by emission of light rays from the eyes all the way to the thing
seen, but this opinion is different from Aristotle's. In fact, vision is not a sending
beyond but a sustaining within. Indeed, by experiencing a certain sensation, this itself
is seen in De Anima. Moreover, here she shows following the opinion of the ancients
since she says that sight looks at the whole body with emitting rays. "Also, man
himself ..." here she shows according to an example by the capacity of a below
ordinary understanding. Following this she shows since these capacities hold toward
each other, "In such as this...." Therefore, from the first she declares likewise in
what way this is understood in a different way by different powers. She says "man
himself," the exterior "senses, imagination, reason and divine intellect consider it in
a different way," than divine intelligence.. For the exterior "sense" as sight "judges
the shape" of man "in underlying matter," that is, in matter that can be perceived by
the senses, but "imagination alone" discerns "without matter,' that is, in the absence
of material things. "Indeed, reason transcends" this imagination and "considers the
specific" itself, that is, the specific nature of man "which is in individual people," that
is, discerns "with universal consideration. Truly the eye," that is, consideration of
"intelligence is higher."

Wherefore divine intelligence approached beyond the

periphery of the universal, which exists in individual things, "that simple form," the
archetype of man is clear, which is in the divine mind, "looks with pure" sight, that
is, with speculation "of a pure mind."
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Note that the first example was from powers of cognition, not below ordinary
as from sight and touch. Moreover, that example is from subordinate powers which
exist, although exterior senses with which all animals are endowed, imagination which
nevertheless, is within perfect animals, reason which nevertheless is in man, and
intelligence by which the divine mind knows. These virtues have different modes of
knowing each thing although man as it is said in the literature, which would not exist
unless thinking were made according to the faculty of excellence of thinking and not
of the thing known. "In such as this the greatest consideration must be toward this..."
here Philosophy shows from where the before mentioned capacities of thinking possess
in themselves mutually showing that everyone is capable of the inferior capacity, and
even higher and beyond. From the first she shows this concerning intelligence with
respect to other capacities. Following this she shows the same concerning reason when
according to this she says, that reason also "in this", that is, in order of these
capacities, "this must be the greatest consideration, the higher power of comprehension
is understood in the inferior itself," while the higher capacity learns all that is inferior.
"The lower" however "does not raise to the higher," so that it understands that which
is superior, which she shows in an example, "For neither does the sense desire the
power" to grasp "matter outside itself," nor "does imagination understand universal
specific forms," that is, lesser particulars, but reason seizes "the simple form," that
is, the universal form. "Intelligence," or the divine, "as if looking from above,"
although it is in the position of knowing, "determines" the conceived form itself and
all things which are underneath that form, so in what ought to be known, it sees the
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archetype of man, understanding all things which are among men, "but in the same
way it comprehends the form itself which could not be known by a lower power. For
it knows the universal form itself," that is, the universal form "of reason and the shape
of imagination materially sensible," which looks to the exterior by means of sense, not
"using reason or imagination or the senses, but all in one stroke of the mind," that is,
without descent it understands what reason does not.
Note that higher capacity brings in the lower capacity, just as the quadrangle
includes the triangle, as it is clear in the second book of De Anima. Therefore, it is
capable of the inferior, superior and higher capacities, wherefore it does not
comprehend higher universals as inferior, in this way higher particulars although not
otherwise.

Therefore, what human intelligence is able to comprehend, divine

intelligence is also able to comprehend, although not otherwise. "Since too, it is
reason which regards..." here she shows the same by means of reason, that just as
intelligence comprehends the other three inferior capacities, she says, so reason also
understands under the other two capacities, which are imagination and sense, saying,
"Also, reason, when it regards a certain universal not using imagination or senses and
it comprehends among imaginable and sensible things" from complete comprehension.
For it is reason that so defined the universal of thought itself: man is a rational bipedal
animal, since by definition, "this is a universal notion...", that is, a known thing.
Since "no one is ignorant that this is imaginable and sensible," this is explained by a
definition. The reason considers the universal not using "imagination or sense, but by
rational conception." Then she shows that just as reason comprehends imagination and
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sense, so imagination comprehends sense, and she says "imagination also, although it
is a assumed for such a thing that its beginning of seeing and forming shapes from the
senses, still it considers with sense beyond imagination," that is, understands all
sensible things not by a sensible, but by an imaginative reason of judging. Then she
concludes, saying, "Therefore, do you see that all use their own", that is, special
"power in understanding, rather than the power of those things which are known?"
Note that although reason in understanding is itself a universal, it does not use
imagination and sense, still in its doing a thing it presupposes imagination and sense,
wherefore nothing is in the intellect unless it was in the sense. Likewise, although
imagination in this act is not used with sense, still it presupposes sense to have been
in the act, wherefore fantasy , which this imagination calls upon is achieved by
emotion from senses, following the act from the second book of De Anima. "Nor is
this wrong... " here she confirms the saying itself through reason, saying although a
thing is understood, not according to its nature but according to its nature of knowing,
it does not understand unjustly, that is, irrationally. "For since all judgement" is the
act of knowing and the labor of judging, that is, powers of thinking, "it is necessary
that each" thinking being " perform his work", that is, his labor of learning, "not from
some other's power" of an inferior thinking thing, "but from his own power", that is,
from the capacity of understanding . Note that from literature such reason is formed.
Every act and labor follows a condition of this power whose act and labor exist, but
to judge or learn is an act or work of power of thinking and not of the thing
understood. Therefore, to judge and learn follows a means and condition of power of
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thinking and not of the thing understood.

"Then she said: 'That is the old... '" here Philosophy begins to respond to the
proposed charges. Moreover, it is a text of very easy language and sentences are
explained enough in the above commentary. Still you understand it to be directed in
signifying in what now is considered a vulgar style. Plinius, Quintillianus, Statius and
others of these times would have considered it vulgar. Cicero would not have
considered it vulgar. As you will remember the above note: two, three and four
separately is not used among learned writers. Moreover, there is "Atque and hunc
modum..." which had disappeared, so I believe it was supplied. Atque ad hunc and
ad hunc modum..." and the rest appear to be produced above. Moreover, "illic,
minime, frustra enim esset." These words are of Boethius without interruption to this
place, "Qui igitur...." Also we distinguished when other we brought in another, but
we will go on to another section.
The Fourth Meter Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"Sometimes the porch has brought..." This is the fourth meter section of this
fifth book which is called Glyconic from the inventor, the feeling predominantly
iambic by measure. In this measure she shows the opinion of the Stoics which appears

to follow opposite her words. In fact, it was the opinion of the Stoics that theoretical
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knowledge was set over apart because exterior bodies impress their likenesses on the
mind, so that the mind alone holds this in reason of suffering and this outer matter
among the reason of a powerful being. From this it follows since suffering is brought
together to the nature of the efficient and not the opposite, because cognition follows
the nature of the thing pondered and not the nature of the one thinking, but it is against
the sayings. Therefore, from the first she shows the opinion of the Stoics. Following
this she rejects it, where she discusses the mind. From the first she says "Sometimes
the porch has brought old ones" according to the Stoics, who were called the old ones,
because of their mature understanding of morals. Old ones in which "excessive
darkness" over among maxims, in which Stoics believe "senses and imagination," that
is, forms of sensible things are impressed upon the mind from "the outermost bodies,"
that is, from exterior things. They considered those bodies in this way to imprint
"images on the mind, as when a character" was made with certain writings "with a
swift stylus on a smooth surface," that is, flat page, "a page which had no previous
marks."
Note that the Stoics are called Stoa in Greek, which is porticus, or porch in
Latin. Wherefore in Athens on a very open porch and in certain places, the Stoics
publicly were accustomed to dispute. They considered the soul still to hold within
itself in reason of suffering with respect to exterior things. And because great thinking
is understood to follow active virtue rather than passive, therefore according to these,
cognition should rather be extended toward the following faculty of the thing known
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which is active, than to the knowing soul which is passive. "But if the mind thriving
on proper things ..." here she rejects this opinion. Following this she considers its
truth where she says "This is efficient. ..". Therefore from the first she brings down
the many dissimilarities as to this opinion, saying, "But if the thriving mind develops
nothing from proper movements," that is, if it has no proper action, "but nevertheless
lies permitting, subjected to marks," that is, in likeness of bodies. And if it "repeats"
itself, that is, portrays "empty" images of things, that is, likenesses "one after the
other as a mirror, "that is, in the manner of a mirror, then it is asked "whence grows
this idea," that is, this knowing in souls that "the soul is all knowing," not yet
corporeal but even incorporeal.
Note that the first dissimilarity is if theoretical learning were made by a
singular impression of bodies upon the soul, then it is not the mental excellence of man
through which the soul learned incorporeal things. However, now it is clear that he
understands even incorporeal things. A certain dissimilar thing she asserts, saying that,
if the soul is still passive, "what power of the soul does the individual see", that is,
from the knowing? Or, whatever of the soul divides the known things, things divided
gather again or whatever gathers to the soul, that is, understanding the way by turns
of what is joined and separated. "Now the head lifts to the highest things," that is, by
ascension with the most general things from the most specific toward the most general
things, a multitude by consideration, and now it falls or descends according to a
certain source, that is, loses worth to the lowest, that is, by proceeding to the most
specific from the most general by separation to the most specific. Then, that is, in the
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end the soul "reconsiders," that is, compares, "for itself and refutes false things by
true things," that is, by truth.
Note that from such a source reason is formed. The soul is not yet passive but
active which judges, restores, separates and refutes true things from false things, but
the theoretical soul is of this way, and therefore the rest and the greater is noted.
Wherefore to judge, to restore, to separate, to refute, are understood to be active
operations. The lesser is evident. The soul judges between a true and false thing.
The predicate is combined with the subject at any time the predicate divides from the
subject and false opinions are refuted. "This is a more efficient (cause) ... " here
Philosophy considers truth, saying, "This mind is a more efficient cause", that is, "a
cause far more powerful than that which in a material manner," that is, in a material
likeness "submits to the impressed marks," therefore, if anyone would believe that in
the soul there is nothing enduring, therefore, they substituted falsely. Yet, enduring
precedes operations of the soul in our body exciting and moving forces of the soul to
work, as when "light leads the eyes," they then allow sight, "or when the voice makes
a noise," that is, sounds in the ears, then hearing. And in the end, "the power of the
mind is excited," that is, "roused, calling forms which it holds inside to similar
movement, it applies these to the outer marks", that is, to the outward likenesses and
'unites," that is, "applies the outer images" of the body "with forms," that is, to forms
"within," that is, to those "hidden" in the soul.
Note that here Boethius uses Platonic thinking because he considers forms of
things from the beginning naturally placed in the soul, but the sophist soul is
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incorporeal, so that it does not learn from these unless it is aroused by an immutable
exterior sense. However, the thing aroused evokes a form similar to that which the
exterior sense impressed, and applying this to the exterior thing, and thus it learns by
this. To this intention Linconienus says also that is, of later philosophers saying that
t

i

Reason in us the Sophist does not lead unless first by operations of the senses by

which it was mingled something known.

i
t

Note that from written works it is

understood that the intellect is capable of suffering, and is also understood as active
since it is an efficient cause, so it is said in written works. Yet, Aristotle in the third
part of De Anima proposes that to be intelligent is to experience and that no
comprehension possesses the nature of the thing unless it is called that which is capable
of suffering. Concerning this, certain ones say that wherefore the soul comprehends
as an intellect capable of suffering rather than an act. The soul is active, by all means,
it is an efficient cause, a synecdoche for reason of active comprehension, but by
common reason comprehension is capable of feeling. Or it ought to be said that
because the intellect is capable of suffering it is a passive power at the least, to which
the first deed of this, since to be intelligent is experience. But all passive power
because of necessity, relinquished active power which reduces itself to an action. Or
such an active thing is not able to exist externally as a corporeal thing, since doing so
is most remarkable with something experienced. Therefore, such active thinking
partly of the soul, will have been comprehended, whose action by working is to make
the perceived power by motion a perceived thing, so that by external things any such
power of guiding perception is impressed upon the mind for comprehension capable
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of suffering, through which it is drawn back in the act of comprehending. Therefore,
it is not the intention of Boethius to deny that the mind does not exist as
comprehension capable of suffering with common reason, but he wishes that the mind
or soul more completely holds efficiency in synecdoche which is a common external
occurrence from the substances themselves. By consequence efficiency of
comprehension ought not be attributed to exterior things as it was concerning the
intention of the Stoics.

"Sometimes the porch has brought... " the verse is in single feet, of one
division, however it is glyconic from its inventor. It is predominantly dactylic by
measure, containing three measures by the number of feet, no syllable wanting in the
last foot, wherefore more and not overflowing. However it is well known as spondaic
and double dactylic measure, but the last syllable thus always is of a common type.
He condemns the opinion of the Stoics who from a balcony, rather, the sayings from
the balcony, afterward they took to be called the painted porch. All other things are
clear enough.
The style is somewhat supported, now an implement of writing on a wax
covered table or in comparison, somewhat a quality of writing. This is an apparatus
as a level surface is called evenness or as by sea and by land, whatever is not uneven
is called a level surface. However, they wished the soul to be just as a tabula raza, on
which nothing was written. However, it is said they were called pages which proved
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their region in the books. So, districts, that is, villages situated close to springs or by
writing which in these verses they were written, that is, impressed. Therefore, it is
a page, each part of papyrus or on which they were composed in these poems, that is,
impressed. Whence, here one says eloquently pressed letters for impressed. For to
write is to compose and fasten together, but through translation one is said to sing by
marks placed, that is by impressions set.
Then strength of the mind excited, so it ought not to be written as exitus which
is expired. Yet he has excited the following common syllable, as with Virgil in the
third book of The Aeneid. it is used when he says "he fell down excited" and this is
considered faulty. They intended accio (to summon) of the fourth conjugation to be
used, and accieo from the second to be considered faulty for by either view they are
considered to be deduced.
The Fifth Prose Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"Now if in understanding corporeal things..." here is the fifth prose section of
this fifth book, in which she specifically shows divine knowledge to be according to
something caused by perceiving, and not by the thing known. Following this she
shows the insufficiency of these things which things are made void from our way of
understanding as divine providence, where she says, "Therefore what. ..." From the
first she raises what has been said. Following this she brings forward two conclusions
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where she says "And so on this [principal] ...". From the first she says, "if in
perceiving," that is, in understanding "corporeal things our rational soul is not yet
distinguished," that is, affected by the event of the body but from its power, judges the
event subject to the body, and so" in understanding it follows a particular motion,
although qualities "brought before from the outside affect," that is, change the
apparatus, that is, instrument of the sensations. "Movement of the body goes is prior
to power of a moving mind, a movement which calls out to itself the action of the
mind and excites forms inwardly, remaining neutral." So this is in our great soul with
rambling ideas, "those things which have been completed with whole feelings," that
is, with qualities of bodies, just as particular intelligence and chiefly God, that
"undiscerning do not follow objects from the outside but they put in order," that is,
they perfect "the action of the mind itself," that is, the theoretical operation according
to one's own nature.
Note that from the writing it can thus be argued that if less is seen to be
contained in this from which it is in, or more from which, but less is seen from which
our soul in perceiving follows of the motions themselves and not of the thing
considered, and yet it follows that the capacity of perceiving itself, therefore by far
greater divine intelligence follows in perceiving its own specific motion of its
understanding than of the thing itself considered. "And for this reason..." here she
brings forward two conclusions from the things said before, saying that from this
understanding it comes out of the nature of understanding and not out of the thing
understood. And since the examinings are diverse according to nature, she says that
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all things combine diverse thoughts as one from different examinations. "And for this
reason..." because perception comes out of the nature of understanding "much
knowledge belongs to," that is, will belong to diverse "and different substances.
Indeed, sense alone deserted by other understanding belongs to immobile beings, such
as shells of the sea and any other thing holding fast to rocks are fed. But, imagination
belongs to mobile animals" which are moving by progressive movement "to those
which volition is understood to be contained in," that is the power "of fleeing" evil or
"approaching" good. "But reason," through which we understand "the whole, such
is of human kind," just as intelligence is of a divine kind. Then she considers the
second conclusion because that conclusion is more notable and nobler, it not only
knows its own object, but even the objects of other sorts of ideas, that is, of
perceptions. First she says, "So it happens that notion," that is, perception "exceeds",
that is, is more noble than others "which is properly its nature," that is, "from its own
nature," it not only understands, that is, not just its own nature over the object, "but
it even knows the subjects of other kinds of knowledge."
Note near the first conclusion that since motions and operations are done
differently, according to difference of those performing and of those working. It
follows that the agent and operation are diverse things which possess different
operations and knowledge, throughout which sense without the other knowledge
belongs to base animals and this close understanding is accepted for sensitive
understanding, which alone is transformed to foreknowledge of something perceptible.
So, in fact, it is distinguished from imagination which still does not understand the

present thing,or even absent thing.
Note near this conclusion that whatever more ability it allows, it is understood
to be more extraordinary because it understands the more distinguished. Therefore,
if anything "knows by capability" its own object and since these objects of certain
inferior faculties, as exists in divine intelligence and not otherwise, it follows that a
more superior faculty is more understanding, nobler as compared to a lower faculty.
"Therefore, what. .." here Philosophy shows the insufficiency of those who from just
understanding in part reject divine providence. Following this she urges us to consider
the manner of divine perception where she says, "wherefore". From the first she
makes clear the insufficiency of these things by simile. Following this she adds to the
simile, in a proposition where she says that a simile is a likeness, yet what it intends
is as follows, that sense and imagination are lower modes of thinking than reason. If
therefore, sense and imagination will pick out to judge a way of knowing reason from
its own manner of understanding and say that a universal thing is nothing that reason
understands, or if truth is judgement of reason, or if a particular or sensible reason
in fact says otherwise, it is clear that what we esteem in either way by better or
understanding, we approved by reason, judging the motion of sense and imagination
to be insufficient. Therefore, she says "What, therefore if sense and imagination
oppose," that is, contradict "reasoning, saying the universal is not that which reason
thinks herself to look at." Thus saying "Indeed, what is sensible or imaginable in not
able to be a universal," that is, universal judgement of sense and imagination.
"Therefore, either the judgement of reason is necessary truth ," and by consequence
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"it is not anything sensible," which is absurd, "or since the following is known to you,
from sense and imagination many things are subject to senses and imagination" which
necessarily "exist as sensible things," you believe conception of reason not "to be
empty because it considered that which is sensible and singular as if some sort of
universal. Further, if reason should respond to observe the universal reason, that
which is sensible and imaginable," truly this sense and imagination are "not able to
aspire to," that is, to come to "the knowledge of universality," that is, the universal,
"since their notion," that is, "their understanding does not exceed corporeal figures."
And she says that "we ought to believe reason the firmer and more perfect judgement
of things. Therefore, in such strife," though that sense and imagination are from one
part and reason is from another, with such that it is contained in us such strength of
reasoning. Of imagination and sense should we not rather prove the cause of reason
and consider the motion of sense and imagination to be insufficient, wherefore she
affirms this.
Note that this ought to exist from judgement of nobler force rather than from
judgement of a lower force. Therefore, since reason is the nobler force, sense and
imagination with it, reason comprehends its own object and the object of sense and
imagination, and not the opposite. Therefore, it ought to exist rather for judgement
of reason than of lower capabilities. "It is similar... " here she applies that simile to
a resolution and says that because that is said about sense and imagination with respect
to reason, "it is similar to this because human reason does" not think "divine
intelligence to observe, unless that reason itself perceives" what it provides from the
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method itself of provmg. "For as you discuss," that is argue, "if things are not
understood to have certain and necessary events, such things are not able to be known
for certain as things about to occur. Therefore there is no foreknowledge in of these
things. Although, if we believe there is foreknowledge in these things there will be
nothing which does not come form necessity." Therefore, we are to use pieces of
reasoning "so we can have judgement of the divine mind, then just as we have judged
that imagination and sense must yield to this in distinction," that is, give place to
reason, that is, we must judge "it is most just that human reason itself should submit
to the divine mind."
Note what is similar concerning judgement of sense and imagination with
respect to reason, and of reason with respect to divine intelligence. For to sense and
imagination it seems that reason otherwise is not able to comprehend this, unless, just
as it comprehends itself, which is a false understanding. So it seems similar to human
reason because like the divine reason it is not able to understand these things as you
understand, otherwise than what it understands from itself, which is a false
understanding. For what human reason understands dubiously, the highest divine
intelligence understands. "Wherefore, among those things..." here Philosophy urges
that we raise ourselves toward comprehension of the divine intellect saying that
"wherefore we are able, let us be raised up" by diligent consideration "in the utmost"
of these to the highest "intelligence" concerning divine things. "For there, reason will
see that which she is not able to observe in herself. Although, "since a clear, definite
innate idea" she sees, "those which have no certain" existence. And that is not
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opm10n, "but rather it is simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed by no
boundaries." Therefore, simplicity of the highest wisdom is infinite. Note that if
reason were to follow faculty of the thing understood, and not of fortitude of
understanding, then just as human reason understands the contingent future to be
uncertain, so divine intelligence itself would understand it to be uncertain. But since
capacity of understanding is following capacity of fortitude of understanding, and
divine intelligence, that is, divine comprehension in perceiving exceeds human reason,
it is able to understand clearly what human reason understands as not firmly
established.

"Now if perceiving corporeal things..." that is, a knowing apart from sense.
Understanding lies in different substances. Because it is usual for "cedere", to yield,
to be interpreted for that which says "locum dare", to give place to. Therefore, it is
not at any time to be accepted for that which is the passive form, "dari", to be given,
because one yields to something, one gives to that. Whence, Virgil writes in the
eleventh book " This whole region and heavens from the wooded region of the
mountain, he yields to the alliance of the Trojans." "Yields," that is, he is diminished
in force, and it is yielded. So, therefore, here she says, "understanding yields to," that
is, they were give, and these things occurred by force. The rest are noted.
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The Fifth Meter Section of Book Five
Saint Thomas
"How living things [travel about] the lands in varieties of shapes..." here
begins the fifth prose section of this fifth book which is called Archilochus from its
inventor. It is predominantly dactylic by measure. In this she shows man to be
disposed toward contemplation concerning the shape of his own body. And from the
first she describes the bodily shape of other lesser animals. Following this she
describes the figure of man when she says "The unique species...". At the beginning
she says "living things travel abut the lands in such various ways, that is, mightily" in
various shapes. For some living things are with long bodies," as serpents or as
reptiles. These "brush," that is turn to "scatter dust and they drag along swiftly
running," that is, moved by strength, "by strength of the stomach as a continuous
plowing" constantly scattering dust about. There are certain living beings in which
their "wanderings belong to their lightness of wings, which they beat against the wind"
and then float and "go beyond the space of the upper pure air," that is, of the lower
atmosphere. There are certain ones who "delight to press footprints in the ground,"
that is, in the soil of the earth. In addition to those there are those who "delight" in
passing throughout "green fields" and walking under trees. All of these living beings,
although you see that they are different in various forms, still "the faces of these are
bending down," that is toward the earth, that is, weighed down, showing the senses
to be dull.
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Note that Philosophy touches upon three kinds of living beings following
reptiles, flying beings, and walking beings which, although they are different in form,
since certain ones are fashioned toward creeping, such as serpents, certain ones,
toward flying as birds, certain ones as walking as terrestrial beasts. Yet in this all
those are united who have their faces turned toward the earth. "The unique class of
men..." here she describes the shape of man saying, "One class of men", that is, one
genus of human beings, " lifts the uppermost part toward the sky," that is, its head,
"very high and easily stands with straight," that is, upright "in body and looks down
on the earth" and turns by this height toward the heavens. You, man, "you, by your
straight appearance seek the heavens and put forth," that is, thrust out your forehead.
This upright figure suggests to you though you ming erroneously deceive yourself, and
also unless you assert, that is, exalt "your spirit in lofty matter," that is, as heavenly,
lest the mind "burdened," that is, burdensome to the divine mind be "lowered down,"
that is, under the feet or beneath, where down is an adverb of place, lest that mind,
proud rely upon, that is, reside in an inferior weakened body. Note although man has
the shape of a body, upright toward the heavens, if the soul raised up in contemplation
of the heavens, the body appears to be more noble than the soul. Note following
Aristotle, in the sixteenth book of De Animalibus: "Man among all living beings has
the linear shape of uprightness. Indeed, Ovid speaks concerning that shape in the sixth
book of Metamorphosis. He says, "Although certain animals look to the earth, he
judges that the face of humanity uplifted allowed that it see the heavens." He
commanded this, and their upright expression exalts the heavens.
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"How...in a variety...." the verse is one measure and it is entirely phaletius or
in the style of Archilochus . It is established from the fourth measure in heroic
(Homeric) style, that is, customary in heroic hexameter, and it has a metrical foot of
three short syllables. Yet the syllable which is last is judged common to all, for the
last foot is frequently spondaic. The fourth, however is dactylic, always the ending
puts part of the language in a mode of pastoral verse, and if the fourth syllable from
the end, is more suppressed, it is wholly heroic. So, whatever of the words will have
been placed in the last syllable, they are suitable to the hexameter.
"How living things travel about the lands in a variety of shapes." And so in
each it is brought together at first with diverse methods. For they say: certain ones
that in various forms, certain ones as in a variety, certain ones then in a variety. In
that verse, however,

"Those delight to press footprints," these two faults are

offensive: "gressibusque" is used instead of "et", and "they delight" should take the
ablative. But "pressisse" was written "precessisse", which neither verse nor sentence
permits. In fact, it comes from the principal parts "premo, pressi". But the sense is
that "they delight to press", that is, to imprint or fix footprints in the ground. Another
fault was because the syllable that was removed there by "gressibusque" , from which
the verse was made, diminished rather than the sense. Only the class of men as Ovid
in the first book of Metamorphoses "Inclined" that with "they looked". "Gens,"
however, is said "genus" and besides, it is attributed to horses, whence Virgil in the
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seventh book also said it is a if they are a herd as horses. "And they look down toward
the earth," here "despicere" is "to examine downwards" and because it is done through
a despising, which we do not wish to examine in any way, and since it is said they
behold him, so we look upon it as if downwards and it is said they inspect,
"inspiientes" a vile thing. Therefore, "despicere", to look down upon, is accepted for
"contemnere, to despise, as it is said in bucolic verse: "I have been disregarded by
you and you do not question who I am of the law." Conversely "suspicere", to respect,
to look upwards, or to examine high up, as, "my eyes were weakened looking up high
in ascent." And "you thrust out the forehead" is erroneously read for "exerisque,"
meaning and you elevate, because the verse does not permit it. Moreover, "exero" is_
composed by "ex" meaning from, or "extra" meaning beyond, and "sero", to produce,
but since "x" desires gemination "ss" or "c", but according to Priscianus, after "ex"
it is not customary to put "s."

For "ab" and the principal parts of "salvio" make

"exulto" not "exsulto", meaning to rejoice. Moreover, "exerere", to thrust out, in this
is greater meaning to serve the language we speak, beyond others, or "expuere" to
expel.
Note also what should be there "and, unless terrestrial, you are erroneously
void of understanding." It ought not be read "you are void of understanding" for it
comes from "de", meaning on, and "sapio", meaning to be wise, not from "capio",
meaning to seize. "Pessum," sank, means beneath the foot, or under the foot.
Moreover, it is erroneous as Augustine teaches the position, can the body which should
be a slave, have dominion over the soul? In what merit will the one who commands
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have done so? Or what while the sense commands against reason? To sink down
means the body is seized by inactivity.
The Sixth Prose Section and the Last
Saint Thomas
"Since, then, as a little before... " here begins the sixth prose section and the
last of this fifth book in which she determines the truth about the compassion of divine
foreknowledge and free will. And from the first she asserts the conclusion itself.
Following this she joins the beneficial exhortation near the end of the book where she
says, "Tum away thus.... " From the first she shows the method of divine
comprehension.
providence.

Following this she solves the objections made against divine

Third, she concludes the compatibility of free will with divine

providence, according to the passage where she says, "Why then do you demand.... "
The third point is made there with "These things being so..... " From the first she
determines about the state of God which is eternal. Following from this she declares
the manner of divine providence, where she says, "Therefore, since every
judgement.... " From the first she sets forth what ought to be concluded about
eternity. Following this, she determines concerning it, where she says, "Eternity,
then, is endless.... " From the first she says that since it was pointed out a little before
that everything which is known is understood not from its own nature, that is, from
the nature of the thing known, but from the nature of comprehending, that is,
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understanding. Let us consider now as far as these are allowable who is of a state of
divine essences or substance, so we may know what is his knowledge. And she adds
that the common judgement of all living, that is, of all using reason, is that God is
eternal. Therefore, let us consider what is eternity, "for this shows to us together
divine nature and divine knowledge."
Note that men living by reason are men endowed with the light of wisdom, and
all these concede that God is eternal. For the philosopher in the seventh book of

Physics says, "the mover outside eternity appears as eternity in motion. And all the
Greeks were such that the barbarians considered them to be gods, as they believed
them to be immortal. Note then that the eternity of God and the nature and knowledge
of God are not different according to substance. Therefore, eternal understanding is
not understood as the nature and knowledge of God. Therefore, "eternity is..." here
she continues on eternity and from the first she considers its definition. Following this
she declares it, where she says "which if by comparison...." From the first she says
"eternity is the complete simultaneous and perfect possession of eternal life." Note
that according to Albertus the greater, in his book on causes: "Something is eternal
and exists in eternity and eternity itself exists just as God." Some things are eternal
and some exist in eternity, but eternity itself they are not, as a separate substance.
Some are eternal not in eternity and they are not eternity itself, such as time and world
motion.
Note when she says eternity is possession, there she employs the name of
possession to designate immutability, and unfailing supply of eternity, because it is
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firmly possessed and calmly held. She says of life to the specification that nonliving
things not be measured by eternity. She says this is endless, concerning difference
among these life forms which has an end in part before and in part after, such as a life
of man or in part before, such as the life of angels. She says all at the same time are
different according to the substance as it is wholly the same. Yet, not according to
works, since they possess successful and intellectual operations. She says it is perfect,
to designate that nothing exists from eternity. Indeed, perfection is for what nothing
is wanting, that is, from heaven and earth.

"Which [becomes clearer] by

comparison..." she declares therefore. She addresses the ideas of eternity in the words
here, where she makes clear which things are not correct. From the first, therefore,
she declares the definition of eternity in comparison to time, saying that it has been
said that "eternity is the simultaneous whole possession of boundless life, which
becomes clearer by comparison," that is, comparison with temporal things. "For,
whatever lives in time proceeds in the present" through successive change "from
present into future and there is nothing established that can by itself encircle," that is,
comprehend the ultimate space of its life, "but tomorrow surely it does not apprehend.
Truly yesterday time has already lost, and "in this day to day life," that is, nothing
more is present of day to day life, rather "in that moving and transitory movement"
continuing of life. And we say that movement is indivisible present, because the future
corrects with the past.

"Therefore, that condition of time," that is, succession,

"although it neither began nor ceases to be, as Aristotle thought about the world,
although life," that is, its duration, "is drawn," that is, extends, "with the infinity of
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time, yet it is not yet such that it may rightly be believed to be eternal." For, "it does
not comprehend or possess simultaneously the whole space of life", that is, its
duration, "though infinite," that is, it perseveres "through infinite time, but it does not
yet hold the future," that is, it does not hold past experiences or past time.
"Whatever, therefore does not comprehend and possess at the same time whole fullness
of boundless life, from which nothing future or anything past or present or has flowed
away, that is rightly defended as eternity, wherefore that eternity of itself and in itself,
because"nothing of itself is wanting, it is always present, possessing itself. "It is
necessarily held as present infinity," that is, "infinite" duration "of moving time," that
is, successive.
Note that since through cognition of time we arrive at cognition of eternity,
from this because it is situated nearly opposite these greatly shine forth. Thus through
the nature and succession of time, he declares to us the nature of eternity. So indeed,
reason of time consists in succession and apprehension of prior and past things, in
motion whose one part is lost and some future thing exists. Thus, reason of eternity
through opposition consists in apprehension of the uniform thing which wholly exists
outside motion, comprehending the same past and future as still present. Note that
of eternity itself nothing passes into the past. Truly, it is all at once present to him.
Wherefore, truly it never ceases thus or ever begins, since he holds boundless life.
Necessarily, it is because whatever things are present in the mind of a different time,
indeed as if it is represented as infinite time. Because in the same way it is present in
the mind of different time, in such a way it subsists in itself. The way, however, by
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which it subsists in itself is momentary. Indeed, for this reason he stands at a different
time in the present means. For this reason one says that it necessary that the eternal
present holds an infiniteness of moving time. "Therefore, those are not right who..."
here Philosophy corrects those ways by which men misuse the meaning of eternity.
According to this she teaches a special way of speaking on it. So, if it is to be proper,
from the first she does what has been said. According to this she makes clear that
temporal things are deficient by the simplicity of the divine in nature by which they
strive to imitate when she says, "For this [makes plain] ...." From the first it has been
said that eternity is not only endless but also simplicity. "Whence those people" are not
right who consider "when they hear the vision of Plato to be a world that did not have
a beginning in time or would have worn out," that is, an end, "in this way they think
the world is made co-eternal to the established author." Moreover, because it is those
who are not right who think this, but it is a different thing to be led to boundless life
with a certain succession, "which is what Plato attributes to the world," and what is
at the same time "to be the complex whole presence of boundless life that is the
property of the divine mind." Because a certain one should say that if the world never
began we are co-eternal with God. To this she answers that God exists before the
world, not "as a condition of the world, but in simplicity of his nature." Whereupon
she says, "Nor should God seem more ancient than things created by an amount of
time, but rather, by the peculiarity, by the simplicity of his nature."
Note thus, she says that Plato, from his book Timeus, wished the world to have
begun but not to have an end. This same thing Aristotle himself set forth in his book
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De Caelo et Mundo. But Plato says that the earth alone began which is therefore why
Boethius said that Plato did not propose the world to have been created. To this it is
said that he said Plato rightly held the world to have a beginning what he held to be
the beginning of its regulation was not, however, the beginning of time. Thus, he
proposes the example of the print of a foot, that if the foot from eternity had remained
in the dust, it follows that the foot is the cause of the footstep naturally preceding the
footstep, not time.
"For this [present nature of unmoving life] ..." here she makes clear since
temporary things fail against the simplicity of divine nature which they endeavor to
imitate, she says "that infinite movement of temporal things imitates" what it is able
"this present state of immobile life," that is, eternity. "And since it cannot represent,"
that is, portray "and equal, it falls short" from its "immobility" to extra procurement
because "it is not able to hold and it decreases from simplicity of foreknowledge into
the infinite quantity of past and future, and since it cannot possess at the same time the
whole plenitude of its life, in this itself, this in some way never ceases to be. It seems
in some respects to emulate that which it is not able to satisfy," obliging itself to a
temporary state "to the sort of present of this moment," that is, of a brief instant, that
is, of an indivisible "and rapid movement", that is, a transitory time which creates a
present of an instant of time. It holds "a certain likeness of adhering to present," that
is, eternity and "grants to whatever thing it touches that they should seem to be." For
this we say exists because they are in the present moment. "Since it cannot continue,"
the present of the instant of time, because of the nature of a mobile thing, thus, "it
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seized the infinite journey of time" by succession "in that way with the result that it
should continue by going" from one thing to another, "whose fullness it did not wish,"
that is, it could not "comprehend" as being permanent.
Note that infinite motion of temporal things how much is possible, that the state
of eternity is imitated since it is not able to be wholly expressed, because the state of
temporal time is a state outside of eternity. And the state of temporal time looks to the
past and future. The state of eternity, however, is present and, moreover, this imitates
the state of eternity, such that it never falls short of eternity. Thus, infinite motion of
temporal things never ceases to be. And so an instance is to confer in time because
it has some sort of likeness with eternity. And so, in the same way a certain thing is
said to exist in eternity, and so these things we say exist because they are in a present
instance. Therefore, it is necessary that the state of temporal things is not able to
imitate the state of eternity presently being permanent, yet it imitates the duration of
time itself by continuing outside of it.
"And so [if we should wish]... " in this part Philosophy teaches that a particular
expression is accordingly concerning God, or the world, saying, " If following Plato
we should suggest the names befitting," that is, assembled "of these things, we should
say God to be eternal, but the world we should say is perpetual." This agrees with the
sayings of the Greek Authors. Indeed, eternity is without a beginning, without end.
It is critical perpetualness for which there is no beginning or an end. "Since then each
judgement..." here Philosophy shows the way of divine knowledge from their
teachings. First she shows of what sort divine knowledge is and how it is named,
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saying, "since then each judgement comprehends those things which are made subject
to it," that is, are made its objects according "to its nature." Accordingly, it is the
nature of virtuous understanding. Moreover, the nature of God is such that God
himself is "always an eternal and present state." From this it follows that "knowledge
of God surpasses all movement of time, shows in the simplicity of his present" and
"possesses infinite space of the past and future time, he considers them all as if now,"
that is, present, just as if "they were being carried out in his simple act" of knowing.
Then she shows in what way the knowledge of God is mentioned saying, "So, if you
should wish to think about foreknowledge by which he discerns all things" do not say
divine knowledge "to be foreknowledge as if it were of the future, but you will more
rightly value divine knowledge to be of instant," that is, of the present, "never
passing." This she confirms by etymological means of this name, she says providence,
from which comes divine cognition "is not called foresight" since that imports an
ordinary nature to the future, "but pre-vision is said, because it is to a distance," that
is, "arranged far from the lowest of things, as if it were seen beforehand from the
highest peak of things."
Note that knowledge follows the way of the thing understanding, understanding
and knowledge of God follow the nature and disposition of God. Moreover, the state
of God is eternal and present, since to be divine is measured by eternity. Therefore,
knowledge of God will be eternal and present in such a way that all things which are
past and future, he knows as if they are present. Note that some would say that
nothing is able to be present by itself, but past and future are not a thing. Therefore,
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the past is not able to exist apart from divine knowledge. The saying is that two is not
one thing, something that in no way is one can be one, and as follows, it is not really
present to something since it is nothing. Something is not simply a thing, but because
the performance of a thing is not the thing, and although such a nonexistent thing
cannot coexist in present time, still, it can coexist in eternity, since eternity, because
it is infinite, exceeds present time by extending itself to the past and future. And so
the past and future are presently coexisting just as if in eternity, since nothing is
outside eternity. A thing does not follow if something coexists in eternity, but it
simply exists by virtue of such a great thing, since eternity also extends itself to the
nonexisting thing, so to the past and to the future.
Note that all things are present to God. To him nothing is future. Therefore,
his knowledge is not a prediction foreknown, that resounds as a future thing, nor
should it be called pre-vision because of the same cause, but it should be called
providence as things created far away from inferior things endowed with all foresight.
"Why then ... " here she solves the highest objections against providence. First she
shows how such objections are to be solved. Following this she resumes the first
objection itself by fortifying as it would normally be solved. Following this she says
that if you speak about the first mentioning such reasons are where the first and
second are established above this, although that nothing can be foreknown by God
unless it is necessary. Third is established beyond this that an uncertain event is
impossible to truly be known. Therefore, she makes the second point. First she
shows that foreknowledge does not impose necessity of a foreknown thing, through
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which the first and second reasons are solved.

Following this she shows that

knowledge of God does not change the nature of a thing, but, likewise, they truly
subsist apart form knowledge and in truth, apart from an event. Through which also
the third reason is solved. Following where she says "And therefore this divine...."
From which God understood all things "as if they were present, why then do you
postulate that these things are made necessary which are illuminated," that is, which
are understood by "divine illumination," that is, divine understanding, "when not even
men make these same things necessary which they presently see" on account of the
word. What man sees in the present is not "made to be necessary. Whether it is
indeed your consideration, does it add," that is, will it give "necessity to a certain
thing in these which you understand as present?" Boethius says, "Not in the least."
Philosophy says, "If this union of divine and human" view is proper with respect to
the present, just as "you see certain things in the temporary present," that is, in present
time, "so God understands all things in his internal view" as present.
Note that our view of a present thing places no necessity of the present thing,
since a vision of hastening of chance does not impose necessity on the hastening, since
chance can hasten or not hasten. So also, divine view, which presently understands
all things imposes no necessity upon things, but he sees such things presently just as
if they were future. The future he also sees unavoidably, as unavoidably future, and
contingent future events he sees as future events that are happening. "Therefore this
divine foreknowledge..." here she shows that around contingent things, just as if they
stand alone as fixed knowledge of God and uncertain outcome of a thing, saying,
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"Therefore this divine knowledge " in which God is unwilling to change "future
events," the proper nature of things in which they are necessary and contingent.
Therefore, he does not impose the necessity of an event just because it is happening,
but "unto hereafter he sees them present just as one day in the future they are foreseen,
nor does he confuse the judging of things" with the result that contingent things are
made not to be contingent, but "with one view of the mind he distinguishes both the
things necessarily about to be and the things not necessarily about to be," that is, the
future. She declares this in an example, saying, "just as you see a man, when at the
same time," that is, in the same instant, "you see the man walking on land the sun
rising in the sky," although "these things are at the same time, understood, still you
discern this to be voluntary," although "the man walking on land and the sun rising is
necessary.

So likewise

"divine vision looking down at everything," looking

downwards, "does not disturb" in the least "the quality of things," though it is the
contingency and necessity of things.

I say before concerning this,

present

circumstances, on the reason of eternity, but of future things toward the condition of
time. "So it is that knowledge" of future things of God as it is not opinion of present
circumstances, "but a knowledge founded in truth," that is, confirmed, "when he
knows" something "to be about to exist," that is, future, "that something he is not
unaware of," that is, he well knows it "to be free from," it can be existing "by
necessity."
Note from this that it is said God presently knows all things past and future.
They are proven in a certain example: de baculo fixo in aqua qui successiva toti fluvio
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praesens est cum partibus eius. So eternity likewise is present as whole time, and with
all who would be in time. Therefore, all time and whatever is extra in time is present
to eternity. A certain example is proven concerning a center, so if eternity is put as
if the middle point of a circle, and all time as if the circumference, then although the
circumference continually moves and part of the whole remains stationary, still in
comparison to this the center holds itself uniform. A certain example is put forth
concerning a certain person who rushes through life and does not see men coming after
him, but this person who looks about from the high tower sees all life and men passing
through, either proceeding or following through it. Thus, God, concerning his view
of eternity, sees looking at everything presently both present and future.
"If at this point you were to say... " here Philosophy returns to the first reason
by strengthening the position itself with the result that soothes and strengthens this.
Following this she makes clear. The third solution she demonstrates, following where
she says, "I shall answer." The third, where she says that "there are two," if you say
this by objecting that the thing cannot not happen because God sees the thing about to
occur. "Therefore God is deceived, moreover, because it cannot happen, I will say
it is an occurrence from necessity, and so you bind me to the word necessity," or I will
concede the occurrence in a certain way to be necessary. "I will acknowledge this is
of the firmest truth to which barely anyone could approach " it conceding, "unless a
witness of the divine," that is, divine nature. Then she makes clear the objection
saying that if he should coerce her so that she concede a certain necessity of the future,
"I will respond that the same future, by which to us whom it is related to divine
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knowledge," by which thing it is its own present. I say it is necessarily from a
necessary condition by the present reason. Moreover, since "the same future event is
considered in its own nature," by what reason it holds the future and the act of
determining future, and determination by its own reason, it necessarily "seems free."
Note that she says just as that thing which is occurring, since it is a present
occurrence, by you it is judged with present reasoning, as a certain necessity with
such a necessity, this itself exists as if it were present, so therefore all things are
present to God, for this present reason is in order according to his own divine
knowledge, which they judge as a certain necessity, although in its nature it seems
utterly free. "For there are indeed two necessities, one simple..." here Philosophy
shows the solution through a certain example, speaking of necessity and applies this
to the argument. Following this she concludes from the things mentioned before,
concerning the stars, since some are following them they are coming to pass and are
uncertain because even though things certainly result, it is said foreseen by God.
Following this she says, "Therefore they will without a doubt come to be...." From
the first she says "there are two necessities, one simple, which is a necessity" of
nature, "as all men are mortals" by necessity. The other is a condition of necessity,
"as if you know a man walks," it is necessary that he walks. "Therefore what anyone
knows," that cannot be otherwise than is known, "but this condition," that is,
conditional necessity, "at the least" carries "with it the simple necessity." For a
conditional necessity "is not made by a proper nature, but by the addition of the
condition. For necessity compels nothing to move forward," that is, walk, taking

174
steps, that is, walking "by his own free will as much as possible, it is necessary that
he walks at that time when" he is taking steps, that is, walking. Here she says this
applies to the previously suggested things, saying, "In the same way if what divine
providence sees as present, that necessarily is to be," following this conditional
necessity which is foreseen, and which seems to- you as present, albeit it has no
necessity of its nature. "But he beholds those future things if present which come forth
from free will. These things, related to divine perception were so through the
condition of investigation by him, truly," that is, in its nature not by that it held with
regard to divine knowledge. Some of these "did not stop," that is, they ceased "from
being absolute," that is, perfect freedom, "as is their own nature.
Note the following instruction where Boethius states a reason, saying that
whatever is foreseen by God occurs by necessity, this is solved by the explanation that
truth is necessary, and occurs by conditional necessity, but it is not absolute necessity.
And other things are solved because that is stated true in the regular perception, but
false to divine perception. One thing which is said is that whatever is foreseen by God
occurs by necessity, truth is regular in perception whereas it is impossible that
something foreseen by God does not occur. Yet, in perception it is from false division
since the occurrence of a thing at the least contingent in itself, is not a necessity.
"Therefore they will without a doubt come to be... " here Philosophy concludes from
the things said before that this, likewise, stands firm, that certain things, according to
these contingencies and uncertainties exist, although still certain other things occur,
in such a way as they are foreseen by God. Following this she objects against this
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where she says that "What then, that they are not necessary...." From the first she
says "without a doubt all future things are such that God foreknows them to be."
Divine providence is not deceived in any other way, "but certain of these are come
from," that is, they proceed "from free will," therefore whatever is from this itself
cannot not occur. It brings on this one, "because, albeit, they occur, still they are not
let go from the proper nature" of freedom, "which, before they happened, they were
capable of not occurring."
Note that is the entire instruction. Boethius speculates upon this that a certain
future event without hinderance from its own nature in comparison to divine
foreknowledge occurs by necessity and as such is a conditional necessity. Therefore
in as much is foreseen, thus it occurs by necessity, but it is not absolutely bound by
foresight. "Therefore what does it matter if these are not necessary things..." here she
objects to the solution and explains the objection. Following this she objects to the
solution a second time where she discusses this, saying as "if he should say it is within
her power." She makes the objection in this, from which foreknown future happening
certainly occurs in necessity, it does not seem to be different between the connected
occurrence and the necessary occurrence. Whereupon she says, "Therefore what does
it matter" that connected and free future events "are not necessary when these should
occur after the fashion of," that is, in a likeness of "necessity." Then she explains that
between necessary events and a connected event this matters because the manifestation
is clear by example "which a little before I proposed, saying that the sun rising and
man walking, while these things are occurring they cannot not occur," that is, they are
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to occur necessarily, and so, whether this is necessary by a present condition. The
present event indeed is necessary to be while they are present. Still, one of these, "the
sun rising, although this happening was necessary to occur. Truly the other," that is,
" the man walking, by no means" had a necessity to occur. "So also," those things
"which God holds as present without a doubt do come forth," since by conditional
necessity these things are foreseen to occur as present, but of these things, because
they are foreseen, concerning this necessity of events, it descends, just as the sun is
rising, the other "upon the power of doing them," though a man walks. From this she
concludes that, therefore "we were not wrong before in this just as" in this because
they occurred contingently, if they referred to a divine notion, these things are
necessary, just as from the condition of divine knowledge. But "if they are considered
by themselves," these things are absolute, " by joining," that is, by linking of
necessity, because they make clear by the likeness "just as if that which is free to the
senses, if you relate it to the reason," then it is "universal." However, "if you relate
it" to the sense, then it is "singular."
Note that if the same thing is related to opposite things, it can be universal or
singular. It seems likely that the same thing compared to an opposite thing can be
related and necessary. For it has a particularly connected reason, and lastly, a reason
of necessity. But we see that human nature holds the last reason, compared to the
acting intellect, diverting from conditions not separate and compared to the possible
intelligence.

But human nature, compared to the sense, which it particularly

understands as reason, has a singular reason.

For it is universal, when it is

understood, but particularly, while it is thought. Likewise, it will exist concerning
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future connections that this itself compared to divine foreknowledge is conditionally
necessary. Considered in itself, it holds this contingently. "But if you will say it is
my...." here she objects to the explanation now expressed and explains the objection.
Following this she removes the uncertainty, where she says "What then...." From the
first she says that he objects to this explanation as "if it lies in my power to change"
as by running or not running I will "cancel," that is, destroy divine "providence,
although" that is foreknown to be future. She explains "I shall answer that you can
turn," that is, change "your intention, but truth of providence, it understands that you
can do this" just as you can change your intention "and as you do this" you change
your intention, and "it is understood by this that you change your intention."
Therefore you know that "you cannot avoid divine foreknowledge, even though with
free will you change to different actions." You cannot "flee the knowledge of the
present eye."
Note that although man can change his intention by this, still he cannot flee
divine foreknowledge, since God foreknows these changes. By this proposition, truly,
because God foresees the hereafter for you, again, outside space, though you cannot
go and you resolve to not go, it is not, however, that you will not go. Wherefore God
foresees also both the intention and possibility of a thing not happening and the change
of intention, also the occurrence of the thing happening, you therefore cannot in any
way flee his foreknowledge.

"What then, will you say..." here she removes the

doubt, saying that he asks by chance what then comes about from this solution, will
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divine knowledge "be changed by my disposition?" that is, by his change as if since
he now "wishes this now something else, it seems that divine foreknowledge alternates
from this," that is, changes "the changes" themselves of things "known" and things
understood. He answers this himself, that "this is not at all" connected, that "divine
knowledge could be changed." Philosophy then proves this, saying that since divine
"perception runs before every future thing and turns" it back to "foreknowledge of
proper thinking" by all understanding, just as if present, lest it turn, that is, change its
change from foreknowledge, now this now that successively, just as you suggest, but
remaining freedom prevents change in one flash, complicates your changes, which at
present he holds everything in his comprehending vision, so that God's present does
not exist accidentally in future things, but proper in simplicity, in which it is resolved,
that is, made clear, "that which you suggested a little while before that, "accordingly,
it is not right if our future acts should be said to be responsible for the cause of God's
knowledge. For the excellence of divine knowledge itself" imposes the way for
everything since the knowledge of God is the cause of all things. It owes truly nothing
to these things just as it learns nothing of these, just as we learn knowledge from these
things.
Note if God, likewise, does not see these things as successive, they occur in
time, then knowledge of God would be variable on account of this, because the
knowledge of one would succeed the knowledge of another. But since all things he
understands as like, as if present, therefore, in his knowledge the variation ceases, so
that before he should know it to be of another cause, and afterward. Or because he

179
should know this not to be, and after to be, indeed he understands all things to exist
at the same time. And indeed, he also knows something not to be in a different event
of time, a measurable thing, and to be in a certain difference of time. "These things
being so..." here she concludes from the before mentioned things, the possibility of
free will with divine foreknowlege, saying, "These things being so...." as was said
before, shows freedom of the will "inviolable by humans," that is, incorrupt. "Nor
are laws set forth" for humans "toward punishment and rewards unfair," that is,
unjust, "for our voluntary freedom," that is, freewill for all necessity. "It shows
also" the immobility in "God's foreknowledge of everything." and "the immediate
eternity of his vision" concurs with "future qualities" as "the dispensation" from our
deeds in good and evil, that is, distributing "of good reward or evil torments. Nor are
prayers made in deception, or "hope in God, because they cannot be ineffectual when
they are right."
Note from this on account of free will these things are possible so in another
manner they come to pass. It is not unjust that for good deeds rewards are set forth
and for bad deeds torments are set forth, nor hope or prayers made in vain. But all
these things are made in vain if all things are used for a bond of necessity. This she
makes evident by saying, "Turn away from vices..." here Philosophy subjoins the
prophetic exhortation saying that from this, since you are not by necessity doing
something, but show it remains in your free will. Therefore, you will be observed,
that is, you should scorn vices through just actions, lest you commit crimes, cultivate,
that is, make use of virtues, because in such you will be followed by rewards, and
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raise up your soul to righteous faith, because true happiness stretches out. And offer
humble prayers up to heaven, to God, and by this reward you shall be made.
Therefore, "if you do not wish to deceive" your soul by turning away from these
things, then a great necessity is given to you, because he alone supplies all, you act
and it cannot be concealed from him who is the· one who sees your deeds. She
adds,"When you act before the eyes," that is, when your actions are in view "of a
judge knowing all," as God. Note vices are rejected because they resign man to
slavery. For he who commits a sin is a slave to that sin. Seneca says "Si scirem deos
peccata ignoscituros et homines ignoraturos," because if you sin, the baseness of sin
will cause you to feel shame. Virtues, however, are to be cultivated, because virtue
is what sets over the thing it possesses and resigns the work to his good.
Righteousness, faith and correct prayers are offerings to God. Therefore in these
things we are joined to God and in this we are comforted. And if we feign to neglect
the great things said before, the virtues, the goodness granted to us, and the promise
we are to follow after, that in such a way all things that we do are in view of an all
knowing God. So truly it is written in Hebrews iiii: 14, "all things are naked and
opened to the eyes of him who is God" is well said in a lifetime of lifetimes, Amen.

"Since then..." here is the last part of the work written. Because several things
are declared here are incomplete, a certain one has taken to pursue what was prevented
by the death [of Boethius]. It is good, nevertheless, although we will see that the
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conclusion made here concerning the Consolation did not appear as it was stated in the
present form [ by Thomas]. We should consider now what is right. It is good to state
what is correct, because it is prudent to have knowledge concerning God. A statement
which is put forth is stated "alti ora te", not "quasi te". Also, it is written "deus amari
non potest nis utcunque notus," but should be written "noscitandus est". From this,
moreover, you know this to be associated with a word, and so it signifies "to serve"
two things, as to serve or protect or examine. And although Alexander offers different
voices of indication, so for the first "tueor" is written. For the second tuor is written,
next, a little line. You say "tuor inspicio," I say tueor defendere, still in either point
of view for significance among appropriate words appearing in the second declension,
so in this place we should be "intueamur." For if "intuor" should be said, it is here
the saying "intuamur." So, because Alexander, wrote "tuor facere tiutum" in the
supine and "tueor tutum," you come to the saying "tueor utrumque" As "inspectio
dicitur a multis intuitus." and from Virgil also we have "obtutus," not "obtuitus."
However, it is not doubted for "tuor dici" where Statius says in his poem "The
Achilleid." In either way I consider a sword attentively. To which "nee" is absent in
everything in the future. So "legendum" is not everything as these "nee" and
Legendum" are often brought together. "Eternum" as when they wish such beat
downwards from the air, should in the first syllable have an "ae" dipthong, and in the
second syllable "h", and it is written "aethernum". Truly, therefore they want to
deduce "ab ethere" as if "eter". That is, heaven when it is the shape of the spheres and
does not possess the beginning or the end, and so it is not "ethernum" or "eternal in
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time". Moreover, it is called "perpetual" without a doubt, from "per" and "peto".
However, it is said that one endures, because that one always seeks, that is, he
undertakes, since he follows, when perpetual time is one part of what by proceeding
always, one always seeks and urges another. Just as "continuum", or continuous, and
"continendo", continuing, when one part "continet," or connects to another, and
"continguum," or meeting, "contingendo", by touching, because one touches
(contingit). The other area continual (assiduum) by engaging (assidendo) when one
engages (assidet) with another.
"For I shall answer. .." here the order is "Namque respondebo," the same
future, that is, a certain on and the same which is future. It seems necessary (videri
necessarium), that is, because (quod) it is related to divine knowledge, he uses "vero"
for "sed", but "videri liberum" and "prorsus", that is, this word is wholly to be
explained by necessity, since (cum), that is, because (quod)it is examined
(perpenditur), that is, considered (consideratur) in itself (sua), that is by its own nature
(propria natura). "Then turn away from vices ..." where he says it is certain that sin
is voluntary and produced from free will. Therefore "turn away" (aversamini), loathe
vices (detestamini). Here it has been written badly as "adversamini". For "adversor"
in the dative means "joined, and at the same time means "I am adverse". "Aversor,"
however, in the accusative signifies "detestari," to be bathed, or "dignari," to be
deemed worthy. This is enough. Officioque leven mon aversatus bonorem. And our
author in the first poem of the first book at the first, so he seems to have been able
when he says, "heuheu qua surda miseros avertitur aure." Just as when in works of
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good deeds freely made they are given first. Therefore, cultivate virtues and when he
who foresees everything also foresees the middle. And he wants that our safe being
should be granted by prayers. Therefore raise up your soul to righteous hopes and
offer up humble prayers to heaven. Humble (humile) is said to come from "humo",
to bury. Therefore it is the antithesis in these words: humble (humiles) and heaven
(excelsa). A great thing is granted to us. To judge (iudere) is very different ["u" as
opposed to "n"], and yet from this comes the word granted (inditus). Just as "predare"
is not read as an active verb meaning to rob, still it is frequently written as the past
participle "preditus", meaning robbed. Moreover, it is "inditum the past participle by
its nature ingrafted or inserted, as "when an act before the eyes of an all knowing
judge." To this statement as said by a holy man. If virtuous man fears the lord, the
all knowing sees this. More pressing however is what is said here "of an all knowing
judge." If indeed he is a judge, then he ought to be feared. These things have been
best explained for Stephanus about The Consolation of Boethius. Into which I bore the
function of grammarian, rather than what has come from an old philosophical
commentary. Since truly as one thing I declared as often for employment, I led the
work of these words which I have explained in particular. I indicated and catalogued
and alphabetized the addendum, joined to the appendix from Marcus Fabius.
Quintilian's De Scholarium Disciplina (such as I call it), but we prepared the former
of the former the table of the commentary.

The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius with the duplex commentary by
Saint Thomas as stated, and Ascensius, is finished.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Boethius in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance
Boethius spent a great part of his life translating works of important Greek
authors into Latin. Perhaps he sensed that the unity of the Roman Empire was not as
stable as many of his fellow senators believed, and with the Empire's stability in
question, Roman Education would no longer offer the quality it had given to him.
Whatever his reasons, Boethius' efforts were not in vain. His translations and
commentaries make him "the principal mediator between Antiquity and the Middle
Ages." 1
Boethius' works were essential in passing along a great deal of Platonic, Stoic,
Pythagorean and Augustinian ideas. 2 Boethius had intended to provide translations of
all the works of Plato and Aristotle, for he thought their philosophies were not as
dissimilar as many believed. He was unable to accomplish this goal because of his
untimely death. Yet, he was able to translate and offer commentary on many of the
works of Aristotle. In fact, in the Middle Ages there were two "standard collections"
1

Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy: Volume 1: Greece and
Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus (New York: Doubleday, 1993) 485.
2

Maurice De Wulf, trans. P. Coffey 145.
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of Aristotle's writings on logic and natural science, with the versions of Boethius and
James of Venice being preferred for the logical works, while the versions by William
of Moerbeke were used for the scientific works. 3 Maurice De Wulf places an even
greater importance on Boethius' influence when he suggests that the translations,
commentaries and original treatises of Boethius "formed the basis of all logical studies
[in the early Middle Ages].4
Boethius was clearly an authority on the logic of Aristotle, yet he was equally
well known for his Consolation of Philosophy. 5 His Consolation of Philosophy
transmitted a great deal of information to the Middle Ages. It was not only steeped
in various ancient philosopher's ideas, it also passed along information on Roman
history during Theodoric's reign as emperor, classical forms of poetry, and classical
mythology. We shall see later that Boethius' texts on Aristotle influenced not only the
history of logic in the Middle Ages, but in turn effected the commentaries written by
medieval philosophers on his Consolation of Philosophy.
Boethius' intentions were to translate and comment on all of the works of
Aristotle, but he managed to translate only six of Aristotle's works, and wrote

G. R. Evans, Philosophy and Theology in the Middle A�es (New York:
Routledge, 1993) 28.
3

4

Maurice De Wulf, trans. P. Coffey 145.

For the two authors who confirm this information, see G. R. Evans 32; Michael
Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the
Thirteenth Century, 2nd ed.(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 67.
5
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commentaries on each of these. These sources were so influential that they made
6

Boethius "the chief source of Aristotelianism" from the time of their transmittal until
the end of the twelfth century.

7

These translations of Aristotle were literal, which

encouraged scholars and commentators of the Middle Ages to carry on the literal
expression of this terminology in a very precise way, which eventually led to the
creation of a perfected, special vocabulary.8
Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, however, did not reach to Northern
Europe until the end of the eighth century, when Alcuin brought the work back with
him after a visit to Italy.9 The text's wealth of information in its variations in poetic
style, philosophical ideas, and logical reasoning, meant that its popularity grew
quickly. The work's popularity is surprising when its lack of Christian references is
weighed against the wealth of information it contains on ancient philosophers and
pagan culture. The immortality of the soul is mentioned only briefly in Book II of his

Consolation of Philosophy, and the god of whom Boethius speaks is the deity of

Boethius translated and commented upon Aristotle's Categories, Prior and
Posterior Analytics, The Hermeneutics (De Interpretatione), Sophistical
Aq�uments, and Topics, see Frederick Copleston, A History of Medieval
Philosophy 54.
6

7

Maurice De Wulf, trans. P. Coffey 145.

Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, Vol. 1, trans. Ernest
Messenger, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952) 111.
8

Jacqueline Beaumont, "The Latin Tradition of De Consolatione Philosophie,"
Boethius: His Life. Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1981) 279.
9
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Neoplatonism. 10 Noel Kaylor explains that despite the fact that there was no direct
reference to the Christian God, medieval translators and commentators on the text tried
very hard to reconcile the deity in the Consolation of Philosophy with the Christian
God. They very often "medievalized" a great deal of the work to make it more
congruous with Christian thinking. 11
What medieval scholars did not feel they needed to alter in the Consolation of

Philosophy was the commentary format itself. It was Boethius who gave the Middle
Ages the "technical models of the way in which a commentary should be made. 12
Commentators certainly made use of the format set forth by Boethius, following it
from its introduction in the late eighth century well into the Renaissance.
The Consolation of Philosophy was written in a genre of classical literature
which had already been firmly established by Boethius' time. This genre is called the

consolatio, 'consolatory discourse', and its form was handed down from Greek
models by Cicero. Thus Boethius was not original in his use of the genre itself, but
he was the first Christian writer to use it. 13 Boethius' themes in the work are greatly

Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolation of Music, Logic, Theology, and
Philosophy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 247.
10

Noel Howard Kaylor, The Medieval Consolation of Philosophy: An Annotated
Bibliography. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992) 12.
11
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Maurice De Wulf, trans. Ernest Messenger 111.

Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development
of Doctrine, Volume 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600),
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) 43.
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influenced by the Greek tradition. 14 Boethius' originality lies in his treatment of the
classical idea that "man is either the plaything of chance or the pawn of an inexorable
Fate."15
A medieval audience might have found a work so immersed in pagan themes
unsettling, had they not been accustomed to the method of using pagan ideas to aid
in Christian edification from the works of Augustine and other early Church Fathers.
Augustine encouraged the use of pagan philosophers' works, arguing that if their
comments aid our understanding of Christian revelation, there is certainly no harm in
using their knowledge. 16 Boethius does as Augustine recommended by employing
pagan philosophers' ideas to better explain faith. The difference in Boethius' use of
classical reasoning to support faith is that his "apologetic aim" is to mention nowhere
in the text anything particularly Christian or Biblical. 17 If Boethius' philosophy was
not original, then we can appreciate the originality in these techniques. Medieval

For more information on the lack of originality in the themes of "variation of
fortune, the nature of evil, and the compatibility of providence with free choice,
see Michael Haren 63.
14

Haren suggests "there is a psychological process from a point where the
possibility of providence requires detailed explanation to a position where it is
considered reconciled or at least reconcilable with the inequity of the world's order
as man experiences it." Haren 64.
15

Betsey Price, Medieval Thought: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell, 1992)71, quotes this passage. See Augustine in On Christian Doctrine
11.40, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr., (Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts
Press, 1958)75.
16

Jaroslav Pelikan 44.

17

thinkers searched his works for understanding of the philosophy of the ancients, and
it was his ability to express their ideas which made him a "channel" by which these
medieval thinkers acquired that understanding, as well as their Latin vocabulary of
logical terms. 18
Henry Chadwick suggests that there are quite a few similarities between the

Consolation of Philosophy and Augustine's earlier works, and such similarities reveal
that "in his Platonism Boethius is not necessarily turning away from Augustine. " 19 The
Platonism of Boethius is similar in that he believed, as did Augustine, that truths were
above the human mind, and these truths could be recognized but not changed by man. 20
Boethius' translations, commentaries and Consolation of Philosophy served
medieval thinkers well. His popularity was so great that his Consolation of Philosophy
was one of the top three "best sellers" of the Middle Ages.21 However, Anthony
Grafton suggests that it was because of such popularity in the Middle Ages that
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Frederick Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy 54.

He believes that Boethius may well have written the Consolation of Philosophy
with many of Augustine's works in mind, saying, "Even the mature works of
Augustine, the City of God, the Trinity, and that neglected masterpiece the Literal
Commentary on Genesis, offer many anticipations of Boethius's Platonism,
especially expounded in the last book of the Consolation." He suggests that the
similarities with the works of Augustine are: "the personification of philosophy
(Solil. i, I), ...the ejection of the Muses from a serious discussion (C. Acad. iii, 7;
De ordine i, 24)." Henry Chadwick 249-250.
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Frederick Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy 34-35.

John McManners ed. and intro., Introduction, The Oxford Illustrated History
of Christianity, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)2.
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Humanists had mixed feelings about Boethius. In fact, "no classic of Latin literature
made the humanists more uneasy."22
A few Italian humanists in the first half of the fifteenth century believed
Boethius to be a "brilliant inventor" and gave him the status of a classic author. This
belief was readily accepted by Northern scholars who went to Italy for learning near
the end of the fifteenth century.23
Northern scholars are of great interest to this discussion, because the two
commentators on the text of Consolation of Philosophy studied here were heavily
influenced by different traditions of Northern scholarship. 24 Moreover, it would be
a disservice to the commentators to ignore the fact that this commentary was used

Anthony Grafton, "Epilogue: Boethius in the Renaissance," Boethius: His Life,
Thought and Influence, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) 410.
22

Grafton believes that Northern scholars readily accepted this belief because
they were "less sensitive to style than the Italians and even more encyclopaedic in
their interests." Anthony Grafton 412.
23

Alastair Minnis, speaking of the Pseudo Thomas Aquinas commentary on
Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy says in a footnote (note 23),"Dr. H. F.
Sebastion suggests that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was a fifteenth century writer,
probably German." See Alastair Minnis, "Aspects of the Medieval French and
English Traditions of the De Consolatione Philosophie, " Boethius: His Life,
Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) 354.
Jose Bade was a product of the Northern Renaissance, being schooled in the
Brethren of the Common Life at Ghent (as were Agricola, Erasmus and Luther).
For the short biography on Bade see,
Wallace K. Ferguson, annot., The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 142-297,
1501-1514, Vol.2, trans. R. A. B. Myers and D. F. S. Thomson,(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1975) 97. For information on the Brethren see,
William R. Estep, Renaissance and Reformation, (Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986) 45.
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during the fifteenth century in university settings, and that the Consolation of

Philosophy was then lectured on in German universities. 25 However, the Consolation
of Philosophy was not used for introductory courses, but rather for students with
advanced skills in Latin. 26 It is important for the study of this commentary that one
remains fully aware of the commentators' purposes and their original audience.
Scholasticism, The German Tradition
and Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas
Falsely attributing a commentary on the Consolation of Philosophy to Saint
Thomas Aquinas immediately suggests the scholastic nature of the work. Humanists
questioned the via antiqua, the name they gave to the teachings of Augustine, Anselm
and Aquinas, but they were especially critical of Aquinas' system of combining
Aristotelian philosophy and Christian revelation, in as much as Scholasticism found
Palmer points out that there are course listings and lists of texts in 1412 at
Erfurt, and in the fifteenth century at Prague the Consolation of Philosophy appears
in a list of texts used in lectures. Each of the lectures were to cover a time period
of four months. At St. Dionysius College of Heidelberg (founded 1452) a master
who had "a short lecture course in a year should lecture on a less usual subject in
the following year, citing the Consolatio and Euclid among examples." Nigel
Palmer, "The Latin and Vernacular in the Northern European tradition of the De
Consolatione Philosophie," ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981)
380-381.
25

Heinrich Behel, who was a professor of oratory and rhetoric at the university
of Tubingen (he began there in 1496), suggests that because Boethius and Seneca
had a "crude and dry" style, they should be reserved for advanced students. James
H. Overfield, Humanism and Scholasticism in Late Medieval Philosophy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 145, 149. Also, Nigel Palmer
suggests that there is no evidence that the Consolation of Philosophy was part of the
main curriculum of courses, but was a "less usual subject." Nigel Palmer 380-381.
26
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its greatest expression in the works of Thomas Aquinas. 27
The name, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas implies the anonymity of the true author,
but there is some rather limited information about the actual person who wrote the
commentary on the Consolation of Philosophy attributed to him. The first printing
of his commentary was in Northern Europe by Anton-Koberger at Niirnberg in 1473. 28
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' method was to open each section of the commentary with a
literal paraphrase. It is this method which reveals the school or university context of
the commentary. 29 The Duplex Commentario edition of Jean de Vingle contains a
preface on the life history of Boethius which offers what is often questionable
information. Noel Kaylor suggests that prefaces such as this formed "a tradition of
their own. "30

For information on Thomas Aquinas as the "peak of this development" see,
William Estep 13. For information on via antiqua, see William Estep 104.
27

lt was the second part of the book, the first part being a bilingual edition of the
Consolation of Philosophy, see Nigel Palmer 363.
28

Palmer also states that this university text was expanded, in that printed
editions of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' commentary later contained elementary school
texts as an appendix to the Consolation of Philosophy. The first edition of these,
which included the elementary texts, was the 1482 Toulouse edition printed by
Johann Parix. It also contains the thirteenth century De Disciplina Scholarium,
which is attributed to Boethius. Palmer also mentions the 1498 Lyons edition
printed by Jean de Vingle, pointing out that it contained a new commentary by
Josse Bade, the De Officio Discipulorum of Quintilian and another section on table
manners. Nigel Palmer 363.
29

°Kaylor says in his introduction: "Earlier translators borrowed information from
earlier prefaces, they used information from the commentaries, and they extracted
material from the Consolatio itself. The resulting mixture of information and
misinformation entered the vitae. In that tradition Boethius was generally viewed
3
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Alastair Minnis says that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was known for "narrative
elaboration." Also, the incipit of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas and William Whetley (fl
1309-16) were the same, so that sometimes there was confusion concerning the
authorship of each. 31 Minnis cites Dr. H. F. Sebastian as saying that Pseudo Thomas
Aquinas was "a fifteenth century writer, probably German, and that he and Whetley
were independent borrowers from [Nicholas] Trevet. "32 Apart from the information
given by Minnis, Palmer, and Grafton, we have just one more mention of the Pseudo
Thomas Aquinas tradition, which is by Pierre Courcelle. Courcelle's information,
however, is scant, offering little information on the commentary other than placing it
in the German traditon, and none on the author himself. 33
Even though German humanism began in the early fifteenth century, it was not
formally acknowledged as a movement in German universities until the 1450's. 34
Assuming that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was German, and living in the fifteenth
century, it is clear from his commentary that he had not embraced German humanism.

as a Christian martyr; he was even acknowledged as a saint in some parts of Italy."
Noel Howard Kaylor, Jr. 14.
31

Alastair Minnis 354.

32

Alastair Minnis 354.

His treatment of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is mentioned by Palmer, who also
suggests that apart from this reference the German tradition in the Consolation of
Philosophy "has received no critical attention." See Nigel Palmer 380. See also
Pierre Courcelle, La Consalation de Philosophie dans la tradition litteraire
antecedents et posterite de Boece, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967).
33

James Overfield 61.
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The content of the commentary, as well as the comments of Jose Bade concerning
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' work are evidence of this.
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' procedure for explicating the text of the Consolation
of Philosophy follows the basic method used by scholastics for the most part, 35 but
differs from the scholastic method in certain ways. He begins the commentary on the
meter sections by discussing the type of meter used for that poem. He gives the name
of the person who is believed to have originated that meter style, and offers a few
words on the technical aspects of the meter. This is the only way in which the
commentary on meter sections differs from the commentary on prose sections.
The commentary on the prose sections of Book Five opens with a general
summation (two to four sentences) of the major points made, citing the places where
those points are to be found in the main text. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas then follows
with an in-depth discussion of each of the major points separately, by which he
intersperses the main text of Boethius with his literal paraphrases and then reiterates
that major point's meaning through summaries in his own words. Throughout the
sections of his commentary Pseudo Thomas Aquinas attempts to validate points made
by Boethius by citing corresponding passages from ancient authors.

Jacque Le Goff explains that this "basic scholarly method began with a
commentary on a text, the lectio, an in-depth study beginning with a grammatical
analysis which gave the letter (littera), advancing to a logical explanation which
provided meaning (sensus), and ending in an exegesis which revealed the text's
content of knowledge and thought (sententia). See Jacques Le Goff, Intellectuals in
the Middle Ages, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell,
1993) 89.
35
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Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is forever working to enhance the authority of
statements in the Consolation of Philosophy by citing ancient authors whose statements
support Boethius' ideas. In the sixth prose section of Book Five, where Boethius
discusses the effect of vices on man's ability to reason, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas
reiterates the author's thought, saying "vices are rejected because they resign man to
slavery, and he who commits a sin is a slave to that sin." Pseudo Thomas Aquinas
then cites Seneca as saying, "if you sin, the baseness of sin will cause you to feel
shame. "36
As mentioned earlier, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas and other commentators were
known for narrative elaboration. With this type of elaboration the commentator
enhances the work of the author by including educational stories, histories of
outstanding people or events, and by brief biographies of individuals, often pagan
leaders and writers. 37 In the fourth meter section of Book Five Pseudo Thomas
Aquinas explains the origin of the word 'stoic', saying, "Stoics are called stoa in
Greek, which is porticus, 'porch' in Latin. Wherefore in Athens on a very open porch
and in certain places, the Stoics were publicly accustomed to dispute. "38 In the second
meter section of Book Five Pseudo Thomas Aquinas mentions Homer's description
of Phoebus as "shining pure light," but also negates the power of this pagan god by

Translation 180.
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Alastair Minnis 315.
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Translation 145.

196
comparing him with the Christian God. He says:
Perhaps Homer made the book on the beauty of the sun, he who "did
not have the strength to burst forth," that is penetrate, "the innermost
parts, " that is the depths, "of the land and sea...." So, not at all, that
is there he does not, possess in himself the maker of the great earth,
God, who himself by his own intellect penetrates all things.39
In the sixth prose section of Book Five Pseudo Thomas Aquinas uses an appropriate
metaphor, a compass, to illustrate the idea of divine perception not alternating, but
remaining constant, anticipating and embracing man's choices at one stroke. He says:
if eternity is put as if the middle point of a circle, and all time as if the
circumference, then although the circumference continually moves and
part of the whole remains stationary...the center holds itself uniform.40
Nigel Palmer explains that the technique of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was to
begin each section with a "literal paraphrase.
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Pseudo Thomas Aquinas summarizes

the major points addressed in that section, and specifies where those major points are
to be found in Boethius' text. His literal paraphrase is often done in such a way that
it is only a word or phrase following a Latin term of Boethius', which a reader might
not readily understand. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the Stoics' concept of
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Translation 109.
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Translation 172.

Palmer also believes that the technique of beginning with a literal paraphrase
"betrays the school or university context in which the work was read." Nigel
Palmer 363. He also believes that "the reading of the Consolation in a school or
university context in fifteenth century Germany is attested by a number of Latin
commentaries, including Ps.-Aquinas, which contain a straightforward elementary
exposition of the text, and which seem to belong mostly to the tradition of Nicholas
Trevet." Palmer 380.
41
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theoretical knowledge illustrates this point. The words inside quotation marks are
from the text of the Consolation of Philosophy, those outside quotation marks are the
literal paraphrases of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas:
forms of sensible things are impressed upon the mind from "the
outermost bodies," that is from exterior things. They considered those
bodies in this way to imprint "images on the mind, as when a
character" was made with certain writings "with a swift stylus on a
smooth surface," that is on a flat page, "a page which had no previous
marks.."42
When the information which he has paraphrased is a particularly important
philosophical concept, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas often follows up the literal paraphrase
with an additional explanation of the idea. A fine example is in the fourth meter
section of Book Five, concerning the Stoic belief that knowledge comes from
experience with exterior things which impress themselves upon the mind. He clarifies
the Stoic concept by comparing it to the Platonic view that knowledge is within the
soul as universal things understood by it and are sought again by the human mind.
Following the comparison, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas refutes the Stoic concept by
asserting that the soul is not passive, because it "judges, restores, separates, refutes
and understands true things from false things," which are all active operations.43
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' literal paraphrase of the definition of eternity in the
sixth prose section of Book Five is exemplary of the laborious exactness which was
expected from the vocabulary in a scholastic commentator's explication of a text. He
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Translation 145.
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chooses his words very carefully, and is clearly preoccupied with expressing what he
views as the sensus, the precise meaning, of the definition. Yet he also alters its
meaning by giving it Christian overtones. By Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' changes to the
concept of eternity presented by Boethius, we see an example of the medieval principle

philosophia ancilla theologiae, that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology, and that
medieval scholars consciously labored to "bring the works and ideas of philosophy into
partnership with those of the Church. "44 He says:
Note when she [Philosophy] says eternity is possession, there she
employs the name of possession to designate immutability, and
unfailing supply of eternity, because it is firmly possessed and calmly
held. She says of life to the specification that non-living things not be
measured by eternity. She says this is endless, concerning difference
among these life forms, which has an end in part before and in part
after, such as a life of man or in part before, such as the life of angels.
She says simultaneous, according to its substance which is wholly the
same. Yet, not according to works, since they possess successful and
intellectual operations. She says it is perfect in order to designate that
nothing exists outside of eternity. Indeed, perfection is that in which
nothing is lacking, that is, from heaven and earth. 45
This synthesis of Christian and ancient philosophical thought was especially
prevalent in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas. 46 Saint Thomas was very aware that
there was a definite difference between philosophical reasoning and Christian

Price suggests that "philosophia ancilla theologiae ... became the motto of the
medievals.... " Betsey Price 70.
44

Translation 162-163.
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revelation, but he also believed that "truth itself is one and common to them both. "

47

Awareness that Aquinas was very conscious of the difference between these two
sources of knowledge prevents our assuming that Aquinas might have been tempted
to "Christianize" the works of Aristotle or other Ancients. He simply used what he
viewed as a very efficient philosophy to better explain aspects of Christian doctrine.
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is quite similar to Saint Thomas Aquinas in this
respect. When commenting on Boethius' use of Aristotle's interpretation of free will,
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas says:
Philosophy shows free will is diversified, certainly, by the difference
in angels and in men, this freedom of the will is clear enough. I
determine that it is not equal, that is comparable, in all things, where
more is in divine substances than in men.48
The key word here is "angels." Clearly, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is adding to the text.
Throughout the commentary he consistently alters the context of the philosophical
ideas of the ancients which are expressed by Boethius to edify his readers on the finer
points of Christian doctrine.
His word choice when expounding on the Stoics' view of theoretical knowledge
in the fourth meter section of Book Five is another area in which he shows his desire
to render Christian revelation more accessible through philosophical reasoning. Here
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas refers to that which the Stoics understand to be passive as

anima, soul. Yet in the Loeb edition of the Consolation of Philosophy Boethius' word
47

Michael Haren 181.
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Translation 103.
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choice for that which the Stoics understand to be passive is mens, mind.

49

If Pseudo

Thomas Aquinas were commenting on the Platonic idea that the rational part of man,
for which the Greek is often translated interchangeably as mind or soul, then the
significance of his word choice would be minimal. However, the significant factor is
that he is not translating from Greek, but is replacing Boethius' Latin word with one
he prefers. Moreover, their can be no confusion after his commentary on the Stoic
position on theoretical knowledge that it is polar to the Platonic one. His word choice
is most likely a conscious decision to intentionally remind the reader of the Christian
concept of the soul.
Boethius' last major point in the sixth prose section of Book Five about the
effect of faith and correct prayers is the point at which Pseudo Thomas Aquinas has
most obviously synthesized philosophy of the Ancients with Christian doctrine.
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas paraphrases Philosophy's thought on this subject as,
"Righteousness, faith and correct prayers are offerings to God. Therefore in these
things we are joined to God and in this we are comforted. "50 His choice of "offerings"
suggests sacrifices, as were performed by the Jews in the Old Testament. It was in
this act that Jews understood themselves to be communing with God. Here Pseudo
Thomas Aquinas is expressing the Christian intellectual notion that "both the law and
the prophets on the one hand and philosophy on the other looked forward to the
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. S. J. Tester The Loeb
Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
49
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Gospel."

51

If any of his readers missed the connection between ancient philosophy and the
Old Testament, he ends the exegesis of this point saying, "So truly it is written in
Hebrews 4: 13, "all things are naked and opened to the eyes of him who is God. "52
This verse of Scripture may not initially appear to be directly relevant to the notion of
the Law of the Hebrews, Old Testament prophets and ancient philosophers anticipating
Christianity, but it cannot be coincidence that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas cites a verse
from "The Letter to the Hebrews." Hebrews is the book of the New Testament which
Christians believe offers "proof of the pre-eminence of Christianity over Judaism. "53
Furthermore, it is the same verse of scripture which Saint Thomas Aquinas quotes in
reply to the idea that God understands all things because it is "in His own essence in
which all the species of things are comprehended. "54
The method of using The Law of the Hebrews and sayings of Old Testament
prophets to add validation to Christian revelation began early on in the Christian
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Translation 180.

lntroduction,"Hebrews," The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the
Apocrypha, eds. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977) 1455.
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The excerpt of Saint Thomas Aquinas' article is taken from: Thomas Aquinas,
"11.B. Omniscience. 11.B.I. On God's Knowledge," The Philosophy of Reli�ion:
Selected Readings, ed. Yeager Hudson (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing
Company) 1991. Hudson lists his source used in his compilation as: Summa
Theologica, question XIV, article 5, in Anton C. Pegis, An Introduction to St.
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House 1945) 134-136.
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tradition. At the same time, this method nullifies the idea of the supremacy of
Judaism in Christians' opinion. Likewise, working from the idea that the ancients
possessed partial truths allowed Christian intellectuals to exercise restraint over the
power of philosophy while utilizing those ideas for Christian exegesis. Ancient
philosophy and the Books of the Old Testament served medieval intellectuals well in
this manner. Certainly Christian doctrine was their foremost subject matter, but with
the scholastics in the later Middle Ages, it was philosophy which came to the forefront
as the mode of expression. 55
It is in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas that we see most vividly this
utilization of ancient philosophy to explicate Christian doctrine. Particularly it is his
use of Aristotle's works to interpret doctrine for which we best remember him. This
was his most readily identifiable trait in the Middle Ages and Renaissance as well. So
it is understandable that a commentary which incorporated this trait by which we
recognize Saint Thomas Aquinas should mistakenly come to be considered the saint's
work.
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was a medieval intellectual steeped in the writings of
Aristotle, and as we shall see in other ancient writers. He was familiar with the works
of Saint Thomas Aquinas as well, certainly with the Summa Theologica. Yet he never
mentions the saint's works in his commentary. This was a clever way to lend authority
to his commentary. Because the author chose to remain anonymous and alluded
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Price 70.
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authorship to Saint Thomas Aquinas, his action cannot be viewed as a personal desire
for fame.

Rather, he seems to have been motivated by a desire to ensure the

acceptance of the commentary. The term auctor, means 'author' in its most literal
sense, but it had a more particular meaning for medieval intellectuals. The word
embodied the idea of the works of a 'founder', an 'author of scientific or literary
productions'; it implied the works of an ancient writer or respected Christian writer.
This is what the anonymity of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' worked to obtain. By
the simple fact that he quoted auctores such as Aristotle, and to a lesser degree Plato
and others, and because he implicated philosophical ideas from Boethius' Consolation

of Philosophy in a certain way, his commentary was readily associated with Saint
Thomas Aquinas. The commentary was given immediate credibility and authority
because of the auctores it discussed, and the manner in which it explicated
philosophical ideas.
Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Aristotelian Philosophy
As mentioned earlier, Christian ideas were the foremost subject matter of
medieval intellectuals, but the way in which they most often chose to express those
ideas was through philosophical ideas and technical language in the later Middle
Ages. 56 Christian intellectuals realized very early on that some philosophers had come
close to the "religious truths recognized by the Jews and Christians," yet not all were
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comfortable with conceding such authority to philosophy.
One way to solve this problem was to suggest that certain philosophical ideas
had perhaps emerged under the influence of Judaism. For instance, some suggested
that Plato "borrowed from the Old Testament. "57 Others believed that the divine word
or Logos gave these philosophers "partial recognition of religious and moral truth."58
This idea suggested that there was some truth to be found in Greek Philosophy, but at
the same time it nullified the pursuit of religious truths through philosophy alone.59
Later in his life Augustine changed his opinion regarding the great importance
of philosophy as an aid to Christian revelation.60 However, many of his works as a
Christian writer incorporated the use of philosophy to aid his understanding of the
Christian religion.

Boethius was also viewed as a Christian intellectual who used

pagan writings in his quest to better understand truths. These authors had a tremendous
impact on medieval intellectuals. In their wake, Scholastics "exploited the literary
heritage of antiquity and made a place for the profane sciences in Christian knowledge

Frederick Copleston explains that "Plato's hypothesis, in the Timaeus, of
the divine craftsman was thought to incorporate ideas borrowed from Genesis."
Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy 19.
57

Copleston also states that Christian writers believed the Logos was synonymous
with the second person of the Trinity. Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy
19.
58
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°Karl Jaspers, "Plato and Aristotle," The Great Philosophers, ed. Hanna
Ardent, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1962) 70.
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in its broadest sense. " 61
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The ultimate goal of medieval intellectuals people was to understand the Bible's
meaning, and following the example of Augustine and others, they used classical texts
as a guide to understanding scripture, believing strongly that "classical knowledge and
ancient languages provided the tools to mine scripture for meaning. "62 In fact,
throughout the Middle Ages utilization of philosophy for understanding grew to be
emphasized more and more, with the result that authors of philosophical commentaries
were to a great extent understood to be under the guidance of philosophy. 63
The method of both Augustine and Aquinas was termed via antiqua. However,
the term became more closely associated with the scholastic method developed in the
universities during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and was exemplified by
Thomas Aqinas (1224-1274) whose theological system is considered the greatest
achievement of the scholastic method. 64 His synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and
Christian teaching was deisgned to enlist reason and logical arguement in support of
Church dogma,65 although the latter proved to be irreconsilable with Christian doctrine
on a number of issues.
Fernand Van Steenberhen, Aristotle in the West: The Ori�ins of Latin
Aristotelianism, trans. Leonard Johnston (Louvaine: E. Nauwelaerts, Publisher,
1955) 33.
61
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For example, Etiennne Gilson explains that Aristotle's god, described in his

Physics as the 'unmoved mover', 'separate', 'pure act', 'thought of thought', is 'the
highest degree of being'. However, Aristotle's "natural theology has as its proper
object a plurality of divine beings, " 66 which is incompatible with Christian natural
theology. Nevertheless, as an unmoved mover, Aristotle's God and the God of Saint
Thomas Aquinas are very similar. Aristotle's philosophy and Christian theology are
in agreement that all things are put into action by God as First Cause. Pseudo Thomas
Aquinas echoes this point of view in the first prose section of Book Five when he
states:
Moreover, in everything God is the reason of all things, it is clear since
heaven and the entire universe depends upon him, as it is clear in the
twelfth book of Metaphysics. 67
Medieval scholastic theologians were convinced that there was a certain "mode
of being" which existed in movement, that there was a "way of existing metaphysically
inherent in the essence of the thing which thus exists."68 We see this view expressed
by Pseudo Thomas Aquinas in the sixth prose section of Book Five:
[ with] infinite motion of temporal things... the state of eternity is
imitated since it is not able to be wholly expressed, because the state of
temporal time is a state outside eternity...69

Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A. H. Downes
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991) 45, 50.
66
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Translation 91-92.
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The sense here is that eternity exists as something apart from what is perceived as the
temporal universe. It is described here almost as if it were an entity, a being existing
by self sufficiency. Here temporal time is described as existing outside eternity,
imitating eternity in the act of looking to past and future.
Aristotle expresses his views on chance in Physics, but also in Metaphysics,
where Boethius takes the example of a man digging in a field for the purpose of
planting but finds buried treasure.70 Boethius tells us that Aristotle defines chance in
the second book of Physics, 71 and we see that it is Aristotle's definition which is used
here. Aristotle sees chance as coincidence that occurs for unintended reasons, it is a
"coincidence of a different process of causation. "72 Philosophy explains chance saying:
For an accidental event has its own causes from which a combination
of both imagined and unexpected things appears to have produced a
chance event for him who made something from the cause of another
matter.73
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas paraphrases Boethius' definition of chance, further
expounding Aristotle's definition, saying, "chance originates from merging
causes...and what causes merge... originates from an order of providence. 74
However, chance is different from luck, in that there is no room here for the
Henry Chadwick states this, giving the citations as Physics (B 4-5) and
Metaphysics (1205a, 14ff.) Chadwick 244.
70
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Translation 93.
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possibility of deliberate choice.75
On the subject of choice, Aristotle suggests that prohairesis, 'practical
reasoning' should end in a "rational choice and appropriate action. "76 When man fails
to do what he should, this is akrasia, 'weakness of the will', or 'weakness of
character' . 77 Electio, 'the act of choice' is a majorpoint of discussion in Aristotle's
Ethics, and it was a view that Christians found essential for their understanding of
choice.78 Only humans, unlike other animals, possess the ability of rational choice,
which men "both think and desire," the actions of which "are open to moral praise and
blame."79 Moreover, an important element to rational choice is that it is a voluntary
act. 80 If rational deliberation did not occur before the decision made by the will, the
act could not be understood as a choice. 81 Pseudo Thomas Aquinas expounds this idea
in the third prose section of Book Five where he says:
Note that all virtues and vices arise from free choice of good and evil.
75

Ackrill 39.
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Ackrill 145.
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1. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)

Gilson explains Aristotle's meaning as "it is by the choice we make between
good and evil that we are morally qualified. The choice belongs to the sphere of
voluntary, but it is only part of it, for all choice is voluntary, but all that is
voluntary is not a choice." Gilson 305.
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Similarly, punishment and reward exist because of the free action of
good and evil....a free act will not exist, unless free action concerning
good or evil exists. Therefore, if an act of our will is not free, the
nature of that act following the will is produced by God. Thus, God
will be causing our failure. But this is absurd.82
Here Pseudo Thomas Aquinas simplifies the question of choice, explaining that it is
a free act. He suggests that denying its existence as a free act makes God responsible
for our actions.
So, for Boethius and others who adhere to Aristotelian philosophy on the topic
of choice, arbitrium does not mean 'the spontaneous option of the will', but 'free
movement of reason'. Also, the will itself is free "only inasmuch as it is judged by
reason. "83 Therefore, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is following Aristotelian philosophy
along with Boethius when he says, "Note that free will is freedom of judging.... Or,
following Boethius ...free will is the judgement of the soul on desire...."84 Pseudo
Thomas Aquinas goes further and explains that man is responsible for his actions,
citing Aristotle in the third book of Ethics, "Man is lord of his works from the
beginning continuously to the end." Pseudo Thomas Aquinas then adds to this,
"following the merits of the works, of free will, he receives penalty or punishment."85
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas shows his understanding of Aristotelian doctrine by
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commenting on Boethius' expression of Aristotle's distinction between sensitive and
intellectual levels of knowledge.

His comments reflect knowledge of Aristotle

independent of Boethius's teachings on this subject, as Pseudo Thomas Aquinas notes
the passage in De Anima where discussions of sense and cognition are to be found.
He writes:
Note that the higher capacity brings in the lower capacity, just as the
quadrangle includes the triangle, as is clear in the second book of De
Anima.... Therefore what human intelligence is able to comprehend
divine intelligence is also able to comprehend, although not otherwise.86
Such methods of incorporating ancient philosophy in a system of Christian
theology seems, at times, to have a sterilizing effect on the religion itself. Often the
rationalizations which scholastics used to expound on Christian doctrine seem trite,
even frivolous. For instance, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, in his attempt to further
distinguish the difference between man and other animals says:
Note, following Aristotle in the sixteenth book of De Animalibus, "Man
among all living things has the linear shape of uprightness." Indeed,
Ovid speaks concerning that shape in the sixth book of Metamorphosis.
He says, "Although certain animals look to the earth, he judges the face
of humanity uplifted, allowing that it see the heavens." He commanded
this, and their uprightness exalts the heavens.87
It is examples such as this that later gave humanists ample opportunity to mock
the Scholastic methods of exegesis. Yet, there is much knowledge to gain from such
a system of theology. By examining the ways in which Pseudo Thomas Aquinas
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employs the works classical authors and philosophers, we are better able to
comprehend what he expected his audience to understand and consider what type of
information he valued and believed needed to be passed on to others through his
commentary.
Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Platonism
As discussed earlier, some Christian_ thinkers were not comfortable with the
idea that some philosophers had come close to "religious truths recognized by Jews and
Christians. " 88 In fact a few went so far as to suggest that Plato's doctrine of the divine
architect in the Timaeus "incorporated ideas from Genesis. "89 However, this problem
was more profitably solved by putting forth the idea that pagan writers had come close
to religious truths through the help of theLogos, who was identified with the second
person of the Trinity. 90 Most medieval theologians have little difficulty with this
platonic idea. The Platonic Deity who "being without jealousy desired that all things
should come as near as possible to being like himself" and the Christian God "who so
loved the world that He sent His only begotten son" are similar enough that Platonism
was used by Christian philosophers to aid revelation with reason. 91 In fact, Pseudo
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Thomas Aquinas echoes a very similar notion in the second meter section of Book
Five, saying, "Note although God by knowing all foresees all...he wishes them to be
creatures of free will, whereas this great thing he gives in his divine goodness. "92
Saint Thomas Aquinas was one of the many medieval theologians who also made use
of the works of Plato in his system of theology. · In fact, there is quite a bit of
Platonism in Saint Thomas Aquinas' works since so many of the Christian writers
before him had incorporated Plato's philosophy to expound on the doctrine of
Christianity. 93
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is steeped in the philosophy of Plato as well, as is
evident in his paraphrase of Boethius' incorporation of Plato's theory of the soul's
reminiscence. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas says:
here she [Philosophy] solves the objection, where it is noted that Plato
proposed the soul to be the things made in heaven and to possess whole
perfect cognizance, but by slipping into bodies, it forgot knowledge of
those things, and retained this in universals. 94
Plato's idea of the soul's reminiscence was not one which all medieval theologians
were comfortable with. Augustine rejected it, as it implied a previous existence of the
soul, and instead substituted his own theory of divine illumination.95 This idea
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suggests that human beings are able, through illumination, to understand eternal truths.
Because Boethius used the theory in the fourth meter section of his Consolation of
Philosophy, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was presented with an opportunity to comment

on it. His comment synthesizes Plato's theory of reminiscence with Augustine's
theory of divine illumination. He says:
Note that here Boethius uses Platonic thinking which considers forms
of things from the beginning naturally placed in the soul, but the
sophist soul is incorporeal, so that it does not learn from these unless
it is aroused by an immutable exterior sense. 96
He suggests that reminiscence, or remembering truths which the soul
understood as truths in its former incorporeal form, is revealed to it by an outside force,
one that does not change. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas paraphrases Plato's theory of
reminiscence in such a way as a similarity between it and Logos, revelation through the
second person of the trinity.
In the Timaeus God is seen in the representation of the demiurge, the architect
or maker of the cosmos.

7
9

Betsey Price explains that Platonism contained the idea that

"everything which comes into being owes its being to a cause." Plato's ideas on
causality suggested that the creator of the universe wanted all things to be good as he

Translation 147-148.
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97 Curtius explains that the Timaeus was the only work of Plato's known to
the Middle Ages. He also suggests that it had its strongest influence through
Cicero, African Platonism, Chalcidius and Boethius (from the Consolation in the
ninth meter section of Book Three).
Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle A2es, trans. Willard R.
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was. She says that with Plato's creator came the notion of a hierarchy of being.
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Pseudo Thomas Aquinas expresses aspects of this idea of a hierarchy of being in the
second prose section of Book Five where he says:
from Plato ...human souls likewise, are things made in heaven, and
afterwards descend into bodies and are held in these, as it were, in
chains. Though souls, when they are made in heaven, are most free in
contemplation of the divine mind. However, as now they are jointly
in bodies, in this they are less free, because less freedom is in these
since they are subjected to vices. 99
It is because of this descent into bodies that the souls perceive less than they did
in their incorporeal forms. This is the theory behind the hierarchy of levels of
knowledge. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas explains this hierarchy where he says, "since
reason is the nobler force, sense and imagination with it, reason comprehends its own
object, and the object of sense and imagination, and not the opposite. "100 It is this
theory which enables Boethius to explain man's inability to fully understand the
coexistence of divine providence and free will. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas clarifies this
theory in the fifth prose section of Book Five where he says, "divine comprehension
in perceiving exceeds human reason. It is able to understand clearly what human
reason understands as not firmly established. 11101
Although medieval intellectuals placed great importance on the philosophies of
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Plato and Aristotle, in particular, philosophy in general was seen as an aid in coming
to a clearer understanding of Christian doctrine. 102 An example of this view occurs in
the first prose section of Book Five, where Philosophy says, "true knowledge is for
no man who ever contested." Pseudo Thomas Aquinas clarifies the statement by
adding, "that is, opposed the ancients. " 103 Here his words embody what Betsey Price
suggests came to be the guiding principle of the Middle Ages philosophia ancilla

theologie, 'philosophy is the handmaiden of theology' . 104
The Renaissance and Josse Bade
In 1277 the Bishop of Paris condemned as heretical the Aristotelianism of the
Averroists at the University of Paris and along with it many of the teachings of Saint
Thomas Aquinas. 105 This condemnation seems to have done little more than increase
his notoriety and little to discourage the use of Aristotelian philosophy to support
Christian doctrine.

By the end of the fourteenth century Scholasticism and

Aristotelianism were almost synonymous. 106 The fourteenth century witnessed the
birth of the Renaissance and its call for a return to the sources of classical antiquity,

102

Price 70.

103

Translation 92.

104

Price 70.

05

Van Steenberghen also notes that the Latin Aristotelianism of Siger Braband
condemned
in the same year. Van Steenberghen 238.
was
1

106

Estep 26.

216
its language, literature, and learning.

10 7

Late medieval scholasticism along with

Aristotelian metaphysics became the target of mounting criticism on the part of the
Renaissance humanists who how favored Plato over Aristotle Aristotle's works which
had been available and read in Latin during the high Middle Ages, 108 now were being
studied in the original Greek, with primary attention· to the Ethics and Poetics, rather
than his Physics and Metphysics which had been too closely linked with
scholasticism.109
It is important to remember that the term 'humanism' was not a term by which
Renaissance intellectuals referred to themselves.110 The term 'humanist' was probably
created among university students to specify a teacher of the Studia humanitatis, who
normally taught what we now think of as the liberal arts, as in grammar, poetry, and
rhetoric.111 These teachers were expected to equip students with the skills to speak and
7
10

Kristeller defines the Renaissance as the period "from the middle of the
fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth." Paul Oskar Kristeller,
Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected Essays (Princeton: Princeton
University Press) 21-22.
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Price suggests that even the "most eager to understand his ideas" read them in
Latin. Price 81.
Estep mentions that Aristotle's works had been used to excess by the
Nominalists as well. Estep 26. Dr. Otto Grundler clarified the information
concerning texts of Aristotle to which Renaissance humanists gave primary
importance.
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includes history and moral philosophy in the Studia humanitatis. See Kristeller 24.
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write well in verse and prose mostly in Latin, but often in Greek as well. 112 The term
'humanists', therefore normally refers to the type of teachers described above, but also
to secretaries, writers, scholars.113 Humanists used the classics as a means to an end.
The primary goal was to gain eloquence, and the study of classical languages and study
of their philology were pursued merely as resourceful means to achieve personal
written and spoken eloquence. 114
Although they studied the same models of ancient literature to achieve that
eloquence, Paul Kristeller states that:
for every opinion that we find expressed by a humanists in one of his
writings, we can find different or even opposite opinions on the same
matter expressed by other humanists or even by the same humanist in
another part of his work. 115
Hence Kristeller suggests that with a work from the Renaissance, we should pay
particular attention to its citations of ancient works, and consider the humanist desire
to avoid technical language.116

112

Kristeller 25. This and the note which directly follows it comprise the
definition of humanism which was developed by Kristeller, and which according to
McGrath, "has gained wide acceptance within North American and European
scholarship, and has yet to be discredited." McGrath 44-45.
113

Kristeller 23.

4
11

McGrath observes that "the writings the humanists devoted to the promotion
of eloquence, written or spoken, far exceed those devoted to classical scholarship
or philology." McGrath 43.
115
116

Kristeller 15.

He also suggests that avoiding technical language was "reflected in the
author's imitation of Cicero." Kristeller 15.

218
The return to classical languages encouraged a return not only to ancient Greek
authors, but to ancient Latin authors as well. A new found interest in Virgil, Cicero
and others aided the recovery of "the true Aristotle and Plato."117 Although for some
the return to these authors resulted only in their imitating the style of these ancients,
in general it renewed the force of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy. 118
The Renaissance saw the creation of a new kind of Christian philosopher, of
which Erasmus was one of the most famous. 119 He was critical of the scholastic
method, as were many in his circle, and he voices this criticism in his Praise of
Folly.120
Josse Bade was an associate of Erasmus, though this association came after his
work on the Boethian commentary of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas,121 and his life shows
some interesting parallels with that of Erasmus. Bade, like Erasmus was educated in

117

Estep 27.

118

Estep 27.

119

Estep states, "The term 'philosophy of Christ' first occurs in the writings
of Rudolf Agricola, but it was Erasmus who gave it new meaning. This term was
symbolic of Christian humanism's approach to reform. Estep 84.
1 0
2

Erasmus implies through the persona Folly that "the scholastics, enmeshed
in their own abstract categories, were more interested in speculative subtleties than
in questions relevant to religious and moral experience." Erasmus of Rotterdam,
Praise of Folly: And Letter to Maarten Van Dorp: 1515, trans. Betty Radice (New
York: Penguin Books, 1993) 87.
1 1
2

Ferguson explains that "a letter was inserted after Epistle 182 [written in
1505] in Erasmus' edition of Valla's Annotationiones which Bade printed," which
states that Bade "remained for years in close relations with Erasmus." Ferguson
97.
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the school of the Brethren of the Common Life. In fact, "some of the most important
leaders of the Northern Renaissance came under the influence of the Brethren. " 122 For
instance, Cusanus, Hegius, Agricola, Wessel, Reuchlin, Celtis, Mutian, Erasmus and
Luther were all educated by the Brethren. 123 The Brethren of the Common Life was
a "semimonastic order", established in 1374, and they considered Gerhard Groote their
founder.124 They are believed by Estep to have "became the transmission lines of both

Estep 45. However, R. R. Post strongly disputes this view, specifying
that the Brethren "were essentally pastors and not teachers in the late medieval and
first Humanist schools. Their main taskk was the pastoral care
of the schoolboys and nuns. Only in exceptional cases and in a few cities did they
introduce their charges to the humanistic culture, and here too they only developed
after the new concepts had already gained a hold in the schools. Post 660.
122

this "roll call" Mutian is also known by the name Mutianus Rufus, who
will be mentioned later in the discussion. Estep 45. Again, the extent to which the
Brethren were responsible for the education of these men is questioned by Post. He
points out that Erasmus did at one time hold Hegius "in particular esteem", but that
the humanist later changed his opinion, as evidenced in his Spongia, where he
wrote that he "owed little of his education to Alexander [Hegius] and Rudolf
Agricola." (see Erasmus, L.B. X 1666, A). Post 659. Erasmus, when reflecting on
the Latin education given to him by the Brethren who were masters in charge of
the hostel in 's-Hertogenbosch, suggested that "one of his superiors he considered
the ultimate in stupidity, while the other in is opinion was merely a recruiting agent
for the monastery." Post 660. In addition, the New Catholic Encyclopedia suggests
that "recent research has shown that the Brethren of the Common Life concentrated
on pastoral work and taught only rarely; usually the students from large city
schools lived in residences managed by the Brethren or with lay families formed by
the Devotio Moderna. New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol II, ed. The Catholic
University of America, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967) 788.
123In

Estep refers to them as a "semimonastic order". Estep 45, yet this is
contradicte,d in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, which defines the Brethren of the
Common Life as "a religious society... [which]differed from
religious orders in that its members did not take vows. New Catholic Encyclopedia
788.
124
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humanist learning and deep religious devotion."

125

An important factor of humanist learning is the particular interest with "how
ideas were obtained and expressed, rather than with the actual substance of those
ideas." 126
Scholastics.

This explains why humanists were opposed to the methods of the
Humanists felt that the scholastic method did more to show the

schoolmen's ignorance than display any proof of knowledge, and that their thoughts
on texts were "tortured obscurities." 127 As Erasmus writes:
Nature has a fine laugh at them and their conjectures, for their total
lack of certainty is obvious enough from the endless contention amongst
themselves on every single subject. They know nothing at all, yet they
claim to know everything....most of them are half-blind or because
their minds are far away, they still boast that they can see ideas,
universals, separate forms, prime matters.... 128
Of the Humanists who accepted Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy as a
classic, the majority were Northern Humanists. 129 They thought that Boethius' works
had been abused by medieval commentators.130 In fact, Mutianus Rufus mocked the
commentary of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, saying his comments were "not only false
125

Estep 45.

126

McGrath is paraphrasing Kristeller here. McGrath 45.

Erasmus writes "These subtle refinements of subtleties are made still more
subtle by all the different lines of scholastic argument, so that you'd extricate
yourself faster from a labrynth than from the torturous obscurities of the realists,
nominalists Thomists, Albertists...." Erasmus 88.
127

128

Erasmus 85.

129

Grafton 410.

0

13

Grafton 412.

and foolish, but not worth reading. "
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131

Josse Bade found similar fault with the commentary of Pseudo Thomas
Aquinas. In line with humanist practice, Bade's comments on the work put a great
emphasis on proper usage of grammar, and correct (classical) spelling and meaning
of words. There are eleven sections of commentary on Book Five, and in three of
these Bade does not comment on any part of the philosophy. He instead concentrates
his efforts on criticizing Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' grammar, improper use of terms
and incorrect spelling of words. 132 Further, he states at the end of the sixth prose
section of Book Five:
These things have been best explained for Stephanus about the
Consolation of Boethius, into which I bore the function of grammarian
rather than [discuss] what has come from an old philosophical
commentary. 133
Bade's singular noteworthy comment on the philosophy of the Consolation of
Philosophy is in the fourth meter section of Book Five, where he discusses tabula
raza, saying, "However, they [Stoics] wished the soul to be just as a tabula raza, on
which nothing was written. " 134 His purpose is not to clarify Aristotle's meaning 135 of
131 Grafton cites Mutianus Rufus' comments on Pseudo Thomas Aquinas in
footnote 23. Grafton 412. See Mutianus Rufus, Briefwechsel, ed. C. Krause
(Kassell, 1885)58.

See Ascensius' comments on the third prose section (39-42); third meter section
(46); fourth prose section (69).
132

1

33

13

Translation 183.

4Translation 149.

135

Simon Blackburn explains that although Aristotle's tabula rasa is a term
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the term, from which Boethius is drawing, rather it is to point out the fact that
Boethius's original phrasing was aequore pagine,/Quae nullas habeat notas, meaning
"a smooth page on which nothing has been written. " 136 He then writes:
However, it is said they were called pages, which proved their place in
books. So writing, which is [what it is called] in those verses, was in
districts, that is, villages situated close to springs, since they were
written, that is impressed. Therefore, it is a page, or each a part of
papyrus, on which these poems were composed. 137
It is somewhat tempting to see Bade's commentary as an example of superficial
humanism due to the excessive concentration on grammar, syntax, and proper word
use. However, Kristeller's view that humanists were "concerned with how ideas were
obtained and expressed, rather than with the actual substance of those ideas"138 is very
pertinent here. Before Bade wrote his running gloss on the commentary of Pseudo
Thomas Aquinas he had studied at Ghent with the Brethren of the Common Life, and
then in Italy. When Bade wrote his running gloss, he was living in Lyons, teaching
Greek, and working for the printer Johann Trechsel. Following this he moved to Paris
where he set up his own printing press and became "professor of letters" in the

used repeatedly in Scholastic theology "to indicate the state of mind on which no
sensation has been impressed, its most noteworthy use is by Saint Thomas Aquinas
(Summa. Ia 79.2) Simon Blackburn, The Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994) 372.
13

6

13

T ester 412.

7

8
13

Translation 149-150.
Kristeller's view is paraphrased by McGrath. McGrath 45.
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university. 139 He was immersed in humanist culture as well as print culture. This
must have shaped his thinking to a great degree.
Yet, despite the fact that his views differed from those of Pseudo Thomas
Aquinas, for the most part, both men shared one important concern, namely, the
teaching of the Consolation of Philosophy in university settings. Pseudo Thomas
Aquinas and Josse Bade clearly represent different philosophies of education, but both
believed that their respective educations contained some noble aspects worthy of being
passed on to other generations.

See Ferguson's note on Bade. Ferguson 97. Also, see John Delaney's dictionary
entry on Bade. Delaney 90-91.
139
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